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Synopsis

This dissertation examines order placement strategies across different trading
platforms. The research provides empirical evidence on an important issue, given the
growing diversity of market structures and the development of order placement
strategies to adapt to these trading environments. Each chapter addresses a unique
research question with scarce or conflicting prior research findings. The empirical
evidence presented in this dissertation can be used by researchers, investors, and
regulators to understand and manage developments in order placement strategies
across financial markets.
This first issue examined in this dissertation investigates the impact of an
increase in the minimum tick size on market quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond
futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl
futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex. On May 11, 2009, the SFE increased the minimum
tick size from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 3Y T-bond contract. The increase in tick size
from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 5Y Bob1 contract occurred on June 15, 2009. To
examine the impact of the increase in minimum tick on market quality, two
subsamples three months before and after the change are examined. For the 3Y Tbond, the pre-period is 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 and the post-period is May
13, 2009 to August 13, 2009. For the 5Y Bob1, the pre-event sample period extends
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 and the post-event sample period extends
from June 17, 2009 to September 17, 2009. Changes in liquidity before and after the
increase in minimum tick may reflect changes in market conditions as opposed to the
change in tick size. To control for this possibility, the 10Y T-bond and 10Y Bund
7

contracts are used as control contracts. Results provide mixed evidence of the effect
of the tick size change on market quality. The tick size increase is associated with an
increase in depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order-book for both 3Y
T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts, which is consistent with prior studies. Bid-ask spreads
(bid-ask spreads per minimum tick) for both 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts increase
(decrease) after the change. However, the results for the control contracts imply that
changes in the both 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts may not be due to the increase
in tick size. Execution costs for both event contracts increase after the change, though
the results for the control contracts suggest that this cannot be attributed to the tick
size increase.
The second issue investigates the relation between algorithmic trading volume
and future market quality. An internal database is directly sourced from the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX). The dataset consists of trade by trade data for the top 100
capitalised stocks listed on the ASX from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The unique
feature of this dataset is that it consists of a field that identifies the source of each
trade. Using this identifier, this study determines which trades are associated with
human traders or computer based systems. To analyze the relation between
algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality, the trading day is partitioned into
multiple time intervals. The variables examined include the bid-ask spread, market
depth, and short-term volatility. These variables are regressed on lagged algorithmic
traded volume and a number of control factors. Over the whole sample period, results
provide no evidence that algorithmic trading volume has an impact on market quality.
However, when the sample is split into increasing and decreasing stock returns, results
show that AT is negatively associated with future market quality when prices are
8

falling and has no relation when prices are rising. Finally, algorithmic trading’s negative
association with future market quality can be explained by algorithmic traders
engaging in positive feedback trading, where they systematically decrease their
purchases of stocks during periods of falling prices, while increasing their level of
selling.
The third issue examined measures the magnitude of execution costs of
outright options and options which constitute strategies (“strategy-linked options”)
and examines if any differences in trade prices between these two groups is
attributable to differences in market making costs on the Australian Options Markets
(AOM). The data are obtained from an internal database from the AOM. The sample
consists of trade by trade data for all equity options listed on the AOM. The sample
period extends from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2007. The difference in the
percentage effective spread between option strategy trades and outright options is
regressed on a range of option characteristics and hedging and adverse selection
costs. Results reveal that execution costs for standard and tailor-made strategy-linked
options are greater than outright options. Multivariate analysis shows that after
controlling for a number of liquidity determinants, only tailor-made strategy-linked
trades incur higher execution costs than outright options trades. Results also indicate
that the difference in execution costs between tailor-made strategy-linked options
and outright options is driven by the initial costs in delta hedging of option positions
and not a result of higher adverse selection costs.
The fourth issue examines intraday variations in quoted depth on the Nasdaq,
a competitive dealer market. The sample contains stocks listed on the Nasdaq-100
index and covers the period November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. The trading day is
9

partitioned into 30-minute intervals, these one-minute intervals are averaged into 14
separate 30-minute trading intervals, from 09:30 hours to 16:00 hours (i.e. from the
open to the close of trading). The variables examined include the bid-ask spread,
quoted depth, volume and volatility. Consistent with prior literature, results reveal a
negative relationship between the intraday patterns in quoted depth and bid-ask
spreads. At the open of trading, quoted depth is relatively low and bid-ask spreads are
relatively wide. Near the close of trading, quoted depth increases and bid-asks spread
narrow. The pattern in spreads and depth at the close of trading on the Nasdaq is the
opposite of that reported on specialist and order-driven markets. Results also show
that after controlling for volume and volatility, the patterns in quoted depth and bidask spreads are qualitatively similar. The difference in the intraday pattern in quoted
depth and bid-ask spreads on the Nasdaq relative to specialist and order-driven
markets is attributed to Nasdaq dealers using both the price and the quantity of
quotes to manage inventory levels at the close of trading and that this is associated
with an increase in liquidity.

10

Chapter 1: Introduction

The provision and availability of liquidity is a crucial determinant of the success of
financial markets and a key issue in the market microstructure literature. Liquidity is
of important concern, given the impact it has on a diverse range of stakeholders. From
the perspective of market participants, a liquid market lowers transaction costs and
increases price efficiency. For exchanges, liquidity affects the ability of exchanges to
attract order flow from traders and to compete for order flow with other trading
venues. For firms, liquidity affects both a firm’s cost of capital and optimal capital
structure. A higher level of liquidity attracts more investors to a stock and that order
arrival reduces the trading costs of investors because they are more likely to find
counterparties willing to trade.
Liquidity and trading costs on a financial market depend not only on the
characteristics of the traded security, but also on the structure of the market and the
order placement strategies of market participants. Market design affects the
profitability of various trading strategies and hence affects price formation and
implicit execution costs. Order placement relates to the effective timing of trades
using appropriate order attributes. The way market design impacts order placement
strategies and consequently liquidity is therefore a fundamental issue. Market
structure defines the rules of trading that affect how market participants formulate
their trading strategies (O’Hara, 1995). This dissertation focuses on two market types,
namely order submission strategies in (1) limit order markets where market makers
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are not present and (2) markets that employ designated market makers. Limit order
markets do not depend on a designated market maker to provide liquidity, with the
limit order book matching submitted orders at a particular price and quantity by
investors. For instance, an investor submits a limit order to buy or sell a security at a
particular price, whereas another investor creates a market order that matches
against an existing limit order in the book. Conversely, designated market makers have
an affirmative obligation to maintain a regular presence across the trading day
supplying liquidity and is separately compensated to do so. Market makers derive
profits through trading that provides “immediacy” to investors. For example, an
investor who is keen to sell utilises a market maker’s standing ability to buy the asset
for itself, immediately.
Understanding the determinants of liquidity in limit order markets is important
as liquidity may not be endogenously created at all times. That is, limit order markets
face the problem of asynchronous order flow. For example, uncertain market
conditions may reduce the likelihood of investors submitting limit orders due to the
risk that the limit order will be mispriced. The probability of there being sufficient
liquidity during the trading day depends on the order submission strategies of
investors, such as whether an investor submits a market or limit order and cancels or
amends an existing order. The literature on order placement strategies identifies a
number of important factors affecting an investor’s order submission decision. These
include the state of the order book at the time of order submission, level of liquidity
supplier competition, expected time to and probability of execution, adverse selection
costs and stock return volatility (Parlour, 1998, Foucault, 1999, Foucault, Kadan, and
Kandel, 2005, Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan, 2005, 2009, Roşu, 2009). These factors
12

influence a trader’s ability to execute a desired quantity at favourable prices. An
exchange’s trading platform affects these determinants and hence a trader’s order
submission strategy. Consequently, an understanding of market design and their
impact on order submission strategies provides insight into the factors influencing the
provision of liquidity in limit order markets.
This dissertation examines two elements of market design for limit order
markets and their associated impact on market quality; the minimum price increment
and algorithmic trading. One common feature in limit order markets is the presence
of a minimum price increment, which is the minimum price difference in the bid-ask
spread. As exchanges specify the minimum tick size, they can directly impact on
available liquidity and the transaction costs imposed on investors. The overall impact
of a tick size change is an empirical question. A larger tick size can encourage traders
to post more limit orders, as the value for supplying liquidity is greater and the risk of
front-running, that is those who move inside the bid-ask spread by submitting a limit
order at a better price, is lower. Conversely, a larger tick size can come at a cost to
liquidity demanders as the bid-ask spread is wider. Consequently, exchanges face a
difficult task in balancing the competing interests of liquidity suppliers and investors
(Harris, 1996). In addition to this difficulty, there is little experience to draw on in
determining an optimal minimum tick size as exchanges rarely adjust their minimum
price increment (Bollen et al., 2003). Research on the impact of changes in the
minimum tick size provides important insight into its impact on market quality.
In contrast to previous research examining the impact of a reduction on the
minimum price increment, the first chapter contributes to the literature by being the
first to investigate the impact of an increase in minimum tick size on market quality
13

for limit order markets. In response to the Global Financial Crisis that resulted in lower
trading volumes on both exchanges, the Sydney Futures Exchange and the Eurex
increased the minimum price increment for their medium term bonds in 2009. The
increase in the tick size was designed to encourage greater liquidity in the futures
markets. The literature suggests that a reduction in the minimum tick benefits small
trades and liquid securities, as a lower bid-ask spread is likely to be more beneficial
than reduced quoted depth (Bollen and Whaley, 1998). Futures markets offer another
avenue to test this idea, as futures markets differ from equity markets in several
important ways. Futures markets are more liquid than equity markets and are also
dominated by institutional investors (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996; Frino and
Oetomo, 2005). Analysing the increase in the tick size provides a unique opportunity
to test whether an increase in the tick size can improve market quality for markets
with high liquidity.
Another important aspect of limit order markets is the use of high frequency
trading (HFT) practices, where traders use algorithms to make trades at high speeds.
The impact that HFTs can have on liquidity provision is potentially significant, with the
Tabb Forum estimating that over 60 per cent of trading activity in the US was
conducted by HFTs in 2012. Algorithmic traders may generate earnings from trading
strategies through doing a large number of small-size, small-profit trades. Due to the
use of computer algorithms, HFTs can detect and act upon trading opportunities at
higher speeds than their human counterparts. As HFTs are not regulated, they are able
to pursue all profit maximizing short-term investment opportunities.
A number of studies suggest that HFTs act as pseudo market makers through
earning profits supplying liquidity (Menkveld, 2012). One concern is that because they
14

are not designated market makers, HFTs may destabilise markets during periods of
heightened uncertainty as they rapidly withdraw and/or consume liquidity. For
example, Golub and Keane (2011) suggest that HFTs that engage in market making
activities quickly remove their inventory holdings when there is a significant stock
price movement against their stock position. The flash crash of May 6, 2010, in which
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by 600 points within minutes, is often cited
as evidence that algorithmic trading can be harmful for financial markets. The cause
of the crash, according to the joint SEC/CFTC report, was a sell order initiated by a
large fundamental trader at 2.32pm on the E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts. This sell
order was executed rapidly over the next twenty minutes. The report noted that
computerized trading was a contributing factor of the Flash Crash, with HFTs being net
sellers as prices declined, accentuating the fall in prices. No research examines how
the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality during market declines, of which
the flash crash was an extreme event, differs from that during market upturns.
Addressing this gap in the literature allows for a better understanding of risks to the
provision of liquidity in limit order markets.
The second chapter addresses this gap in the literature by examining whether
the relation between algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality differs across
up and down markets on the Australian Stock Exchange. Analysing algorithmic trading
on the ASX provides an opportunity to test this relationship as unlike the data used in
other studies, this dataset identifies each specific type of participant involved in a
trade. That is, each trade consists of an identifier which allows categorisation as either
a computer automated or human-based trade. It further categorises each computer
automated trade as either a general algorithmic trader or Broker Engines.
15

This thesis also examines the order submission strategies of designated market
makers. As market makers have an obligation to supply liquidity, market makers adjust
the bid-ask spread to offset three kinds of market making costs that have been
identified in the literature of market microstructure; order-processing costs,
inventory-holding costs and adverse selection costs (Stoll, 1978). In addition to
adjusting the bid-ask spread, market makers also adjust their liquidity by changing the
quantity dimension, the level of quoted depth (Harris, 1990). This thesis looks at the
determinants for market makers adjusting bid-ask spreads and quoted depth,
providing a better understanding of the factors affecting liquidity provision by market
makers and its associated impact on market quality.
If an investor has private information about the fundamental value of a
security (i.e. they are an informed trader), these investors will only trade when they
know they will earn a return. This can include information about the timing of a news
announcement and its potential impact on stock prices and returns. When trading
against and informed trader, the market maker will earn a return below the market
return. Therefore, market makers will moderate the size of the bid-ask spread based
on the number of informed traders in the market. There is conflicting evidence on the
extent to which market makers adjust bid-ask spread as a result of adverse selection
costs (Vijh, 1990; Neal, 1992; Ahn et al.; 2008, Bartram et al., 2008). The options
market provides an avenue to examine whether adverse selection costs are an
important component when market makers determine bid-ask spreads. This is
because the bid-ask spread is unlikely to vary as a result of inventory holding costs as
these can be hedge in the underlying market. The literature suggests that informed
traders may be more likely to act on their private information in the options market
16

as the leverage implicit in an options contract can generate significant returns (Biais
and Hillion, 1994; Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998). Relative to outright options,
options strategy trades are likely to contain information about future realized volatility
(Fahlenbrach and Sandas, 2010). Analysing the determinants of execution costs for
option strategy trades can shed insight how market makers adjust bid-ask spreads and
whether this is driven by informed trading. Therefore, the third chapter contributes to
the literature by examining the relationship between the execution costs of option
strategies and the determinants of market making costs on the Australian Options
Market, which is a quasi-limit order book market where liquidity is supplied by public
limit orders and designated market makers.
In contrast to adverse selection costs, there is evidence that market makers
adjust bid-ask spreads in relation to inventory costs. Inventory-based models of the
bid-ask spread concentrate on the risk faced by market makers stemming from holding
an undiversified portfolio (Tinic, 1972). Spreads exist to compensate market makers
for the risk of holding unwanted inventory. This cost is equivalent to the expected
difference in revenue from holding a well-diversified portfolio (Stoll, 1978). The cost
of holding unwanted inventory has implications for how spreads change in response
to changes in inventory holdings. Inventory-based models suggest that risk-averse
market makers want to end the trading day with the desired level of inventory and
thus may actively seek order flow before the close in an attempt to resolve any
inventory imbalances accumulated during the day (Amihud and Mendelson, 1982).
Analysis of intraday patterns in competitive dealer markets (markets where liquidity
is predominantly supplied by market makers) show that market makers compete for
order flow with other market makers by narrowing the bid-ask spread. A market
17

maker resolve inventory balances by both narrowing the bid-ask spread and increasing
quoted depth (Harris, 1990). The combination of the spread and depth is needed to
infer overall changes in liquidity (Lee et al., 1993). Consequently, an examination of
both spreads and depth at the close of trading is needed to conclude that market
makers adjust for inventory imbalances and that this results in an overall improvement
in liquidity. This study examines the close of trading on the Nasdaq, a competitive
dealer market, to examine whether quoted depth increases, in line with inventorybased models of market makers. A dealer market like the Nasdaq is used as liquidity
is predominantly supplied by market makers. Other markets such as the Australian
Options Market is a hybrid market where liquidity is also supplied through limit orders.
An examination of intraday patterns in those markets would mask the effect of market
maker behaviour on liquidity.

18

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Market microstructure is how market structure influences the economics of liquidity
provision. Liquidity is important as it reduces transaction costs to investors as they are
more likely to find a counter-party to trade (Menkveld and Wang, 2009). The two types
of literature examining liquidity provision in markets are those examining order
submission strategies in electronic limit order markets and those examining liquidity
provision through designated market makers. In a limit order market, liquidity is
submitted by buyers and sellers without any obligation to trade. Liquidity in these
markets arise endogenously and as long as there is a sufficient number of buyers and
sellers, there is no need for a market maker. A number of studies examine how orders
are submitted in this type of market.
Conversely, other studies examine markets with designated market makers.
Market makers exist under the assumption that liquidity provision is unlikely to arise
at all times. Liquidity may in fact disappear under certain market conditions, such as
high levels of volatility or asymmetric information. Consequently, market makers have
an obligation to provide liquidity in these circumstances. This literature review looks
at order submission strategies for these two market structures and their impact on
market quality. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 examines the
literature concerned with order submission strategies on limit order markets,
particularly relating to the minimum price increment and algorithmic trading. Section
2.2 concentrates on the literature addressing the order submission strategies of
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market makers, particularly in relation to the options market and intraday patterns in
liquidity. Section 2.3 summarises and concludes the chapter.

2.1 Order placement Strategies in Limit Order Markets

When a trader decides to submit an order on an order-driven market, a trader faces a
trade-off between submitting a limit order or a market order. An order that is
submitted as a limit bid order is a quote to buy at that given price. Conversely, a limit
ask order is quote to sell at that given price. The trader pays (receives) less (more) than
the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask prices using a limit bid (ask) order. Though
the limit order can allow the trader to obtain a better price for the order, the cost
involved with submitting a limit order is execution risk, as the time to execution is
uncertain and the limit order may not execute at all. A market order has the advantage
of providing the trader with immediacy as it does not face the risk of non-execution if
the size of the order is less than or equal to the prevailing depth of the limit-order
book. However, to obtain this immediacy the trader pays (receives) more (less) than
the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask prices. As a result of these trade-off,
investors formulate optimal order submission strategies in order-driven markets to
minimise costs of execution.
Determining optimal order submission strategies in the use of limit and market
orders is difficult to develop as a limit order executes against a future market order,
competes with existing limit orders and limit orders that may be submitted in the
future. Thus, in seeking to determine the price and quantities to submit for one or
20

more limit orders and the quantities for market orders, traders must condition on all
factors that may affect the future trading process (Parlour and Seppi, 2007). Cohen et
al. (1981) provide the first theoretical model examining the choice between limit and
market orders. They suggest that a limit order has a ‘graviational pull’ property, where
after a limit order is submitted, a market participant has a higher incentive to post a
market order than to place another limit order near the price of the existing limit order
due to the risk of non-execution.
Handa and Schwartz (1996) provide empirical evidence for the assertion of
Cohen et al. (1981). They find that limit orders are associated with higher returns as
the limit orders occur due in part to liquidity driven price changes which quickly revert
back to the mean. However, the authors assert that the reason market orders are still
used is due to the risk of non-execution. They find that limit orders subject to nonexecution have negative market-adjusted returns. Further evidence is provided by
Hollifield et al. (2002) who report, using a sample of stocks on the Vancouver Stock
Exchange that traders with higher valuations of a stock are more likely to submit
market orders.
In response to the static model of Cohen et al. (1981), Parlour (1998) and
Foucault (1999) develop dynamic equilibrium of models of the choice between limit
and market orders. The model of Parlour (1998) assumes traders arrive randomly in
the market with different valuations for an asset. The execution probability of a limit
order depends on the state of the limit order book at the time of order submission
and how many market orders will arrive in the future. After a buy (sell) market order,
a limit order at the ask (bid) has a higher probability of execution. As the return from
submitting a limit order increases with the probability of execution, a trader who
21

wants to sell (buy) is more likely to submit a sell (buy) limit order than a corresponding
market order. Consequently, there is a ‘crowding out’ of market buy (sell) orders after
observing market sell (buy) orders. Buy (sell) market orders are less frequent after sell
(buy) market orders than after buy (sell) market orders. Consistent with Parlour
(1998), Handa et al. (2003) also show that the greater the excess market depth of the
buy (sell) side relative to the market depth of the sell (buy) side, the higher the
execution risk to buyers (sellers). Therefore, the larger the imbalance between the buy
(sell) side relative to the sell (buy) side, the more likely buyers (sellers) are to use
market orders rather than limit orders.
Foucault (1999) suggests that the decision to submit a limit order is driven
through price volatility. The author develops a model of price formation and order
placement within a limit order market. Within this model, traders can post either limit
or market orders. Limit orders enable the trader to obtain a potentially better price,
but face the risk that the trade fails to execute. Foucault (1999) finds that the mix
between market and limit orders are determined by the degree of price volatility. In
periods of high market volatility, the probability of trading against an informed trader
increases. This causes limit buy (sell) order traders to post lower (higher) bid (ask)
prices and/or reduce their order sizes to compensate for the risk of being picked off
by informed traders. This leads to a direct relationship between price volatility and the
bid-ask spread and an inverse relationship between price volatility and quoted depth.
The model of Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009) also suggests that speculators are less
likely to supply liquidity when volatility is high.
Extending the models of Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999), other models
examine the impact of waiting costs and adverse selection costs. Foucault et al. (2005)
22

and Roşu (2009) suggest that traders incorporate the expected time to execution for
limit orders when formulating whether to use a limit or market order, with traders
categorised as patient and impatient traders. Impatient traders have a larger waiting
cost per unit of time and the expected total waiting cost is determined by the product
of the delay between order submission and execution, and the waiting cost per unit
of time. Foucault et al. (2005) suggest that dynamics of the limit order book is
determined by the mix of patient and impatient traders and the rate of order arrival.
Their model has a number of predictions: impatient traders are more likely to submit
a market order than a limit order; traders become more impatient at the market close,
increasing the arrival rate of market orders; when the proportion of patient traders is
large then traders are more likely to submit aggressive limit orders (improve upon
quoted spread).
Bias et al. (1995) suggest that order placements are concentrated at the best
bid and ask quotes. Examining a dataset of 40 stocks on the CAC Index, the authors
report that a large proportion of trades improve upon the existing best bid and ask
price, indicating that traders are trying to compete for time-priority to maximise their
probability of execution. Reflecting the risk of non-execution, traders place more
market orders when the spread is narrow and limit orders when the spread is wide.
Al-Suhaibani and Krynowski (2000) show that the decision to place a limit or market
order depends on the state of the limit order book. Examining stocks listed on the
Saudi stock market, they find that market orders are more likely to be submitted when
the spread (depth) is narrow (wide). Griffiths et al. (2000) reach a similar conclusion
looking at 5 classifications of order aggressiveness on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
They find that orders are less aggressiveness when the bid-ask spread is wide, and that
23

greater depth on the same side of the order book encourages more aggressive orders
to gain priority over other orders. Similarly, Ranaldo (2004) finds patient investors are
more likely to submit aggressive orders when the same side of the book is thicker.
Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008) reveal how the state of the full limit order book
affects order submission strategies as well as cancellation and amendment strategies
on the Australian Stock Exchange. Consistent with Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999),
the authors show that a large inside spread discourages market orders, whereas depth
at the top price step encourages more market orders. The rest of the limit order book
doesn’t affect order submission but does affect cancellations and amendments. The
driver of this outcome is the level of order imbalance in the book; when there are a
large number of limit orders on one side of the book, a trader is likely to be crowded
out the other orders and is likely to improve the price of their limit order to obtain
price-priority or cancel their order.
Research on the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is less conclusive.
In line with the model of Foucault (1999), Ahn et al. (2001) find that an increase in
transitory volatility results in a greater placement of limit orders, as higher volatility
lowers execution risk and thereby encourages limit order submissions. Beber and
Caglio (2005) and document a similar relation positive relation between the
placement of limit orders and volatility, as predicted by Foucault (1999). In contrast,
Aitken, Brown and Wee (2007) find that limit order usage declines when volatility
increases. Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggest that this is because volatility provides an
information advantage to informed investors, allowing them to pick off uninformed
investors.

24

In the market microstructure literature, investors can be segregated into
informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders are those that possess
information about the true value of a security that has not been impounded into the
share price. Kyle (1985) suggests that traders try to maximise returns based on this
information, through buying below fundamental value and waiting for the price to rise
or vice versa they are short-selling. Uninformed traders are those who trade for
reasons other than information. This could be because of liquidity reasons to access
cash flow (Harris, 2003). Alternatively, they could be trading on noise as if it were
information (Black, 1986). Black (1986) suggests that these ‘noise’ traders are an
important source of liquidity, as uninformed traders will trade against informed
traders believing they are in fact trading on ‘information’.
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) develop a dynamic model that analyses
strategic trading between two asymmetrically informed investors. The first informed
trader knows the information seen by both informed traders and the second informed
trader knows only his/her information. In this model, the lesser informed trader learns
about the better informed trader’s information through an analysis of the order flow.
The behaviour on the part of the lesser informed trader leads the better informed
trader to strategically respond by trading intensely on information common to both
parties at the start of the trading day, and to trade on his own private information
later in the day once the common information has dissipated through trading. This
leads to the prediction that the start of the trading day is characterised by high
volume, variances and spreads.
Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) contend that informed investors are more
likely to submit market orders as they are impatient and want to capitalise on their
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information quickly. Conversely, uninformed investors are more likely to wait to
reduce the likelihood of trading with informed investors. In contrast, the model of
Chakravarty and Holden (1995) suggest that informed investors prefer to submit limit
orders. This is because information about the future value of a security is not
necessarily short-lived, reducing the likelihood of non-execution risk.
Kaniel and Liu (2006) suggest that the decision for an informed trader to use a
market order is dependent upon the expected horizon of the informed trader’s private
information. The risk to using a limit order is that the order might not execute. As the
expected horizon of private information increases, the probability that the limit order
will be hit also increases, reducing the risk of the uncertain execution. Consequently,
limit orders become more attractive to informed traders the longer the information
horizon. As a test of this hypothesis, the authors find that limit orders on the NYSE
convey more information than market orders about future prices, implying that
informed traders prefer to submit limit orders on average.
This result is supported by Keim and Madhavan (1995), who find that
institutional (informed) investors do submit limit orders. Similarly, Doung et al. (2009)
find that the order submission strategy differs between individual and institutional
investors. In line with Foucault (2009), both institutional and individual investors
submit less aggressive orders when spreads are high for large cap stocks. For small cap
stocks however individual investors are more likely to use market orders even when
spreads are wide. For both institutional and individual investors, order aggressiveness
declines for mid cap stocks when volatility increases. However, for large cap stocks,
institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness in seeking to profit from
‘picking-off’ stale limit orders. Finally, institutional investors are more likely to place
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aggressive orders at the start of the trading day to take to exploit potential private
information, whereas individual investors become more aggressive as the trading day
progresses.
Beber and Caglio (2005) find that informed traders strategically place limit
orders. Focusing on specific situations characterized by higher probability of
information-based trading, they find that orders are less aggressive, suggesting
strategic behaviour of informed traders. Analysing the Moscow Interbank Currency
Exchange, Menkhoff et al. (2010) find that in response to increasing volatility,
informed traders place more aggressively priced limit orders, whereas uninformed
traders are insensitive to changing order book conditions. Supporting Menkhoff et al.
(2010), Chung et al. (1999) and Bae et al. (2003) find that NYSE traders are more likely
to place limit orders relative to market orders when the spread is large.

2.1.1 Minimum tick size and Order Submission Strategies

The imposition of a minimum tick influences the order submission strategies of
traders. This is because it sets the minimum difference between bid and ask prices,
the ‘bid-ask spread’. A widening of the bid-ask spread resulting from the
establishment of a minimum tick size changes the relative attractiveness of supplying
and demanding liquidity, which may lead to an increase or decrease in overall
execution costs. Whether market quality is improved by a tick size change thus
becomes an empirical issue (Bessembinder, 2000).
The bid-ask spread is considered a trading cost to liquidity demanders, and is
a premium received by liquidity suppliers (Harris, 2003). A wider bid-ask spread
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increases the marginal profitability of supplying liquidity. Traders who in the absence
of a minimum tick size would have demanded liquidity using a market order may
decide to supply liquidity through submitting a limit order to take advantage of this
higher premium. Chung et al. (1999) examine the intraday variation in spreads
established by limit-order traders and show that more investors enter limit orders
when the spread is wide. Arnold and Lipson (1997) confirm that the proportion of limit
order submission increases substantially after stock splits because stock splits alter
pricing grids.
A widening of the bid-ask spread also reduces the likelihood of a limit order
becoming stale, increasing the incentive to submit a limit order relative to a market
order. A stale limit order refers to an order that no longer reflects the true value of a
security, as new information has changed the security’s value. These stale limit orders
can be taken advantage of by traders who place a market order at the price offered
by the limit order, profiting from the difference between the security’s updated value
and the existing price of the limit order. This is referred to as picking-off risk (Liu, 2009;
Fong and Liu, 2010). For example, suppose that all traders currently agree on a
security’s true value. Trading only occurs in this instance as a result of liquidity
reasons, with liquidity suppliers hoping an impatient trader will trade against them.
Suppose now that information is released leading to the security’s value being revised
upwards. Some sell limit orders will now be at a price below the security’s true market
value, allowing traders to submit market orders against all limit orders up to the new
valuation of the security, causing liquidity suppliers to lose money. The higher the risk
that a limit order will become stale reduces the likelihood that traders will post limit
orders. Whether a limit order become ‘stale’ prior to being executed is partially
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dependent on the size of the bid-ask spread. A wider bid-ask spread reduces the
likelihood that a limit order will become stale. A wider bid-ask spread means the value
of the security needs to change by a larger amount to exceed the limit order price.
A minimum tick may reduce the incidence of front running, increasing the
incentive of traders to supply liquidity to the market (Harris, 1994). Front running
refers to trading in front of an order in the queue, by submitting a limit order at a
better price. For example, suppose that a trader place a limit order to purchase a stock
at 1.00 and the order is displayed in the limit order book. Posting the limit order is
costly as the trader faces the risk that the order doesn’t execute. If another trader
arrives offering to also post a limit order to buy at 1.00 then the new trader’s order
has a lower priority, with a market sell order executing against the former trader’s
order first. This maximises the former trader’s probability of execution at the given
price. If however the latter trader could post a bid a 1.000001 then the trader can
move to the front of the queue without having to meaningfully improve upon the bid
price.
Bacidore et al. (2003) suggest that the risk of front running may mean that if
uninformed investors are disadvantaged often enough, this might result in them
reducing the use of limit orders and increasing the use of market orders. Instituting a
minimum tick induces a trader to meaningfully improve upon the bid by an
economically significant amount in order to go the front of the queue. This increases
the relative attractiveness of posting limit orders as a limit order has a greater
probability of executing at a given price.
In response to the risk of front running, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2003) and
Bacidore et al. (2003) report that a reduction in the minimum price increment reduces
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the average size of limit orders while increasing the cancellation rate of limit orders,
in order to reduce the value of the trading option to other traders. High cancellation
rates also helps to frustrate quote matchers as it increases the difficulty to identify a
trader’s intentions.
A minimum price increment can also influence the level of informed trading in
the market. The transaction cost hypothesis suggests that the security with lowest
transaction costs will attract informed trading. Because lower transaction costs could
lead to higher profits, informed traders have more incentives to trade in the market
with lower transaction costs (Booth et al, 1999).
Given the conflicting impact that the minimum tick has on liquidity demanders
and suppliers, exchanges face a difficult task in balancing the competing interests of
liquidity suppliers and investors (Harris, 1996). In addition to this difficulty, there is
little experience to draw on in determining an optimal minimum tick size as exchanges
rarely adjust their minimum price increment (Bollen et al., 2003). Research on the
impact of changes in the minimum tick size provides important insight into its impact
on market quality. Section 2.1.2 examines the literature assessing the impact of a tick
size change on market quality.

2.1.2 Theoretical Impact of the Tick Size on Market Quality

Harris (1994) develops a cross-sectional model of the discrete bid-ask spread subject
to a minimum price constraint. The minimum tick size places a lower bound limit on
the size of the bid-ask spread. Harris (1994) predicts that if the minimum tick acts as a
binding constraint for stocks, then a reduction in the tick size will result in a
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corresponding fall in the bid-ask spread. He forecasts that this will be particularly
pronounced for lower priced stocks, as the tick size will have greater economic
significance. The benefits of a tick size reduction should also be greatest for stocks
with high trading activity, as high turnover decreases per trade fixed costs. Predictions
are also given for market depth. If the minimum price variation is greater than the
spreads dealers would otherwise quote, the profits to supplying liquidity are artificially
increased. A decrease in the tick size under this scenario would lead to a decrease in
quoted depth. Minimum price variation rules may also increase quoted depth if the
exchange operates on a price-time priority, as the tick size may stop other traders
from taking advantage of the information provided by an order by placing a quote at
a better price.
In line with the predictions of Harris (1994), Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(1995) suggest quoted bid ask spreads should decline with a reduction in the minimum
tick. Looking at payment for order flow between NYSE market makers and non-NYSE
market makers, when non-NYSE market makers can pay for order flow in the presence
of a finite tick size, orders do not flow to the lowest cost provider of market making
services. This is because there is a significant incentive for brokers to move orders off
the NYSE to obtain payments offered by the non-NYSE market makers, who can offer
the best quoted price without being the lowest cost provider, as the tick size acts as
constraint on the spread. This suggests that lowering the tick size should lower market
maker rents and improve quoted bid-ask spreads.
In the theoretical model of Cordella and Foucault (1999), the price increment
which minimizes the cost of immediacy is not zero. They show that an increase in the
size of the minimum tick can improve liquidity. For instance, if the current tick size is
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too fine, an increase in the minimum tick will increase the propensity of investors to
post at the competitive spread. Second, even considering that a higher minimum tick
increases the cost of immediacy, this may be offset by significant growth in limit
orders, leading to an overall improvement in market quality. Seppi (1997) finds a
similar result. Creating a market microstructure model of liquidity, Seppi (1997) shows
that large institutional investors have a larger optimal tick size relative to retail traders,
though both prefer a tick size greater than zero.
Developing a model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary
liquidity traders, Foucault et al. (2005) finds that imposing a minimum tick size can
improve the resiliency of the limit order market. A market is resilient if price changes
that result from high order volumes quickly attract new limit orders which, in turn,
pull the price back again. The authors state that actors which induce traders to post
more aggressive limit orders make the market more resilient. A minimum tick size can
induce traders to post more aggressive limit orders, improving the resiliency of the
market.

2.1.2 Empirical Tests of the Impact of Tick Size Changes on Market Quality

Ahn, Cao and Choe (1996) is the first study to directly test the impact of reducing the
tick size on transaction costs and trading activity. The event examined is the reduction
in tick size from $1/8 to $1/16 on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) effective 3
September, 1992. The authors find a significant reduction in both quoted and effective
spreads of approximately 19% for stocks priced between $1 and $5 dollars. This is a
result of an increase in one-sixteenth quotations and a decrease in one-eighth
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quotations. Traded volume and market depth remain unchanged after the tick
reduction. Stocks with greater trading activity, lower prices and stronger competition
from the regional exchanges experienced the greatest reductions in spreads. Van
Ness, Van Ness and Pruitt (2000) however find mixed evidence on the impact of a tick
size change on quoted depth. Analysing the impact of the move to sixteenths on the
AMEX, Nasdaq and NYSE, Van Ness, Van Ness and Pruitt (2000) show that the number
of quotes increases significantly after the change, though the effect on quoted depth
is mixed, decreasing on the AMEX and NYSE and increasing on Nasdaq.
In contrast to Ahn, Cao and Choe (1996), Bacidore (1997) and Porter and
Weaver (1997) show that a decline in the tick size leads to a reduction in quoted depth,
in line with the predictions of Harris (1994). They examine the effect of decimalisation
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) on investor welfare. In 1996, the minimum tick
size was reduced from 12.5 cents to 5 cents for stocks priced over $5 and was reduced
from 5 cents to 1 cent for stocks priced between $3 and $5. Stocks trading below $3
were unaffected. Following decimalization bid-ask spreads should fall and traded
volume should increase. Market depth may fall if liquidity supplier profits decline
because the increase in traded volume does not offset the decline in bid-ask spreads.
Bacidore (1997) shows a significant decline in bid-ask spreads and quoted depth,
particularly for high priced stocks. Bessembinder (2003a) also find that quotation sizes
decreased 65% and 24% for the NYSE and Nasdaq respectively resulting from the
change to decimalization in 2001.
Explaining the change in quote behaviour after a change in tick size, Chung and
Chuwonganant (2002) authors conjecture that price discreteness has a larger effect
on spread than depth revisions, as the tick size is more likely to be a binding constraint
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on spreads than depth. In line with this hypothesis, quote revisions involving spreads
increase significantly after the change. The proportion of quote revisions involving
changes in the spread is smaller for low-price, high-volume stocks both before and
after the change. Furthermore, the authors find that the number of quote revisions
involving changes in spread (depth) was largest (smallest) during the first hour of
trading even after the change in the tick size. These results suggest that the tick size
acts as a binding constraint on the bid-ask spread even after the reduction in tick size.
A change in the tick size might not just affect spreads and depth but also
whether a trader exposes their order. Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) analyse the
reduction in tick size on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for stocks priced above
$10 and below $A0.50 in 1995. Stocks priced between $A0.50 and $A10 are used as a
control sample as they experienced no change in tick size. Liquidity is measured using
the time-weighted absolute and relative bid-ask spread, depth at the best bid and ask
prices and a weighted order book measure developed by Aitken and Comerton-Forde
(2003) to determine the overall impact of the tick size change on market liquidity.
Order exposure behaviour is also examined, where investors can decide to hide their
order volume for order sizes above $A25 000. Liquidity for the control group is found
to be unchanged before and after the event date. Stocks priced under $A0.50
experience a significant decrease is bid-ask spreads and depth. Using the liquidity
proxy, overall liquidity improves, though order exposure is unaffected. For stocks
priced above $10, liquidity for high volume stocks increased significantly, yet liquidity
for low volume stocks decreased.
Porter and Weaver (1997) show that a reduced tick size primarily benefits small
traders as narrower bid-ask spreads are accompanied by reduced quoted depth, which
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can result in higher overall transaction costs for large traders. Bacidore (1997)
however shows that adverse selection costs declines and trading volume experiences
no change, indicating a reduction in liquidity supplier rents. In contrast, Porter and
Weaver (1997) show that internalization on the TSE is found to be unaffected.
Member profits remain unchanged while revenue from commissions increases.
In line Porter and Weaver (1997), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) also find that
a reduction in the tick size has a differential impact on small and large traders.
Subsequent to the minimum price increment from an eighth to a sixteenth on the
NYSE, quoted spreads and depth fell by 14.3% and 48%, respectively. More
importantly, cumulative depth declines and NYSE floor members decreased the
amount of liquidity they display. The combined effect has resulted in smaller traders
to be better off and larger traders to be worse off. Studying the same event as
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Johnson and Lipson (2001) argue than an analysis of
the change in quoted and effective spreads for institutional trades are not a sufficient
measure of the change in market quality. This is because institutions execute a large
position over multiple trades, and orders may suffer from information leakage prior
to execution. Examining realised execution costs for institutional orders after the
reduction in tick size, the authors find that the cost of orders below 1000 shares
declines, while the cost of medium sized orders remains unchanged. Similar to
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), large orders above 10,000 shares experience an
increase of up to one-third in execution costs. The authors conclude that for the
institutional orders examined, the reduction in tick size has generally lead to an
increase in execution costs.
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Chakravarty, Panchapagesan, and Wood (2005) examine the conclusions
drawn by Johnson and Lipson (2001) by analyzing the trading costs of 34 large buyside institutions trading NYSE stocks before and after the move to decimalisation in
2001. Confirming the results of Johnson and Lipson (2001), they present mixed
evidence on the effect of decimalisation on execution costs. The authors show that
the move lead to higher costs for orders that aggressively sought liquidity (those that
transacted the whole order within one trading day). Partitioning trades into bid-ask
spread quartiles, trading costs declined in the smallest spread quartile as the predecimal tick size acted as a binding constraint, while the largest spread quartile
experienced an increase in trading costs, suggesting that liquidity fell for stocks not
constrained by the minimum tick. The authors conclude that despite this mixed effect
on different groups of investors, the change to decimalisation resulted in a significant
decline in trading costs overall.
The decline in both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth as a result of the decline
in the tick size means the overall impact on execution costs is uncertain. Bollen and
Whaley (1998) find that that the volume-weighted quoted bid/ask spread declines by
13 percent, while quoted depth fell by 38% resulting from the NYSE’s decision to
change stock price quotations from 1/8ths to 1/16ths. To determine which offsetting
effect dominates, they create a measure called the Market Quality Index (MQI), which
is a ratio of the average share depth at the prevailing bid and ask quotes to the
percentage quoted spread. The MQI suggests that the tick size change has little
impact, increasing by a modest 1.44 percent. The largest gains from the tick decrease
are for low priced stocks and small trades.
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A reduction in the tick size might not always be optimal if bid-ask spreads are
already narrow. Examining a change in the pricing grid on the Paris Bourse which
raised the tick size for certain stocks and lowered it for others, Bourghelle and Declerck
(2004) reveal the reduction (increase) in the tick size is associated with a decrease
(increase) in quoted depth, while investors use more (less) hidden orders after the
decrease (increase) in tick size. The results document no change in relative quoted and
effective spreads under both an increase and decrease in tick size, suggesting a convex
relationship between the tick size and bid-ask spread. They conclude that reducing the
tick size is not always optimal as a coarse pricing grid may not lead to excessively large
spreads, increases quoted depth and encourages liquidity providers to expose their
trading interest.
In addition to potentially reducing transaction costs, a reduction in the
minimum tick size may lead to improved price discovery, because stocks are traded
closer to their intrinsic value, attracting greater levels of informed trading. Bacidore
(2001) analyses the impact that the move to decimalization on the TSE has on traders’
information acquisition. A fall in bid-ask spreads following a reduction in the minimum
tick is consistent with the argument that liquidity suppliers were earning noncompetitive rents before the change. The author notes that the components of the
spread consist of order-processing, inventory and adverse selection costs, and the
decline in the bid-ask spread may instead come from one of these components.
Developing a model similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Bacidore (2001) shows
that the imposition of a minimum tick increases the precision of a trader’s information.
This is because a minimum tick increases the cost of inaccurate information. In support
of the model, the author finds a positive relationship between the restrictiveness of
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the pre-decimalisation minimum tick regime and the decline in the adverse selection
component of the spread. Similarly, Chen and Gau (2009) find that the information
share of the stock market increases following the reduction in tick size Taiwan Stock
Exchange (TSEC), suggesting that price discovery improves following a tightening in
bid-ask spreads and a decline in transaction costs.
Hau (2006) examines the effect of the tick size on price volatility. The minimum
tick size on the Paris Bourse increases for stocks priced above French Francs (FF) 500
from FF 0.1 to FF 1, providing a natural experiment to examine the effect of an increase
in the tick size on volatility. Higher transaction costs may lower volatility by privileging
trading based on fundamental information and discouraging destabilizing short-term
speculators. Similar to other studies, the higher tick size acts as a binding constraint
with effective spreads 20 percent higher for stocks priced above FF 500. Daily realised
volatility is 27 percent higher for stocks trading above FF 500. Controlling for market
wide volatility, the volatility differential between the two tick regimes increases on
days of low index volatility. The authors conclude that an increase in tick size
contributes to higher volatility.
Studies also examine the impact of a reduction on the minimum tick in a
futures market setting, which largely align with the literature in equities markets. apGwilym, McManus, and Thomas (2005) is the first study to investigate the impact of a
reduction in the minimum tick in a futures market setting. The reduction in tick size
occurred on the UK Long Gilt Futures on LIFFE, which experienced a change in
quotation from fractions to decimal quotes in 1998. The results reported by the
authors are largely consistent with the evidence for equity markets. Price clustering
increases, with zero being the most frequently used digit after the change to decimal
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pricing. Quoted and effective spreads measured as a proportion of ticks increases
following the reduction in tick size, however the monetary value of the spread
declines. Trade size decreases as quoted depth declines after the change. However,
results show a significant increase in daily traded volume, with the authors concluding
that the benefits of narrower spreads offsets the negative impact of reduced depth.

2.1.3 Order Submission Strategies of Algorithmic Traders

Algorithmic trading refers to trades conducted by computer algorithms, with little or
no human intervention. Algorithmic trading refers to the use of algorithms to conduct
and manage trades. These programs are used to trade under both agency and
proprietary contexts. These uses extend to minimizing execution costs by splitting
larger orders into smaller packages, or finding price patterns for minute arbitrage
opportunities, referred to as high frequency trades. Initial studies concerning
algorithmic trading focus on the effect it can have on an investor’s transaction costs.
Kisell and Malamut (2006) argue that an important use of algorithmic trading models
is to aim at achieving or beating a specified benchmark for their executions. Bertsimas
and Lo (1998) find that the optimal strategy for traders with large positions trying to
minimize execution costs is to break the order into smaller pieces. Konishi (2002)
develops an optimal slicing strategy for VWAP trades. Although these execution
strategies predate the rise of algorithmic trading, such strategies are suited for
Algorithmic Traders (ATs). Domowitz and Yegerman (2005) show algorithmic trading
is less expensive than alternative means based on a measure of implementation
shortfall. However, these algorithms underperform human execution for order sizes
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greater than 10 % of average daily volume. VWAP algorithms have an
underperformance of 2bps relative to the VWAP benchmark, but the authors suggest
that this can be compensated by the lower fees attached to computer algorithms
relative to human brokers.
Algorithmic traders may generate earnings from trading strategies through
doing a large number of small-size, small-profit trades. Due to the use of computer
algorithms, HFTs can detect and act upon trading opportunities at higher speeds than
their human counterparts. As HFTs are not regulated, they are able to pursue all profit
maximizing short-term investment opportunities. These high-frequency trading
opportunities may roughly be divided into liquidity-providing trading strategies and
liquidity-consuming trading strategies.
Liquidity-consuming trading strategies consists of placing market orders to
take advantage of directional movements in prices. When HFTs use trade and order
flow information to determine where prices may go in the future, they consume part
of the available limit orders that other investors might have used to trade. One such
liquidity consuming strategy (Hirschey, 2013) is to anticipate and trade ahead of the
order flow of other investors. For example, a trader may anticipate the trades of an
institutional investor if the investor splits their large order into numerous smaller
orders and their initial trades reveal information about their future trading intentions.
The algorithmic trader can profit from this by trading ahead of the institutional
investor, profiting from the price impact of the investor’s subsequent trades. This
strategy can be complemented through the practice of quote-stuffing, where traders
generate a large amount of message traffic which other investor’s must process,
allowing the algorithmic trader to trade ahead of them (Brogaard, 2011).
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Brogaard et al. (2014) reveal that HFTs engage in both directional and
contrarian trading strategies. Using a subset of HFTs operating on the NASDAQ for a
sample of stocks, the authors decompose stock price movements into permanent and
temporary components. Permanent price movements reflect new information that
changes the fundamental value of the security, whereas the temporary component is
interpreted as pricing errors. The authors find that HFTs trade in the direction of
permanent price movements and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors
using market orders. Foucault et al. (2016) suggest that their ability to do this arises
from their ability to process information slightly ahead of the rest of the market.
Consequently, Brogaard et al. (2014) show that HFTs can predict price changes over
horizons of less than 3 to 4 seconds.
Another strategy is the use of statistical arbitrage or pairs trading, where a long
position and an offsetting short-position is taken in two highly correlated instruments.
When the correlation between the two stocks temporarily diverges, an arbitrage
position is taken where a short position is taken in the outperforming instrument and
a long position is taken in the underperforming instrument. The profitability from the
trade occurs from the spread between the two instruments converging. Brogaard
(2011) examines the propensity for algorithmic traders to either provide or take
liquidity around news events. Algorithmic traders during stock-specific news events
increase their frequency in providing liquidity and reduce the frequency of taking
liquidity. The opposite result is found for macro-economic announcements. As stockspecific news relates only to the stock, the information released from the
announcement allows trader’s to trade the stock’s correlated pairs. As macroeconomic announcements affect all stocks, the pairs trading strategy is less effective.
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Algorithmic traders can also engage in market-making, posting bid and ask
quotes that allows them to earn a liquidity premium through the bid-ask spread.
Employing two proprietary datasets from Chi-X and Euronext that contain anonymized
broker IDs for trades in Dutch index stocks, Menkveld (2012) examines the entry of a
large high frequency trader to Chi-X in September 2007. The trader has an upper
bound latency of 1.67 milliseconds, engages in proprietary trading, generates a high
number of trades, and finishes the trading day with a net zero inventory position. The
authors key finding is that 78 per cent of the of the trader’s quotes are passive market
maker quotes. He concludes that HFTs provide liquidity and are the new market
makers. Whereas traditional market making occurs in a single stock, Gerig and
Michayluk (2010) show that automated market makers can also make money by
trading in similar stocks in a way that traditional market makers do in a single stock.
They consider a model whereby an automated market maker is confronted by two
traders in different but similar stocks. If one trader is selling and the other buying at
the same time, the HFT can provide liquidity by taking the opposite side of each order.
This lowers the losses automated market makers incur to informed traders because
the opposite direction of the trades makes it more likely one or both of the investors
are uninformed.
One of the issues with HFTs acting as market makers is that as they don’t have
affirmative obligations to provide liquidity, HFTs may not provide liquidity during
periods of market stress. A Designated Primary Market Maker (DPM) is a specialized
market maker approved by an exchange to guarantee that he or she will take the
position in a particular assigned. These designated market makers have affirmative
obligations to provide liquidity to market participants, through providing quotes on
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both sides of the market, contributing to the depth of the market and maintaining
market activity. These obligations can take the form of maximum spread width,
minimum quoted volume, location of the market makers spread width relative to the
best bid and offer, minimum percentage of the day the market maker must quote and
minimum time in force for market maker quotes. Alternatively, HFTs make money
through providing liquidity by turning over shares quickly while minimising exposure
to adverse price movements during these brief holding periods. If the likelihood of
adverse price movements increase, HFTs can respond through reducing their liquidity
provision or withdraw from the market altogether as they have no obligation to make
markets.
Though not specifically related to HFTs, Anand and Venkataraman (2013) study
the trades of Endogenous Liquidity Providers (ELPs), who supply liquidity because it is
a profitable activity, and those of Designated Market Makers (DMMs), who have
exchange-assigned obligations to maintain markets on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
The authors find that during market conditions reflecting high inventory risk, such as
periods with low volume or one-sided order flow (more buy orders than sell orders
and vice versa), DMMs participate in undesirable trades, especially for less active stock
where they are the only reliable counterparties to available to investors. The authors
suggest that the obligations of DMMs oblige them to supply liquidity during periods of
high inventory risk. Conversely, ELPs exercise the option to withdraw from the market
during these times. These results suggest that HFTs are likely to withdraw their supply
of liquidity during periods when liquidity is already weak.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) provides
evidence supporting the contention that HFTs reduce the supply of liquidity and
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increase their liquidity demand during periods of high volatility. ASIC (2012) considers
the impact of high frequency trading on the quality and integrity of Australia’s financial
markets over the period of January to September 2012. ASIC (2012) finds that high
frequency trading is concentrated in the most liquid securities, the S&P/ASX 200 (the
largest 200 stocks on the exchange). In the S&P/ASX 50, HFTs buy and sell more during
times when prices are around the daily average and reduced their participation when
prices diverged from the daily average. For the S&P/ASX 150-200 (the least liquid
proportion), HFTs reduced their participation in the market when prices fell of
increased by around 1.8 to 2 standard deviations from the average price.
Korajczyk and Murphy (2014) also report that HFTs reduce their supply of
liquidity during stressful periods. The authors find that HFTs provide significantly more
liquidity than designated market makers to large institutional trades. Utilising a unique
data set that provides all orders, trades and trader identities, the authors are able to
identify designated market makers and HFTs on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In line
with the findings of ASIC (2012), the authors find that despite HFTs providing more
liquidity than market makers to larger trades, liquidity provision changes significantly
when the large trade is considered stressful. When the trading volume of a large trade
as a proportion of total trading volume is in the upper quintile, the proportion of
liquidity supplied by HFTs decline significantly. Further, HFTs reduce liquidity provision
on days in which the stock price is particularly stressful.
Hu (2013) examines the factors that influence liquidity provision by high
frequency traders. The author suggests that interactions between HFTs are one reason
for why HFTs supply less liquidity when markets are volatile. Specifically, the author
provides evidence that information asymmetry induced by the liquidity consuming
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strategies undertaken by certain HFTs induces HFTs that engage in market-making
activities to supply less liquidity. For example, if a liquidity-providing HFT and a
liquidity-taking HFT have the same reaction speed on average, then the liquidityproviding HFT will be faster 50 per cent of the time and vice versa. Half the time, the
liquidity-taking HFT submits a market-order before the liquidity-providing HFT has had
a chance to adjust their quotes. At these times, the liquidity-providing HFT has been
adversely selected. If the liquidity-providing HFT takes this issue into account, the
trader provide less liquidity on average and will supply even less liquidity as the level
of information asymmetry increases. Using the NASDAQ-100 Exchange Traded Fund,
the author finds that information asymmetry increases as volatility increases, resulting
in HFTs supplying less liquidity.
Golub et al. (2012) suggest that HFTs that engage in market making activities
quickly remove their inventory holdings when there is a significant stock price
movement against their stock position. The authors examine mini flash crashes using
six years of U.S. stock market data. Mini flash crashes are abrupt and severe flash
crashes that occur in an extremely short period. The authors use the example of a flash
crash that occurred on 16th April 2010 in the stock of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
where a -1.9% price change occurred in less than 50 milliseconds. Their analysis of the
speed and magnitude of the flash crashes suggested that these are caused by HFT
activity. Their hypothesis is that when a stock price has a distinct price movement,
market makers receive a significant increase in orders that increase their inventory
risk. For example, if there is a distinct decline in the stock price, a market maker will
receive an increase in sell orders, forcing market makers to be the buyers. If the stock
price continues to decline, the inventory exposure of market makes continues to
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increase. When the market maker’s risk management limits are breached, comprised
of the size of the inventory and the unrealised profit and loss, the market maker has
to stop providing liquidity and aggressively take liquidity by selling back the shares
purchased previously. For HFTs without affirmative obligations who trade in short
increments, they do no wait for prices to revert to favourable levels and therefore
remove their accumulated inventory as quickly as possible. The authors state that this
action is likely to cause a sharp movement in the stock price.
The literature examining the order submission strategies on algorithmic
traders suggest that they engage in both liquidity supplying and consuming strategies.
The overall impact of these strategies on market quality is uncertain, which is
examined in the next section.

2.1.4 Theoretical impact of Algorithmic Trading on Market Quality

Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) build the first theoretical model to address how HFTrs
affect market conditions through their order submission strategies. They model an
electronic market populated by low frequency traders (humans) and add a high
frequency trader (machine). This machine is assumed to be uninformed, similar to a
market maker. The advantage of the machine relative to a human trader is its higher
speed in submitting and cancelling orders. The authors find that the presence of HFTs
yield transaction prices that differ from the HFT-free price; when a HFTr is present, the
distribution of transaction prices will have thinner tails and are concentrated near the
mean. Their second finding is that as humans increase their order submissions,
intertrade duration decreases and trading volume increases in proportion to higher
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human order arrival rates. The implication is that the presence of HFTs results in an
increase in liquidity. Alternatively, Gsell (2008) creates a simulated environment which
examines the impact that implemented algorithmic trading concepts have on market
outcomes, which the paper limits to market prices and volatility. The outcome of the
simulation shows that an increase in high frequency trading had a negative impact on
market prices, though it significantly reduced volatility.
Gerig and Michayluk (2010) develop a theoretical model that seeks to explain
the increasing dominance of algorithmic trading and to understand its effect on the
market. Their model shows that automated liquidity providers are able to price
securities more accurately than human market makers. This is because they can trade
almost instantaneously and can accurately model complex relationships between
securities. Consequently, automated liquidity providers come to transact the majority
of trades at prices that are more efficient than provided by human market makers.
This has a number of positive market effects: informed investors make less profits and
uninformed investors have smaller losses. This can lead to a situation where
uninformed investors increase their trading activity, increasing total traded volume
and lowering overall transaction costs.
A distinguishing feature of algorithmic trading is that trades are conducted at
much higher speed and higher frequency relative to other traders on the market. The
investment time horizon of ATs is therefore a lot shorter. Outside the algorithmic
trading literature, other work has examined the impact of different investment time
horizons on market quality. Froot et al. (1992) show that short term speculators
decrease the informational quality of asset prices. In standard models of informed
trading, informational externalities are negative; returns to acquiring information falls
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as other traders possess this information. In contrast, the authors show that a market
with short-term speculators creates positive informational externalities; as more
speculators study a piece of information, the information is disseminated into the
market, impacting the price. Therefore, profits from that information are inversely
related to how early it is learnt. This leads to a situation where traders ignore some
fundamental information, which fails to get impounded into the price, leading to a fall
in price discovery. In contrast to the theoretical predictions of Froot et al. (1992), Vives
(1995) show that short term speculators can increase or decrease the informational
efficiency of prices depending on the temporal pattern of information arrival. In the
model of Vives (1995), short-term trading intensity is a function of the pattern of
information arrival, with short-term traders reducing price informativeness with
concentrated arrival of information, and enhances it with diffuse arrival of
information.

2.1.5 Empirical Tests of the Impact of Algorithmic Trading on Market Quality

The brief literature modelling the potential effect of algorithmic traders on market
quality provide conflicting outcomes as to whether the effect is positive or negative.
Consequently, academic research has begun to empirically examine the potential
impact of algorithmic trading on market dynamics. Despite the growing academic
interest in this area, the empirical literature concerning algorithmic trading is still brief.
This is primarily due to data constraints, which are unable to clearly identify trades
belonging to an algorithmic trader. The studies that do look at the impact of

48

algorithmic trading on market characteristics employ traditional proxies of market
quality, including bid-ask spreads, market depth, stock volatility and price discovery.
Employing a unique dataset from Nasdaq OMX that distinguishes between
high frequency and non-high frequency trades, Brogaard (2010) finds that HFTs have
a positive impact on market quality, as they improve the price discovery process
without affecting volatility. Similarly, Castura et al. (2010) show that market quality
has improved for a broad range of stocks on the Russel 1000 and Russell 200 index,
coinciding with automation on exchanges. Governed by the theory that an efficient
stock price should exhibit no serial autocorrelation, the authors report that prices are
more efficient, finding a reduction in the mean reversion of mid-market quotes.
However, Castura et al. (2010) don’t show causality between algorithmic trading and
market quality. Using the implementation of auto-quoting on the NYSE is treated as
an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading, Hendershottet et al. (2011) show
that algorithmic trading improves quoted and effective spreads, but reduces market
depth. The degree of price discovery that is correlated with trading is shown to
decrease after the introduction of autoquote, indicating that algorithms respond
quickly to order flow information and reduce adverse selection in the market. The
authors interpret these results as indicating that algorithmic trading causally improves
liquidity.
Conflicting evidence is presented on the impact of algorithmic trading on
volatility. Chaboud et al. (2009) find that the correlation between algorithmic trades
is higher relative to non-algorithmic trades on the foreign exchange market. However,
the evidence suggests that despite this higher correlation of trades, algorithmic
trading does not contribute to higher volatility, though it does contribute to improve
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price discovery. Similarly, Hendershott and Riordan (2011) find that algorithmic
traders on the Deutchse Bourse closely monitor changes in liquidity and time their
trades to demand liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive,
moderating movements in prices.
However, Smith (2010) reveals the increase in algorithmic trading on U.S
markets has resulted in a marked change in the correlation structure of stock trading,
leading to an increase in short-term volatility. Smith (2010) examines the Hurst
exponent of traded value over short time scales (15 minutes or less). The Hurst
exponent measures the long term memory of a time series, i.e the autocorrelations of
a time series and the rate at which these decrease as the distance between two values
increases. The author shows that the increase in the Hurst exponent of U.S stocks
occurs prominently after the implementation of Order Protection Rule (Rule 611). This
rule mandates that trades are to automatically trade at the best price offered across
all exchange venues, and lead to a substantial growth in algorithmic trading. A Hurst
Exponent greater than 0.5 points towards increasing volatility on the U.S market, as
more participants in the market generate more volatility, not more predictable
behaviour.
HFTs may have a negative impact on liquidity as they may increase the level of
information asymmetry in the market. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) develop a
theoretical model of algorithmic traders as market makers in electronic limit order
markets, and assess the effect this role has on investor welfare. In limit-order markets
without middlemen, newly placed limit orders are either matched with existing limit
orders or are added to the order book. The placement of a limit order faces the risk
that the order becomes stale due to the arrival of new information, creating a trading
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option that may be picked off by a later investor. Traders in limit order markets
therefore face adverse selection costs, which hampers trading activity. As algorithmic
trading is the use of computer algorithms to analyse market data and make trades,
the introduction of ATs to a limit order market may reduce information friction if the
information between two investor arrivals is hard, machine-processable information.
Alternatively, ATs may reduce investor welfare if the there is no information friction
between the early and late investor with respect to hard information. Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2011) assess the validity of this model using the natural experiment
provided by the introduction of Chi-X to compete with Euronext. The features of ChiX make it attractive to ATs, as it provides a subsidy to a quote that leads to execution,
relative to Euronext, who charge a fee for price quote changes. The authors find that
entry of an HFT to the market was accompanied by a 23% reduction in adverse
selection costs and a 17% increase in trade frequency.
One issue with determining the effect of HFTs on liquidity is how often they
demand and supply liquidity in the market. Employing two proprietary datasets from
Chi-X and Euronext that contain anonymized broker IDs for trades in Dutch index
stocks, Menkveld (2012) examines the impact of a HFT on these two markets. The
author identifies a trader that enters both markets simultaneously, who fits the profile
of an HFT. Menkveld (2012) notes that the entry of the HFT coincided with a 50% fall
in the bid-ask spread and that the HFT contributed to liquidity across both markets,
supplying liquidity 80% of the time.
Even if HFTs act as a market maker on average, one key difference between
them and designated market makers is that they are under no obligation to supply
liquidity to the market at all times. Consequently, they may exacerbates volatility and
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destabilizes financial markets during periods of heightened volatility. The author tests
whether volatility causes HFTs to increase or decrease their trading activity. Using
macro and stock-specific news as exogenous sources of volatility, HFTs tend to
decrease their liquidity demand during stock specific news periods and tend to take
more liquidity during macro news periods. Finally, using the natural experiment
afforded by the removal of a fraction of HFT participants after the short sale ban of
2008, Brogaard (2011) documents that HFTs reduces intraday volatility.
Examining the Flash Crash of 6 May, 2009 Kirilenko et al. (2011) hypothesize
that the Flash Crash occurred as a result of a large sell order that was executed rapidly
on the E-Mini Index. HFTs contributed to the price decline as they were initial buyers
of the sell order, but quickly became aggressive net sellers to balance their inventory
positions. The results show that HFTs exhibit a number of characteristics that can have
a negative impact on market stability. They exhibit trading patterns inconsistent with
traditional market makers, trading aggressively in the direction of price changes and
do not accumulate significant inventory positions. Thus, HFTs do not supply liquidity
when prices move against their trading position. Furthermore, they can exacerbate
price movements by competing for liquidity as they try to rebalance their inventory
positions.

2.1.6 Empirical Tests of Latency and Market Quality

Latency refers to the amount of time it takes to submit and receive feedback about an
order. Financial markets have witnessed a significant reduction in latency over the last
couple of decades, driven by exchange co-location services, improved market
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infrastructure and trade automation. Not surprisingly, algorithmic trading and latency
are strongly related, with reductions in latency contributing to the growth of
algorithmic trading. The arguments put forth for and against reduced latency are
similar to the arguments governing algorithmic trading; increased latency allows
better monitoring of the market and gives investors the ability to more easily
rebalance their portfolio to changes in fundamental information, though it can also be
used to take advantage of the option granted by limit order traders, discouraging
liquidity provision. Given the relationship between algorithmic trading and latency,
understanding the effect that reductions in latency have on market quality can provide
further insight into algorithmic trading.
A number of studies have examined the effect of trading speed on market
quality. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011) use the natural experiment provided by the
reduction in latency on the Deutchse Bourse in 2002 to test the effect of speed on
liquidity and price discovery. The authors findings show a decrease in both quoted and
effective spreads in the post-event period. This decrease was driven primarily by a
reduction in the adverse selection component of the spread. Similar to the results
presented by Hendershott et al. (2011), the decline in the adverse selection
component was partially offset by an increase in the realised spread, suggesting that
liquidity suppliers were able to increase their revenues after the change. Drawing the
same conclusion as Hendershott et al. (2011), liquidity suppliers are interpreted as
being able to increase their revenues due to a reduction in the competition between
liquidity suppliers. Price efficiency shows a significant improvement in the post-event
period, with the contribution of quotes to price discovery doubling to 90%. The results
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of the paper are similar to the empirical literature on algorithmic trading, showing
reduced latency leads to improvements in market quality.
The studies reviewed above examine reductions in latency during a period
where ATs were becoming prominent in the market. Other studies have analysed the
effect a reduction in latency has on market quality in earlier time periods. Easley et al.
(2009) examine the impact on stock prices of an upgrade to NYSE’s infrastructure in
1980. The upgrade consisted of two phases; phase 1 introduced on 14 July, 1980
improved dissemination of quotes and the reporting of floor transactions to off-floor
traders and phase 2 introduced a technology upgrade that reduced latency from 2
minutes pre-upgrade to 20 seconds post-upgrade. The upgrades reduced the trading
option granted by limit order traders to the specialist on-floor traders. The authors
hypothesise that because limit order traders require compensation for adverse
selection, the upgrades should be associated with positive abnormal stock returns. For
phase 2, the results indicate that the total return over the next 20 days was 4 percent,
and this excess return result is robust to Fama French, momentum and industry
factors. A reduction in latency is therefore associated with a reduction in adverse
selection risk and an improvement in market quality. Analysing trading activity in the
millisecond environment using Nasdaq order-level data, Hasbrouck and Saar (2012)
also find that a decline in latency is associated with tighter quoted spreads, increased
depth, reduced price impact and lower volatility.
In contrast, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) find that the reduction in latency
on the NYSE had mixed effects on market quality. On 24 June, 2007, the NYSE
converted to a hybrid market system, where trades could take place on the trading
floor or electronically. The introduction of the Hybrid market reduced the execution
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time of market orders from 10 seconds to less than a second. Hendershott and
Moulton (2011) find that the reduction in latency on the NYSE had mixed effects on
market quality. On average, from the month prior to the stock’s activation date to the
month after, quoted spreads increase from 7.9 basis points to 8.3 basis points, and
effective spreads increase from 5.6 basis points to 5.9 basis points. Decomposing the
spread, the authors report an increase in the adverse selection component of the
spread. However, the authors also note that price noise dropped after the
introduction of the Hybrid system, indicating an improvement in price efficiency.

2.2

Order Submission Strategies of Market Makers

Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggests there is no need for a market maker as market
participants provide liquidity in limit order markets. However, a fundamental issue in
trading is the asynchronous arrival of buyers and sellers. A mismatch of buyers and
sellers leads to uncertainty in both the time it takes to complete a trade and the price
the trade will transact at (Demsetz, 1968). This uncertainty can be mitigated by the
presence of liquidity suppliers who serve as counterparties to the trade, providing
immediacy of execution (Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). Market makers play an
integral part in the provision of liquidity in various financial markets, including
derivative markets. Market making primarily involves the submission of nonmarketable resting orders that provide liquidity to the marketplace at specified prices.
A market maker’s trading strategy involves quoting both a buy and a sell price for a
financial instrument or commodity, seeking to profit from the difference between the
two prices, known as the bid-ask spread. An important component of this strategy is
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to always quote competitive buy and sell prices, with the intention of buying and
selling equal components of the financial instrument being traded.
The market maker’s profits from the bid-ask spread is to offset three kinds of
market making costs that have been identified in the literature of market
microstructure; order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs and adverse selection
costs (Stoll, 1978). Order processing costs involve the fixed cost of market making
(Demetz, 1968). Demsetz (1968) argues that the bid-ask spread partly compensates
market makers for the operating costs incurred in providing immediacy. Inventoryholding costs arise from the market maker managing his/her inventory positions
(Tinic, 1972, Stoll, 1978, Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1982, Ho and Stoll, 1981).
Adverse selection costs occur as market makers, in supplying liquidity, may trade with
individuals who are better informed about the true value of the underlying security
(Bagehot, 1971, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Kyle, 1985, Amihud and Mendelson,
1986, Easley and O’Hara, 1987, Glosten and Harris, 1988, and Admati and Pfleiderer,
1988). The market maker minimises the costs of inventory and adverse selection costs
through adjusting their quoted bid and ask prices.
Inventory-based models of the bid-ask spread concentrate on the risk faced by
market makers stemming from holding an undiversified portfolio (Tinic, 1972).
Spreads exist to compensate market makers for the risk of holding unwanted
inventory (Stoll, 1978, Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1982, and Ho and Stoll, 1981,
1983). This cost is equivalent to the expected difference in revenue from holding a
well-diversified portfolio (Stoll, 1978). The cost of holding unwanted inventory has
implications for how spreads change in response to changes in inventory holdings. In
the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1980), transaction prices result from the
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execution of randomly arriving sell and buy orders at the market-maker’s bid and ask
prices. These prices are set so as to move the specialist to a desired inventory position.
At this desired inventory position, the bid-ask spread is minimized. The authors
demonstrate that as long as the specialist is managing his inventory, a monopolistic
specialist will widen spreads from this preferred position as inventory imbalances
accrue.
Alternatively, Ho and Stoll (1983) develop an inventory model of a competitive
dealer market, made up of competing market makers who differ only in their
inventory positions and risk preferences. According to Ho and Stoll (1983), the
reservation fee of a market maker depends on his/her risk aversion and inventory
level. Controlling for risk aversion, a market maker’s quotes become a monotone
function of his/her inventory level, where market makers with long (short) positions
post competitive ask (bid) prices. In other words, when an order imbalance occurs that
moves the market maker away from his/her desired inventory positions, he/she
adjusts the bid-ask spread to move back to the desired inventory position.
A number of studies support the inventory-holding models of bid-ask spreads.
Hansch et al. (1998) undertake an empirical test of Ho and Stoll’s (1983) inventory
model of competitive dealership markets on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The
authors provide empirical evidence supporting the model of Ho and Stoll (1983),
revealing that a market maker’s inventory position is significantly related to the ability
of the market maker to execute large trades, changes in quotes are strongly correlated
to changes in inventories and inventory positions are mean reverting with the strength
of mean reversion increasing as a function of his/her inventory level.
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Order-flow imbalances give rise to the inventory holding cost component of
the bid-ask spread (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981). The process of equilibrating order
imbalances may cause the market maker’s inventory position to deviate from optimal
levels, resulting in an increase in inventory holding costs. Chordia et al. (2003) examine
the effect of order imbalances on liquidity and market returns on the NYSE. Employing
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to designate transactions as buyer-initiated or
seller-initiated, the authors calculate the daily aggregate order imbalance for each
stock (buy orders less sell orders). The authors find that after an event resulting in a
large order imbalance, specialists alter the quotes to motivate investors to take the
other side of the trade, consistent with inventory models of the spread (Stoll, 1978).
Harris (1990) points out that liquidity has both a price and quantity dimension,
meaning overall changes in liquidity cannot be determined by analysing one
dimension alone. Harris (1990) argues that a market maker can adjust his/her liquidity
by changing both the price dimension (the bid-ask spread) and the quantity dimension
(the quoted depth). Ye (1995) examines the function of quoted depth in mitigating the
risk of adverse selection on the part of the market maker. He develops a framework
for analysing a specialist’s optimal quotation strategy. The author finds that when the
probability that the specialist is providing liquidity to an informed trader increases, the
specialist will both widen the spread and reduce depth to protect themselves from
losses. Similarly, Kavajecz (1999) reveals that a market maker responds to information
events by adjusting the quoted depth in addition to quoted prices.
Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) show that designated market makers actively
monitor their inventory positions, being more likely to be sellers when holding long
inventory positions and vice versa. Consequently, market makers do not just adjust
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bid-ask spreads to control their inventory positions, they also selectively time the size
and direction of their trades. However, Panayides (2007) states that designated
market makers are most likely to engage in inventory rebalancing when they are not
constrained by their market making obligations.
Information-based models are concerned with adverse selection costs faced
by liquidity providers in the presence of information asymmetry. As liquidity providers
have less information about the true value of a security relative to informed traders,
liquidity suppliers can expect to lose money when transacting against informed
traders (see Bagehot, 1971, Copeland and Galai, 1983, Easley and O'Hara, 1987, and
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Market makers widen spreads to offset the expected cost
of transacting with informed traders. Copeland and Gelai (1983) argue that the
dealer's bid-ask spread is a trade-off between expected losses to informed traders and
expected gains from liquidity traders. The pricing strategy of the dealer is equivalent
to offering an out-of-the-money option straddle for a fixed number of shares during a
fixed time interval. The exercise prices of the straddle determine the bid-ask spread,
with the profit maximizing spread occurring at the point where the expected total
revenues from liquidity trading balance the expected total losses from informed
trading. Similar to Copeland and Gelai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
demonstrate that adverse selection gives rise to bid-ask spreads when all other
transaction costs are zero and dealers are risk neutral and perfectly competitive.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) provide an alternative explanation to the inventory
hypothesis of why dealers adjust prices in response to a large incoming order. Under
the inventory model, large trades force the dealer away from his/her desired
inventory position, with bid-ask spreads being compensation for bearing this
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inventory risk. The authors show that as informed traders want to trade, they will
trade larger amounts at any given price. Large trades are transacted at less favourable
prices, as market makers try to offset losses when transacting with informed traders.

2.2.1 Market Makers in Option Markets

In the option market, there are unique factors that affect the cost of liquidity provision
relative to the equity market for market makers. In the options market, managing
inventory levels are a much bigger problem for market makers relative to the equity
market. In the model of Biais and Hillion (1994), the reservation buying and selling
prices depends on the volatility of the underlying security. As a result of the implicit
leverage of the options market, the volatility of an option position is much larger than
an equal dollar position in the equities market, causing higher inventory holding costs.
As discussed by Jamesone and Wilhelm (1992), not only is option volatility larger
relative to stock volatility, but is dependent upon the underlying stock price. Over a
particular time period for a stock, if the volatility is constant then the risk per dollar of
investment is nonstochastic. For options however, the volatility changes with changes
in the price of the underlying stock, making the risk stochastic. This results in higher
inventory costs for option market makers.
The evidence by Lakonishock et al. (2007) suggest that option market makers
face less control over their inventory positions relative to equity market makers. The
authors provide detailed descriptive statistics on purchased and written open interest
and open buy and sell volumes across a number of investor types. For both calls and
puts, written option positions are more common than purchased positions, leading to
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an imbalance in order flow that moves the market maker away from his/her optimal
inventory position. Battalio and Schultz (2011) suggest that other factors impede the
market maker in managing inventory levels, including options being split over
numerous strike prices and expiration dates, order flow differing for options at, in or
out of the money and the option’s time to maturity.
Market makers in the options market are also likely to face greater adverse
selection costs relative to equity market makers. If informed investors regard options
as a superior investment vehicle relative to the underlying stock, then the implied
stock prices from options are likely to reveal information about the future equilibrium
value of the observed stock price. Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that both stock
prices and volumes lead option prices and volumes. The authors claim that the findings
of Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Anthony (1998) are seriously undermined
from the use of closing prices, as the option market closes ten minutes after the stock
market. The information lead of options may be a result of information that was
disseminated between the closing times of the two markets. Stephan and Whaley
(1990) overcome these issues by employing intraday transaction data and examines
the direct lead/lag relationship between option and stock prices and volumes. The
authors find that options do not contain information, with stock prices and volumes
leading option prices and volumes.
However, a number of studies find that options are informative. Manaster and
Rendleman (1982) test whether options provide information on future stock values by
forming portfolios based on the differences between the implied stock price of an
option and the observed price, and compare the returns earned on the different
portfolios. The results show that closing option prices contained information that was
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not contained in stock prices for a period of up to 24 hours. Similarly, Anthony (1998)
finds that option volume on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) is
informative, with option volume leads stock trading volume by a one day lag.
Back’s (1993) model of informed option trading predicts that a component of
option returns that are independent of the underlying stock return, will exist due to
the presence of informed trading. Sheikh and Ronn (1994) conjecture that strategic
behaviour by informed traders will lead to similar patterns in the return series of
stocks and options. Supporting this hypothesis, Sheikh and Ronn (1994) find a strong
similarity in both the means of day end stock returns and adjusted option returns, and
the variances of intraday stock and option returns.
Easley et al. (1998) investigate the informational role of transaction volumes
in the options market. In line with the findings of Stephan and Whaley (1990), stock
price changes lead option volumes whereas option volumes do not lead stock price
changes. However, when aggregating option trades into positive and negative news
trades, option trades are shown to be informative, with option volumes leading stock
price changes. Building on Easley et al. (1998), Chan et al. (2002) suggest that the
inferred information content of option trades may originate from stock trades, which
Easley et al. (1998) do not examine. Their results show that stock net trade volume is
informative for stock and option quote revisions, suggesting informed traders initiate
trades in the stock market only.
Charkravarty et al. (2004) provide evidence that option trading contributes to
the price discovery process in the underlying market. Previous studies examining the
lead-lag relationship between option and stock prices combine permanent and
temporary price changes, whereas permanent price changes is the only component
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that represents information. Employing the price discovery methodology of
Hasbrouck (1995), the evidence indicates that 17 to 18% of price discovery occurs in
the options market. Furthermore, price discovery is greater when the ratio of option
volume to stock volume is high and the option bid-ask spread is narrow relative to
stock bid-ask spreads.
The above evidence suggests that market makers in the options market face
greater inventory and adverse selection costs relative to market makers in equity
markets. This means that market makers will quote greater spreads in option markets
relative to equity markets and that changes in quoted prices will also be greater (Cho
and Engle, 1998, Kaul et al. 2004).

2.2.3 Determinants of Bid-Ask Spreads in Options Market

Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) discuss how market makers face risks that are unique to
options. These risks include the inability of option market makers to continuously
rebalance their inventory position and the uncertainty about the return volatility of
the underlying stock. Employing the inventory model specification of Ho and Stoll
(1983), the authors find that after controlling for variation in spreads produced by
costs generally associated with market making, discrete hedge rebalancing (gamma
risks) and stochastic stock return volatility (vega risks) are not fully diversifiable and
account for 8% and 4.5% of the option bid-ask spread, respectively. These costs,
unique to the option market, are given as the reason why option bid-ask spreads are
greater relative to stocks. George and Longstaff (1993) provide supporting evidence
for this conclusion, examine the cross-sectional distribution of bid-ask spreads on the
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S&P 100 index options market. The authors find that the determinants of market
making costs explain 70 percent of the variation in bid-ask spreads. Specifically, bidask spreads are negatively related to the option’s delta and level of trading activity
and positively related to the option’s price and time to maturity. Wei and Zheng (2010)
examine the effect of trading activities on the liquidity of US equity options and come
to similar conclusions. Several liquidity determinants are found to affect the
proportional spread, including time to maturity, moneyness, stock return volatility,
option return volatility, option trading volume and option price. This supports the
inventory model of option bid-ask spreads, with changes in these liquidity
determinants altering the market makers inventory risk.
In addition to vega and gamma risks, time to maturity will also effect bid-ask
spread. An option’s term-to-maturity has two opposing effects on its bid-ask spread.
Market makers face higher gamma and theta risks trading in option contracts with a
shorter time-to-maturity. However, market makers face higher credit risks holding
longer term options, which may cause them to widen spreads as compensation for the
higher credit risk exposure. Chong et al. (2003) show option bid-ask spreads to be
negatively related to their term-to-maturity. This result holds after controlling for
competition, trading activity and price. The results suggest a market risk effect in
trading shorter term contracts, as market makers are exposed to greater theta and
gamma risks.
Cho and Engle (1999) proposed a new theory called “derivative hedge theory”
in which bid-ask spreads in the option market are determined by option activity and
activity in the underlying stock. If market makers in derivative markets can perfectly
hedge their position using the underlying security, then spreads in the option market
64

will be determined by spreads in the underlying market. Examining S&P 100 index
options, the authors find that option market spreads are positively related to spreads
in the underlying market, supporting their derivative hedge theory. Option market
duration does not affect bid-ask spreads, with slow and fast markets leading to wider
spreads. As inventory costs predicts wide spreads in slow markets and information
asymmetry predicts wider spreads in slow markets, neither outcome would occur if
the underlying market provided a perfect hedge. The authors conclude that the
market maker is only able to imperfectly hedge his/her position in the underlying
securities market.
However, Kaul et al. (2004) argue that the derivative hedge theory of Cho and
Engle (1999) accounted for the initial hedging cost only. That is, the percentage delta
is related to the cost of setting up the hedge position, but this does not account for
rebalancing costs. The authors calculate rebalancing costs as proportional to vega
multiplied by the spread of the underlying stock. Their results imply a large proportion
of the bid-ask spread is attributable to inventory management costs; 50% attributable
to setting up a delta neutral position and 6.93% associated with discrete rebalancing.
Similar results are found by Patrella (2006), who develops a model of the option bidask spread that incorporates a reservation bid-ask spread applied by market makers
to protect themselves from scalpers. In line with Kaul et al. (2004), the model includes
the main determinants of option market making costs, including initial hedging,
rebalancing and order-processing costs. Examining a sample of covered warrants on
the Italian Stock Exchange, the model explains 64% of the total variation in bid-ask
spreads, and that the inclusion of the reservation spread increases the explanatory
power of the model from 20 to 54 percentage points. Engle and Neri (2010) however
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state that the cost of rebalancing the hedging position is proportional both to gamma
and to the volatility of the underlying stock. Employing a significantly greater dataset
than both prior studies by examining the whole US options market, the authors find
that these three costs account for a significant proportion of the bid-ask spread.
In addition to hedging costs, spreads may also be affected by informed trading.
The literature provides conflicting evidence on the adverse selection component on
the bid-ask spread. Vijh (1990) is the first to examine the relationship between
information asymmetry and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE. He argues that the greater
implicit leverage of options relative to equities attracts both informed and noise
traders. Results show price effects are absent surrounding large option trades,
providing evidence against informed option trading. Examining the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread, results show information asymmetry to be an
insignificant determinant of option spreads. Similar results are found by Neal (1992),
who calculates the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread using the
method of Glosten and Harris (1988). He finds that adverse selection is an insignificant
determinant of the bid-ask spread, accounting for 3% of the average spread.
Conversely, Ahn et al. (2008) test the level of informed trading on the KOPSI
200 Index options traded on the Korean Exchange using the spread decomposition
model developed by Madhaven et al. (1997). Estimating the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread, the authors find that information asymmetry
accounts for 34.99% of the bid-ask spread for call options and 39.14% of the bid-ask
spread for put options. The authors find that adverse selection costs are positively
related with option delta.
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Bartram et al. (2008) also show that informed traders are attracted to the
options market, by assessing the impact of adverse selection on option bid-ask spreads
by examining two markets with different levels of information asymmetry. The
authors compare the EuRex, a traditional derivatives exchange, with EuWax which
specializes in bank-issued options. The level of adverse selection is lower on the
EuWax as market makers know the identity of the investors with whom they trade. In
contrast to Vijh (1990) and Neal (1992), the results from comparing similar option
contracts across both markets show that bid-ask spreads on the EuWax are tighter
(4.2%) compared to bid-ask spreads on the EuRex (8.8%). The authors also reveal that
inventory costs are a significant determinant of bid-ask spreads. Ask prices on EuWax
are systematically higher than on EuRex, which is consistent with the idea that market
makers are unable to control their inventory and incur hedging costs to cover their net
short positions.
Extending the results of Vijh (1990) and Neal (1992), Lee and Yi (2001) suggest
that informed trading may only be important for some trade types. They find that
informed trading in the options market is primarily driven by small investors, with the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the CBOE greater than on the
NYSE, with the opposite result found for large trades. This suggests that there are
some investors who prefer to trade in options relative to stocks, with option markets
playing an important role in the price discovery process. The authors also show that
adverse selection costs are negatively related to the option’s delta, implying that
options with greater leverage attract greater levels of informed trading.
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2.2.4 Option Trading Strategies

Option strategies involve the purchase and/or sale of different call options at the same
time. Despite the significant market microstructure literature covering option
markets, there are a scant number of studies examining option strategies. This is
surprising, given the importance of strategy trades in option markets. Chaput and
Ederington (2003) document the use of option strategies by traders for options on
Eurodollar Futures. The authors find that spread and combination trading collectively
account for over 55% of large trades in the Eurodollar options market and almost 75%
of the trading volume due to large trades. The four most heavily traded combinations
are straddles, ratio spreads, vertical spreads and strangles, representing about two
thirds of all strategy trades. The authors find that effective bid-ask spreads are higher
on orders exceeding 500 contracts and on combinations that short volatility.
Fahlenbrach and Sandas (2010) study trading in option strategies using a
sample covering all strategy and individual option trades on the FTSE-100 Index. They
find strategy trades represent 37% of all option trades and account for 75% of the
number of contracts traded. The authors document that the most actively traded
combinations are strangles, straddles, bull and bear spreads, calendar spreads and
covered calls and puts. Furthermore, the most popular strategy trades are delta
neutral trades that have exposure to volatility. Volatility trades, with little or no delta
exposure that consists of only option trades, are found to have information about the
future volatility of the underlying stock. However, the authors find that volatility
trades consisting of both options and futures, do not contain information about future
volatility, as these trades are likely used for hedging reasons. Directional option
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strategies, which are long or short delta with little or no vega exposure, do not contain
information about future returns. The results suggest that informed traders use
volatility strategies, not directional strategies.

2.2.5 Market Makers and Intraday Patterns in Liquidity

A number of studies examine how market makers account for inventory imbalances
and how this affects the intraday variation in liquidity. Transaction demand at the
opening is greater and less elastic as a result of new overnight information, changing
the investors’ optimal portfolio. Inelastic demand at the close results from the
imminent non-trading period leading to different optimal portfolios relative to the
continuous trading period. On a specialist market, a specialist is designated by the
exchange to make a market in a particular security. This allows the monopolist market
maker to charge higher prices at these periods of heavy and inelastic demand. Brock
and Kleidon’s (1992) show that this model predicts high volume at the open and close
of trading, which is contemporaneously associated with wide spreads.
McInish and Wood (1992) examine the intraday behaviour of time-weighted
bid-ask spreads on the NYSE. Examining minute-by-minute spreads across the trading
day, spreads are found to be highest near the open of trading, declines over the course
of the trading day and increases near the close of trading. The authors also split the
day into 13 half hour intervals. Using a linear regression model, spreads are found to
be significantly related to trading activity, risk, information content and competition.
Including time dummies into the regression, parameter estimates of the dummy
variables for each interval reveal spreads are higher at the start and end of the trading
69

day relative to the interim period. The results support the contention of Brock and
Kleidon (1992) that wide spreads at the open and close are driven by the inelastic
demand of investors.
The monopolistic power of the specialist on the NYSE allows them to widen the
bid-ask spread in response to the inelastic demand of investors. However, when
market markers have to compete with one another on a competitive dealer market,
bid-ask spreads do not widen at the close despite inelastic demand. Chan et al. (1995a)
show that spreads on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (a competitive dealer
market) are narrow at the close of trading relative to the NYSE. The reason for this is
that at the close of trading, inventory effects are particularly acute at the close of
trading, as dealers face the risk of holding undesired inventory overnight. This can lead
the market maker with long positions to decrease both their bid and ask prices
(making ask quotes more competitive and bid quotes less competitive) to attract buy
orders, while short positions lead to an increase in bid and ask quotes. This results in
a narrowing of the inside spread (the highest bid price and lowest ask price) near the
close of trading. In an analysis of intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads on the Nasdaq
(a competitive dealer market), Chan et al. (1995b) the authors report that inside
spreads on the Nasdaq narrow significantly near the close of trading and that this
arises from a minority of dealers moving within the spread.
Lee et al. (1993) posit the impossibility of making inferences about liquidity
changes on the basis of spreads or depth alone. The authors illustrate with a simple
pricing function of a dealer using ordered pairs of the ask-price and ask-size and bidprice and bid-size that the combination of the spread and depth is needed to infer
overall changes in liquidity. A simple examination of the bid-ask spread can therefore
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be misleading in inferring patterns in liquidity without also examining changes in
quoted depth. Lee et al. (1993) test the general relation between spreads, depth and
volume on the NYSE as well as testing the relation between these three variables
conditioned on an information event; quarterly earnings announcements. The authors
find that traded volume and bid-ask spreads follow an intraday U-shaped pattern
while quoted depth follows a reverse U-shaped pattern. Results show that bid-ask
spreads widen and quoted depth decreases after periods of high trading volume.
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) posit the impossibility of making inferences
about liquidity changes on the basis of spreads or depth alone. The authors illustrate
with a simple pricing function of a dealer using ordered pairs of the ask-price and asksize and bid-price and bid-size that the combination of the spread and depth is needed
to infer overall changes in liquidity. A simple examination of the bid-ask spread can
therefore be misleading in inferring intraday liquidity patterns without also examining
changes in quoted depth. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) test the general relation
between spreads, depth and volume on the NYSE as well as testing the relation
between these three variables conditioned on an information event; quarterly
earnings announcements. The authors find that traded volume and bid-ask spreads
follow an intraday U-shaped pattern while quoted depth follows a reverse U-shaped
pattern. Results show that bid-ask spreads widen and quoted depth decreases after
periods of high trading volume.
In a test of the inventory model of Ho and Stoll (1983), Chung and Zhao (2004a)
analyse the quote revision behaviour of Nasdaq market makers by examining their
inter-temporal changes in both spread and depth quotes. The authors find that the
intraday variation in the number of quoted revisions follows a U-shaped pattern,
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indicating liquidity management is higher around the open and close of trading
relative to the middle of the day. They attribute the high number of quote revisions
during the last hour of trading as consistent with inventory models such as Amihud
and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1983), with the large number of quote
revisions reflecting the market maker’s attempt to seek desired order flows.

2.7

Summary

This chapter reviews the literature concerned with order placement strategies across
limit order driven markets and markets with a designated market maker that will be
used to inform several hypotheses that are tested in the following chapters. The first
essay assesses the effect of a tick size change on market quality in a futures market
setting. The second essay examines the impact of algorithmic trading on market
quality on the ASX. The third essay analyses the execution costs of option strategies
and their determinants on the Australian Options Market. The fourth essay documents
intraday patterns in liquidity on the Nasdaq.
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Chapter 3: Market Quality Surrounding a Tick Size Increase

3.1

Introduction

The literature reviewed in Section 2.4 provides mixed conclusions with respect to the
impact of a tick size change on market quality. The literature examining reductions in
the minimum price increment find that bid-ask spreads decline in the post-event
period. However, the evidence indicates that quoted depth increases after a reduction
in the tick size. An issue with these studies therefore is determining which of the two
changes has the greatest impact on liquidity. The literature on this issue studies the
impact of a tick size reduction; the effect of a tick size increase is yet to be examined.
The objective of this essay is to bridge this gap in the literature by investigating
a tick size increase in a futures market setting. More specifically, this essay examines
the impact of increasing the tick size on market quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond
futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl
futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex. The remainder of this chapter is structured as
follows. Section 3.2 presents the data. Section 3.3 outlines the research design and
presents the empirical results. Section 3.4 summarises the chapter.

3.2

Hypotheses on Minimum Price Increment

The tick size is the smallest increment that a trading price can move and acts as the
lower bound of the bid-ask spread. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the relationship
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between tick size adjustments and liquidity is a contentious issue, with disagreement
occurring on what constitutes an optimal tick size. For instance, Cordella and Foucault
(1999) establish that transaction costs are not minimized by setting the minimum tick
to zero. Consider a liquidity supplier who observes the competitive price (the price
equaling the expected asset value rounded to the nearest tick) is below the current
best price. In the presence of a minimum tick regime, this trader has the option to
either post at the competitive price or post one tick below the current best price. A
larger tick size creates a bigger wedge between the competitive price and the
expected asset value, providing a greater profit to the trader. This results in liquidity
suppliers being more willing to post at the competitive price, leading to a quicker price
adjustment. The larger tick size therefore does not necessarily increase transaction
costs for liquidity demanders. Whether a change in the tick size increases or decreases
liquidity is dependent upon its effect on both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth.
In a competitive market, a reduction in the minimum price increment allows
liquidity suppliers to post competitive quotes, leading to a reduction in the bid-ask
spread. This is particularly the case if the minimum tick acts as a binding constraint,
which occurs when the bid-ask spread is equal to one tick. Kurov and Zabotina (2005)
argue that a binding minimum tick indicates the tick size is above its competitive level,
which impedes price competition. In this situation, a limit order that improves the
current price becomes a market order. A trader that wishes to earn the bid-ask spread
must place a limit order at the current best price, which due to price-time priority
rules, places the trader’s order at the end of the queue. The minimum tick prevents
the trader from increasing his/her probability of execution through narrowing the
spread, causing bid-ask spreads to be higher in the presence of a minimum tick size
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than without. If the tick size is binding, a reduction in the tick-size will therefore lead
to a reduction in bid-ask spreads. The evidence from prior literature suggests that bidask spreads tighten after a reduction in the minimum tick (see Goldstein and Kavajecz,
2000, Jones and Lipson 2001, Bessembinder 2003, ap Gwilym et al 2005).
Conversely, an increase in the minimum tick may lead to an increase in the bidask spread. However, this depends on whether the new tick size causes artificially wide
bid-ask spreads. Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) report that a coarser pricing grid on
the Paris Bourse does not result in higher bid-ask spreads as the proportion of one tick
spreads is about 10% prior to the tick size reduction. The empirical evidence on the
tick size in futures markets shows that a high percentage of bid-ask spreads trade at
the minimum tick. In a study of the UK Long Gilt Futures, ap Gwilym et al. find that
over 96% of quoted spreads under fractional pricing and 79% of bid-ask spreads under
decimal pricing trade at the minimum tick.

Hypothesis3.1: Bid-ask spreads will increase after the increase in minimum tick

An increase in the minimum tick increases the premium paid to liquidity suppliers for
providing liquidity to the market. The increase in liquidity supplier revenues may
encourage greater participation by liquidity suppliers on the exchange. If the minimum
tick is a binding constraint on the spread, spreads are artificially inflated making it
profitable to submit limit orders. Grossman and Miller (1988) contend that dealers can
more easily cover their fixed costs under a large minimum tick regime, thereby
encouraging dealer participation on the exchange which increases liquidity.
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An increase in the minimum tick has implication for market depth at the best
quotes and throughout the limit order book. Liquidity suppliers who previously posted
limit orders outside the best quotes may choose to place their order at the best bid
and ask prices, leading to an increase in quoted depth at the best quotes. Lau and
McInish (1995) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) argue that a tick size reduction
causes liquidity providers to reduce depth at the best quotes and away from the best
quotes. Under a tick increase, as the cost of liquidity has risen, liquidity demanders
may now choose to place limit orders instead of market orders leading to an increase
in cumulative depth.
A larger tick size may also make investors more willing to expose orders. For
instance, Harris (1991) argues a coarse pricing grid enforces time priority by acting as
a disincentive to step ahead of the current quote, thereby encouraging traders to post
liquidity. The following hypothesis predicts the increase in the tick size will lead to
higher depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order book.

Hypothesis3.2: Quoted depth will be larger at the best bid and ask quotes after the
increase in minimum tick

Hypothesis3.3: Total quoted depth visible in the limit order book will larger after the
increase in minimum tick

Lee et al. (1993) note that studies examining liquidity provision need to simultaneously
examine changes in both spreads and depth. Prior literature has consistently
documented reduced spreads and depth after a tick size reduction. A change in tick
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size therefore has opposing effects on liquidity, leading to difficulty in estimating the
effect of the tick size change on market quality. Several studies have examined the
overall impact of the tick size change on liquidity. Bacidore (1997) finds that execution
costs on the Toronto exchange decline after the reduction in the minimum tick.
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) report the combined effect of reduced bid-ask spreads
and quoted depth benefited small orders but increased the transaction costs of large
orders. In contrast, Bessembinder (2003a) report reduced transaction costs for both
small and large traders. Using the Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) measure of
liquidity, Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) find a lower tick size results in a
significant increase in liquidity. An important determinant of the impact of a tick size
increase on liquidity is the proportion of trades executed at the best quotes. If before
the change a high proportion of trades are executed within the best quotes, an
increase in market depth may not reduce transaction costs as sufficient depth to
transact against already exists. Alampieski and Lepone (2009) report that 99 percent
of all trades are executed against the best prevailing quotes and all trades are
executed within the best two quotes on the SFE. This leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis3.4: An increase in the tick size will lead to a reduction in the level of market
liquidity.

3.3

Eurex and Sydney Futures Exchange

Eurex is Europe's largest futures and options exchange. The Sydney Futures Exchange
(SFE) is the largest futures exchange in the Asia-Pacific Region. Trading on both the
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SFE and the Eurex operates through a fully automated electronic limit order book. The
two main trader types, local participants and full participants, enter orders directly
into the order-book with trades taking place based on price and time precedence
rules.
The 3-Year Treasury bond futures (“3Y T-bond”), 10-Year Treasury bond
futures (“10Y T-bond”) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl futures (“5Y Bob1) and the 10-Year
Euro bund futures (“10Y Bund) follow a quarterly expiration cycle. For the 3Y T-bond
and 10Y T-bond futures, contracts expire on the 15th of March, June, September, and
December with settlement occurring three days before expiration. Both bonds have
face values of AUD 100,000 and are quoted on a “100-yield” basis (yield deducted
from an index of 100.00). The trading hours for both contracts are between 8:30 and
16:30 hours for daytime trading and 17:10 and 7:00 hours for night time trading during
US daylight savings time.1 The delivery date for the 5Y Bobl and 10Y Bund contracts
falls on the tenth calendar day of the respective quarterly month. Both bonds have
face values of EUR 100,000 and are quoted on a “100-yield” basis. Trading hours for
both contracts are between 8:00 and 22:00 hours.
The 3Y T-bond contracts has a minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade
transparency of five levels either side of the limit order-book before May 11, 2009 and
a minimum tick of 1 basis point after that date and pre-trade transparency of three
levels either side of the limit order-book. The 5Y Bob1 contracts have a minimum tick
of 0.5 basis points before June 15, 2009 and a minimum tick of 1 basis points after that
date and pre-trade transparency of ten levels either side of the limit order-book. The

1

Trading is between 17:10 and 7:10 hours for night time trading during US non daylight savings time.
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10Y T-bond contracts have a minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade
transparency of five levels either side of the limit order-book and the 10Y Bund has a
minimum tick of 0.5 basis points and pre-trade transparency of ten levels either side
of the limit order-book. On both the SFE and Eurex, traders can view in real time prices
and order volume on each side of the order book and the traded volume and price of
each trade that occurs. Trading identity however is anonymous as broker mnemonics
are not visible.
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3.3

Data

The data used in this study are provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia
Pacific (SIRCA) and contain a record describing each transaction, including the contract
code, date, time, price, and volume. The data also provide the prices and volumes of
prevailing bid and ask quotes throughout the limit order-book, which are timestamped to the nearest second. On May 11, 2009, the SFE increased the minimum tick
size from 0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 3Y T-bond contract.2 The increase in tick size from
0.5 to 1 basis-point for the 5Y Bob1 contract occurred on June 15, 2009.
To examine the impact of the increase in minimum tick on market quality, we
examine two subsamples three months before and after the change. For the 3Y Tbond, the pre-period is 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 and the post-period is May
13, 2009 to August 13, 2009. For the 5Y Bob1, the pre-event sample period extends
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 and the post-event sample period extends
from June 17, 2009 to September 17, 2009. The day of the change is excluded for both
events. In line with Frino and McKenzie (2002) who find abnormal levels of liquidity
motivated trading near expiry, this study excludes the five days prior to expiration. In
line with Bortoli et al. (2006), analysis is restricted to the nearest to expiry contract
only.

2

The change in tick size on May 11, 2009 coincided with a reduction in the visibility of the order book
in the 3-Year bond futures from five to three price levels.
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3.4

Research Design and Empirical Results

Changes in liquidity before and after the increase in minimum tick may reflect changes
in market conditions as opposed to the change in tick size. To control for this
possibility, the 10Y T-bond and 10Y Bund contracts are used as control contracts. The
two futures contracts on each exchange are regarded as potential substitutes as they
trade on the same platform during the same hours, with underlying assets being riskfree government bonds. The minimum tick size of 0.5 basis points and the level of
transparency of 5 price levels on each side of the order-book for the 10Y T-bond
remained constant over the sample period. The tick size and the level of transparency
also remains constant for the 10Y Bund, with a minimum tick size of 1 basis point and
transparency of 10 price levels either side of the order book.
In an analysis of the Sydney Futures Markets, Alampieski and Lepone (2009)
state that market activity, volatility, and trading in interest rate futures contracts
follow seasonal patterns. As a result, the impact of an increase in transparency may
be indistinguishable from seasonal trading patterns. To further ensure the change in
liquidity results from the increase in the minimum tick and not the impact of
seasonality in trading, a year-on-year analysis is conducted. The post period is
compared to the period 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008 for the 3Y T-bond and 17
June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008 for the 5Y Bob1.
The variables used to assess changes in market quality after the transition are
the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, traded volume, and volatility. The bid-ask spread
is calculated using two measures. Following Frino et al. (2008), the first is the
absolute bid-ask spread in points, measured as the ask-price minus the bid-price.
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Following Alampieski and Lepone (2009), the second measure employed divides the
absolute bid-ask spread by the minimum tick. The bid-ask spread is sampled over 5minute intervals for the day trading sessions and then averaged over each trading
session.
Lee et al. (1993) establish that an examination of liquidity must involve an
analysis of both spreads and depth. Harris suggests that a tick size increase may reduce
the with Harris (1994) arguing that changes in liquidity can only be determined by
assessing changes in depth throughout the limit order book. Goldstein and Kavajecz
(2000) note that an analysis of depth at the best prices omits valuable information as
to whether the change in tick size results in a sufficient change to cumulative depth to
change the transaction costs of large orders. Alternatively, Cao et al. (2009) find that
order book information beyond the best quotes is moderately informative.
Consequently, quoted depth is examined using two measures; best depth and total
depth. Best depth is defined as the combined volume of shares available at both the
best bid price and best ask price at the end of each interval. Total depth is the sum of
the volume of contracts at each bid and ask price throughout the visible limit-order
book at the end of each interval. Similar to bid-ask spreads, best and total depth are
sampled over 5-minute intervals for the day and then averaged over each trading day.
Traded volume is included as a measure of market quality because if
transaction costs increase, trade volume should decrease (Harris, 1994). This is
because a higher bid-ask spread would increase the cost associated with trading as
the spread is a transaction cost paid by liquidity suppliers (Harris, 2003). Trading
volume is calculated as the total number of shares traded during the trading session.
Schwartz (1993) defines volatility as unexpected changes in prices. The tick size can
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effect volatility as prices deviate from fundamental value. A greater tick size will
increase this difference between price and value. Volatility is measured as the natural
logarithm of the highest traded price divided by the lowest traded price for each
trading session.

3.3.1 Univariate Analysis

Table 3-1 provides descriptive statistics of the market quality indicators surrounding
the structural transitions for both event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bobl) and control (10Y Tbond and 10Y bund) contracts. Prior literature including Ahn et al., (1996, 1998),
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2005) indicate
reductions in the minimum tick lead to lower bid -ask spreads. In line with these
findings, there is a significant increase of 0.0050 (0.0046) basis points in the bid-ask
spread for the 3Y T-bond (5Y Bob1) contracts. For the control for 3Y T-bond (i.e., 10Y
T-bond), bid-ask spreads decline significantly at the 1% level, while those for the
control for 5Y Bob1 (i.e., 10Y Bund) increase significantly at the 1% level. Supporting
the prediction of hypothesis H3,1, results suggest that the increase in the bid-ask spread
for the 3Y T-bond is due to the tick-size increase since the market for the 10Y T-bond
contracts experiences the opposite change. This is in line with a number of These are
in line with a number of studies showing that tick size reductions are associated with
lower bid-ask spreads. With respect to the 5Y Bob1 contract, the increase in the bidask spread could result from a market-wide change as bid-ask spreads for the 5Y Bob1
and 10Y Bund change in the same direction, in contradiction to hypothesis H3,1.
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Bid-ask spreads per minimum tick for the 3Y T-bond (5Y Bob1) contracts
decrease by 0.028 (0.128) ticks, which is significant at the 1% level. For the 10Y T-bond,
bid-ask spreads per minimum tick decline significantly at the 1% level, while those for
the 10Y Bund increase significantly at the 1% level. As opposed to the bid-ask spread
results, only the change in the 5Y Bob1 bid-ask spread per minimum tick can be
attributed to the tick size increase since the change for the 10Y Bund occurs in the
opposite direction. In regards to the bid-ask spread per minimum tick for the 3Y Tbond, it is not possible to conclude whether the tick size increase is the cause of the
decrease as the control contract (i.e., 10Y T-bond) experiences a qualitatively similar
change.
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Table 3-1
Descriptive Statistics
This table present descriptive statistics for measures of market liquidity surrounding the increase in
minimum tick for the 3Y T-bond and the 5Y Bob1 contracts. The tick size of the 3Y T-bond contracts was
increased from half to a full-basis point on May 11, 2009. The pre-event sample period extends from
13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13
August, 2009. The tick size of the 5Y Bob1 contracts was increased from half to a full-basis point on June
15, 2009. The pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The postevent sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. Bid-ask spreads and depth are
sampled every 5 minutes (15 minutes) and then averaged for each day. Bid-Ask Spread is the best ask
price minus the best bid price in contract points. BAS is calculated as the bid-ask spread divided by the
minimum tick. Best Depth is the aggregate order volume at the best bid and best ask price. Total depth
is the aggregate order volume throughout the limit-order book. Volatility is the natural logarithm of the
highest traded price divided by the lowest traded price for each day. Volume is the average daily traded
volume. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1%
level.
Panel A: SFE
3Y T-bond
(Event Contract)

10Y T-bond
(Control Contract)

Pre

Post

Post - Pre

Pre

Post

Post - Pre

Bid-Ask Spread

0.0052

0.0102

0.0050**

0.0053

0.0052

-0.0001**

BAS

1.043

1.015

-0.028**

1.059

1.034

-0.025**

531

1,179

648**

192

148

-44**

Best Depth
Total Depth

3,471

4,686

1,215**

1,227

865

-362**

Volatility

0.0860

0.1008

0.0148*

0.0860

0.0921

0.0061*

Volume

48,939

51,461

2,522

19,662

15,356

-4,306**

Panel B: Eurex
5Y Bob1
(Event Contract)

10Y Bund
(Control Contract)

Pre

Post

Post - Pre

Pre

Post

Post - Pre

Bid-Ask Spread

0.0059

0.0105

0.0046**

0.0105

0.0107

0.0002**

BAS

1.176

1.051

-0.125**

1.052

1.069

0.017**

Best Depth

259

651

392**

375

335

-40**

Total Depth

3,719

9,889

6,170**

7,128

6,029

-1,099**

Volatility

0.4819

0.3653

-0.1166**

0.6721

0.5691

-0.1030**

Volume

491,517 315,963 -175,554**

794,117 588,931 -205,186**

Harris (1994) predicted a reduction in the tick size would decrease quoted depth as
liquidity provision is less profitable and more risky. In line with this prediction, quoted
depths at both the best quotes and throughout the limit order book increase for the
3Y T-bond (an increase of 648 (1,215) contracts for best (total) depth) and 5Y Bob1
contracts (an increase of 392 (6,170) contracts for best (total) depth), in contrast to
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the control contracts where both best and total depth levels decline: a reduction of
44 (362) contracts for best (total) depth in the 10Y T-bond and that of 40 (1,099)
contracts for best (total) depth in the 10Y Bund. All changes in (both best and total)
quoted depths reported in Table 3-1 are statistically significant at the 1% level. This is
line with the predictions of the second hypothesis. In contrast to the results for bidask spreads and bid-spreads per minimum tick, results clearly indicates that the
increases in (both best and total) quoted depths for the two event contracts are due
to the tick size increase rather than a market-wide event, as the changes for the
corresponding control contracts are in the opposite direction.
Table 3-1 also reports changes in trading volume and volatility surrounding the
tick size increase. Trading volume is significantly higher for the 3Y T-bond, but is
significantly lower for the 10Y T-bond, while volatility is significantly higher across both
contracts. However, these are in line with the changes in the control contract,
suggesting that the change in tick size has not had an impact on traded volume. For
example, Ahn et al. (2007) finds no increase in volume on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
following the 1997 tick reduction. There is a significant decline in traded volume and
volatility for the 5Y Bob1 and 10Y Bund contracts.

3.1.2 Multivariate Analysis

As documented by Chordia et al. (2000), changes in market quality measures such as
bid-ask spreads and quoted depth are associated with changes in market-wide
liquidity factors. To better isolate the impact of the tick size increase on bid-ask
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spreads and quoted depth, the following regressions (“market wide regressions”,
hereafter) are estimated:

𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(3.1)

𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

(3.2)

𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

(3.3)

where 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the observation is
taken from the post-event sample and zero otherwise. 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 is the bid-ask
spread, 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 is the logarithm of the aggregate order volume at the best
bid and best ask price, and 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 is the logarithm of the aggregate order
volume throughout the limit-order book for the event contracts. The variables
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 , 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ), and 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ) represent
bid-ask spreads, the logarithm of best depth, and the logarithm of total depth for the
control contracts, respectively. In Equation (1), the bid-ask spread is used as the
dependent variable. As a falsification test, these three regressions are re-estimated
using the control contracts as dependent variables.
As presented in Panel A of Table 3-2, the bid-ask spread regression results for
the 3Y T-bond contracts indicate a significant increase in bid-ask spreads at the 1%
level. In contrast, the results for the 10Y T-bond contracts show a negative coefficient
on the dummy variable (at the 5% level), indicating that spreads narrow over the
period. As reported in Panel B and C of Table 3-2, best depth and total visible depth
for the 3Y T-bond contracts increase significantly (at the 1% level) in the post-period
after controlling for depth in the 10Y T-bond contract. The regressions for the control
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contract (10Y T-bond) show a reduction in both best and total depths after the tick
size increase, with both of these changes significant at the 1% level.
Table 3-2
Market Wide Regressions
This table reports the regression results of spreads and depth around the move to full-basis point
trading in the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the pre-event sample period for
extends from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May,
2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl, the pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to
17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009.
The regression equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated for the event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1) contracts
as the dependent variables. As a falsification test, these three regressions are re-estimated using the
control contracts as dependent variables. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level.

Intercept

Change

10Y Tbond

0.0050**

0.1483

3Y T-bond

10Y Bund

5Y Bob1

R2

Panel A: Bid-Ask Spread
SFE
3Y T-bond 0.0044**
10Y T0.0044**
bond
Eurex
5Y Bob1
0.0037**
10Y Bund
0.0090**
Panel C: Best Depth

0.9974

-0.0009*

0.1655

0.0046**
-0.0010*

0.184
0.2071*
0.2519*

0.9931
0.1693

SFE
3Y T-bond
10Y Tbond
Eurex

3.4770**

1.0110**

2.8810**

-0.5580**

5Y Bob1

1.134

0.9810**

10Y Bund

3.0700**

-0.5338**

0.5102**

0.7707
0.3591**

0.3451
0.7240**

0.8921
0.4771**

0.3927

Panel D: Total Depth
SFE
3Y T-bond
10Y Tbond
Eurex

5.3250**

0.4616**

4.7560**

-0.4414**

5Y Bob1

2.6380**

1.0690**

10Y Bund

2.9340**

-0.8574**

0.3892**

0.3559
0.2840**

0.4468
0.6224**

0.9524
0.7195**

0.5531

Table 3-2 also shows the market wide regression results for the 5Y Bob1 contracts.
Bid-ask spreads for the 5Y Bob1 are significantly wider after the change at the 1% level,
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as indicated by the positive dummy variable coefficient. In contrast, there is a
significant decrease in bid-ask spreads for the control contract at the 5% level. Both
best depth and total depth for the 5Y Bob1 increase significantly after the tick change.
For the 10Y Bund contracts, the negative dummy coefficients indicate a significant
decline (at the 1% level) in best depth and total depth in the post-period. These results
support hypotheses H3,1 and H3,2 for both event contracts.
Chordia et al. (2000) find that liquidity measures are dependent on factors
specific to the particular financial instrument in addition to market-wide liquidity
factors. Harris (1994) argues that two important determinants of the bid-ask spread
and quoted depth are trading volume and price volatility. To control for both marketwide and security specific factors on the bid-ask spread and quoted depth, this study
follows Frino, Gerace, and Lepone (2008) and estimates the following equations:

𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝛼3 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 (3.4)
+ 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝛼5 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) +

(3.5)

𝛼3 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝛼5 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) +
(3.6)
𝛼3 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) + 𝛼5 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 , 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ), 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ), and 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 are as described in
Equations (1), (2), and (3). 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 ) is the logarithm of the average daily
traded volume, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the highest traded price
divided by the lowest traded price for each day in the control contracts. 𝐿𝑛(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 )
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and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 represent daily traded volume and volatility in the event contracts,
respectively. As a falsification test, these three regressions are also re-estimated using
the control contracts as dependent variables.
Panel A of Table 3-3 shows that after controlling for volatility and volume for
the 3Y T-bond contract, bid-ask spreads experience a significant increase at the 1%
level after the change in tick size. Supporting hypothesis H3,1, the increase in spreads
is isolated to the 3Y T-bond contract, with bid-ask spreads for the 10Y T-bond contract
showing a significant decrease at the 1% level after the change. In line with the
hypothesis H3,2, the regression results in Panel B and C of Table 3-3 show a significant
improvement in both the best and total depth levels for the 3Y T-bond contracts after
the increase in tick size: this result is specific to the 3Y T-bond contracts, with the
coefficients on the change dummy variables for the 10Y T-bond contracts being
negative at the 1% level. The results of the combined regressions for the 5Y Bob1
contracts are also presented in Table 3-3. The positive dummy coefficient for the 5Y
Bob1 (presented in Panel A) indicate that the bid-ask spread widens in the post-period.
Bid-ask spreads for the 10Y Bund contract are wider in the post-period, as indicated
by the poisitive dummy coefficient (significant at the 1% level), however the economic
size of the coefficient is much smaller than for the 5Y Bobl at 0.0002 relative to 0.0047,
also supporting hypothesis H3,1 with regards to the 5Y Bobl contract. As shown in Panel
B, the dummy variable coefficients for best and total depths are both highly significant
and positive at the 1% level, indicating an increase in depth levels after the tick
increase for the 5Y Bob1. On the contrary, the 10Y Bund contracts experience a
significant decrease in both best and total depths at the 1% level, thus supporting
hypothesis H3,2.
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The results of the analysis suggest that in line with the literature, the increase
in the tick size resulted in both higher bid-ask spreads, and greater depth. The increase
in spreads is not surprising, as the average quoted spread was close to the minimum
tick size prior to the increase in the tick size for both the 3Y T-bond contract and 5Y
Bob1. Harris (1994) suggests that an increase in the tick size will improve quoted depth
as it reduces the cost of front-running an order, as it increase the price a trader has to
pay to obtain price-time priority. The higher tick size therefore provides protection
against quote matchers and front-runners, reducing the cost of displaying quotes on
the limit order book. Furthermore, the greater tick size reduces the likelihood that a
liquidity supplier will trade with a limit order trader (Anshuman and Kalay, 1998).
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Table 3-3
Combined Regressions
This table reports the regression results of spreads and depth around the move to full-basis point trading in the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the
pre-event sample period for extends from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl,
the pre-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. The
regression equations (4), (5), and (6) are estimated for the event (3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1) contracts as the dependent variables. As a falsification test, these three regressions
are re-estimated using the control contracts as dependent variables. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Volatility

Volume

Volatility

Volume

Volatility

(10Y Tbond)

Volatility
(10YTbond)

Volume

Change

Volume

(3Y Tbond)

(3Y Tbond)

(10Y Bund)

(10Y Bund)

(5Y Bob1)

(5Y Bob1)

0.0053**
0.0053**

0.0049**
-0.0002**

-0.0000
-0.0000

-0.0012*
-0.0002

-0.0000
0.0000

0.0014*
0.0005

0.0059**
0.01038

0.0047**
0.0002**

Intercept

R2

Panel A: Bid-Ask Spread
SFE
3Y T-bond
10Y T-bond

0.9974
0.1825

Eurex
5Y Bob1
10Y Bund

0.0000
-0.0000

-0.0000
0.0003

0.0000
0.0000

-0.0000
-0.0003

0.9927
0.1698

Panel C: Best Depth
SFE
3Y T-bond

1.755

0.8727**

-0.0668

-0.0002

0.4870**

-2.980**

0.1804

10Y T-bond

2.5580**

-0.1040*

0.4294*

0.5729

0.4151*

-1.435*

0.4046

5Y Bob1

3.3130*

0.9778**

-0.2926

0.1774

0.4522*

-0.5155

0.128

10Y Bund

2.362

-0.0718

0.3123*

-0.0488

0.1397

-0.2202

0.1875

Eurex
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Table 3, continued
Panel D: Total Depth
SFE
3Y T-bond

4.3510**

0.3273**

-0.044

-0.3102

0.4151**

-3.147**

0.4345

10Y T-bond

5.6300**

-0.2330**

0.3562**

-0.2891

-0.1888*

-0.5096

0.4843

5Y Bob1

6.4900**

0.9915**

-0.0039

-0.1102

0.1397

-0.2165

0.9216

10Y Bund

6.7520**

-0.1711**

0.2997*

-0.2032

-0.1427

-0.1254

0.2945

Eurex
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3.3.3 Execution Costs

To provide a more comprehensive assessment of the change in liquidity after the
increase in minimum tick (i.e., whether the change in bid-ask spreads dominates the
change in quoted depth), this section tests the third hypothesis by examining the price
impact of executing orders. The pre-trade benchmark represents the price that would
have prevailed had the trade not executed (Domowitz et al., 2001), while the posttrade benchmark represents the equilibrium price after all short-term price pressure
has dissipated (Harris, 2003). A significant price impact would suggest that the
increase in quoted depth did not offset the cost of the increase in the bid-ask spread.
Trades are classified as buyer- and seller-initiated using the method of Ellis,
Michaely, and O’Hara (2000). Each trade is classified into four mutually exclusive
quartiles based on trade size. The first quartile contains the smallest 25% of trade sizes
and the fourth quartile contains the largest 25% of trade sizes. Studies employ
different different pre- and post-trade benchmarks. Berkman et al. (2005) use an
intraday benchmark of mid-quotes five seconds before and five minutes after
transactions. However, studies of intraday show patterns in liquidity in order-driven
markets shows that traded volume follows a U-shape pattern, meaning that the
number of trades within 5 minutes is not constant across the trading day (Ahn and
Cheung, 1999). Therefore consistent with Gemmill (1996), the transaction price five
trades prior to the trade is used as the pre-trade benchmark, where the price impact
of each trade is measured as the basis point change from the pre-trade benchmark
price to the trade price. This is averaged across each day and then across each sample
period.
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Results of the price impact analysis for the 3Y T-bond contracts are shown in
Table 3-4. There is a significant increase in execution costs across all quartiles for both
buyer and seller-initiated trades at the 1% level. For purchases, execution costs for the
first quartile averaged 0.1109 basis points before the tick increase and 0.2105 basis
points after, a significant change of 0.0996 basis points at the 1% level. Similar results
are found for the other three quartiles.
Qualitatively comparable results are obtained for sales. For the first and
second quartiles, price impact increases significantly by 0.1000 and 0.0610 basis points
at the 1% level respectively, while the third and fourth quartiles show a significant
increase of 0.0600 and 0.0920 basis points (both at the 1% level). Table 3-4 also reveals
that results for the 5Y Bob1 contracts are qualitatively similar to those for the 3Y Tbond contracts.
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Table 3-4
Execution Costs
Price impact results are presented before and after the change in tick size for the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bobl contracts. For the 3Y T-bonds, the pre-event sample period extends
from 13 May, 2008 to 13 August, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 13 May, 2009 to 13 August, 2009. For the 5Y Bobl, the pre-event sample period extends
from 17 June, 2008 to 17 September, 2008. The post-event sample period extends from 17 June, 2009 to 17 September, 2009. Trades are classified as buyer and seller
initiated using the methodology of Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000). The price impact of each trade is measured as the change from the transaction price five trades prior
to the trade price. This is averaged across each day and then across each sample period. Each trade is classified into four mutually exclusive quartiles based on trade size.
The first quartile contains the smallest 25% of trade-sizes and the fourth quartile contains the largest 25% of trade-sizes. Price impact is reported in basis points. * indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Quartile 1
Buy
Panel A: Pre-period
SFE
3Y T-bond
0.1109
10Y T-bond
0.1418
Eurex
5Y Bob1
0.1637
10Y Bund
0.3424
Panel B: Post-period
SFE
3Y T-bond
0.2105
10Y T-bond
0.1655
Eurex
5Y Bob1
0.2805
10Y Bund
0.3076
Panel C: Post - Pre
SFE
3Y T-bond
0.0996**
10Y T-bond
0.0237**
Eurex
5Y Bob1
0.1168**
10Y Bund
-0.0348**

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

All

Sell

Buy

Sell

Buy

Sell

Buy

Sell

Buy

Sell

-0.1140
-0.1260

0.1047
0.1425

-0.1260
-0.1360

0.1099
0.1460

-0.1410
-0.1540

0.1544
0.1810

-0.1710
-0.1900

0.1194
0.1584

-0.1380
-0.1610

-0.1555
-0.3367

0.1412
0.3147

-0.1421
-0.3146

0.1507
0.3108

-0.1507
-0.3078

0.1437
0.3346

-0.1517
-0.3415

0.1484
0.3255

-0.1509
-0.3245

-0.2140
-0.1700

0.2233
0.1474

-0.1870
-0.1470

0.2424
0.1461

-0.2010
-0.1560

0.2985
0.1629

-0.2630
-0.1790

0.2394
0.1555

-0.2160
-0.1630

-0.2652
-0.3177

0.2702
0.2883

-0.2575
-0.3005

0.2855
0.2973

-0.2726
-0.2919

0.3197
0.3879

-0.3110
-0.3986

0.2889
0.3203

-0.2856
-0.3292

-0.1000**
-0.0440**

0.1186**
0.0049

-0.0610**
-0.0110

0.1325**
0.0001

-0.0600**
-0.0020

0.1441**
-0.0181**

-0.0920**
0.011

0.1200**
-0.0029*

-0.0780**
-0.0020

-.01097**
0.0190**

0.1290**
-0.0264**

-.01154**
0.0141**

0.1347**
-0.0136**

-0.1218**
0.0160**

0.1760**
0.0533**

-0.1596**
-0.0570**

0.1405**
0.0051

-0.1347**
-0.0038
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In contrast to the results for the event contracts, those for the control (10Y Tbond and 10Y Bund) contracts are mixed. With respect to the total sample, results for
both control contracts indicate that there is no significant change in execution costs
for both purchases and sales at the 1% level. Results are not uniform across the four
quartile groups for both control contracts, however when costs are seen to increase
this is still less than for the 3Y T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts. For example, for
purchases of the 3Y T-bond, the difference in execution costs for the first quartile
averaged 0.1109 basis points, relative to 0.0237 basis points. This means that the
changes in execution costs for the event contracts is likely to be attributed to the tick
size increase, supporting hypothesis H3,3. These results suggest that increasing the
minimum price increment has a negative impact on market quality, where the cost of
increasing the bid-ask spread more than offset the increase in quoted depth. This is
likely the result of there being already sufficient liquidity in futures markets prior to
the tick increase to absorb the impact of market orders. This is in line with studies that
find that the impact of a reduction in tick size primarily benefits small trades and liquid
securities (Bollen and Whaley, 1998).

3.5

Summary

This essay investigates the impact of the increase in minimum tick size on market
quality using the 3-Year Treasury bond futures (“3Y T-bond”) on the Sydney Futures
Exchange (SFE) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl futures (“5Y Bob1”) on the Eurex, which is
distinguished from prior studies that examine tick size reductions. The literature for
both equity and futures markets provide evidence that a reduction in the tick size is
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associated with lower spreads and quoted depth. As these changes have conflicting
effects on liquidity, certain studies attribute the change in spreads and depth as
indicative of an improvement in liquidity, while other studies conclude a reduction in
overall liquidity, which warrants a re-examination of this issue.
This essay provides evidence that a tick size increase is associated with an
increase in depth at the best quotes and throughout the limit order-book for both 3Y
T-bond and 5Y Bob1 contracts, which is consistent with results in prior studies.
However, with respect to both bid-ask spreads, this paper finds mixed evidence. The
results show that the change in tick size lead to wider bid-ask spreads for the 3Y Tbond and the 5Y Bob1. This chapter suggest that the increase in the tick size lead to
an increase in execution costs, indicating that the increase in the bid-ask spread has
more than offset the increase in quoted depth.
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Chapter 4: Algorithmic Trading and Market Quality

4.1

Introduction

This study investigates the relation between algorithmic trading volume and future
market quality. Recent academic research has begun to focus on the impact of
algorithmic trading on market quality such as liquidity and volatility (Hendershott and
Riordan, 2011, Hasbrouck and Sarr, 2011, Brogaard, 2010, and Jones and Menkveld
2011). Although the evidence suggests that algorithmic traders (ATs) are not
associated with reduced market quality, there are concerns that ATs can exacerbate
market instability by increasing (decreasing) their demand (supply) of liquidity when
liquidity is scarce. Despite these concerns, none of them examines how the impact of
algorithmic trading on market quality during market declines differs from that during
market upturns. The aim of this study is to bridge this gap in the literature by
examining whether the relation between algorithmic trading and market quality
differs across up and down markets. Furthermore, it examines whether market
conditions affect the behaviour of ATs, which differentially impacts the market.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the
hypotheses on the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality. Section 3 gives an
overview of the institutional details of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) provides
an overview of the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the
research design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarises.
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4.2

Hypotheses on Algorithmic Trading

Algorithmic trading involves automating order executions according to a set of prespecified conditions such as prices, volatility etc. This enables algorithmic trading
programs to be more efficient at processing and utilizing trading information relative
to human market makers (Gerig and Michayluk, 2010). One of the other distinguishing
features of algorithmic trading is its speed of execution, with latency speeds measured
in milliseconds. ATs can thus transact on the information they acquire
instantaneously. Hendershott and Riordan (2011) suggest that the AT’s superior ability
to process trade data and their fast execution speed enable efficient monitoring and
adjustment of limit orders in response to new public information. This reduces the
cost of the option provided by limit orders, leading to an improvement in liquidity.
Furthermore, the ability of algorithms to continuously monitor the market can allow
ATs to supply liquidity when it is cheap and take liquidity when it is expensive, thereby
moderating short-term volatility. The empirical literature for equity and foreign
exchange markets document that ATs improve market quality. Higher algorithmic
trading leads to a narrowing of bid-ask spreads and effective spreads, price discovery
increases and short-term volatility either reduces or does not increase (see Brograad,
2010; Chaboud et al., 2011; Hendershott et al., 2011; Hendershott and Riordan,
2011). The following hypothesis predicts that algorithmic trading has either no impact
or leads to an improvement in market quality.

Hypothesis4.1: An increase in algorithmic trading will either have no impact or lead to
an improvement in market quality.
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Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) model ATs as a new form of market maker on limit
order markets. If a trader places a limit order, a common value innovation occurring
after the placement can leave the order stale and provides a trading option that can
be picked off by other traders. This increases the adverse selection costs faced by the
limit order trader, resulting in higher execution costs. The superior information
processing speed of ATs creates an edge in quickly updating limit orders as public
information arrives. ATs may therefore act as middlemen in limit order markets for
other limit order traders, as their limit orders are continuously refreshed, which
inhibits informed traders from taking advantage of this trading option.
Kirilenko et al. (2011) however find that during periods of market stress,
algorithmic traders display behaviour inconsistent with traditional market makers. A
designated market maker differs from a strategic trader as they have an affirmative
obligation to maintain two-sided markets during exchange hours and to buy and sell
at their displayed bids and offers. An analysis of the behaviour of HFTs during the flash
crash of 6 May, 2010 reveals that HFTs trade aggressively in the direction of price
changes and comprise a large percentage of total trading activity, but do not
accumulate significant inventory positions. They are not willing to either accumulate
large positions or sustain large losses and in rebalancing their positions, they may also
compete for liquidity, thus amplifying price volatility. An implication of this result is
that algorithmic traders may have a negative impact on market quality during intraday
price falls. The following hypothesis predicts that algorithmic trading leads to a decline
in market quality during intraday periods of negative returns.
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Hypothesis4.2: During intraday periods of negative returns, an increase in algorithmic
trading will lead to a reduction in market quality.

There is also the possibility that algorithmic trading may differentially impact market
quality during different market environments. However, the empirical evidence
suggests that this is not the case. Hasbrouck and Saar (2012) find that the impact of
low latency activity (a proxy for algorithmic trading) enhances market quality over
periods dominated by flat or rising prices and during periods dominated by falling
prices and economic uncertainty. Brogaard (2012) examines the effect of HFTs on
volatility over the 2008-09 period, which is a time period characterized by heightened
volatility. Examining the short sale ban in 2008 that removed a fraction of HFT
participants, the author finds HFTs reduce volatility. The following hypothesis predicts
that the effect of algorithmic trading on market quality should be similar across
different market conditions.

Hypothesis4.3: There is no difference in the effect of algorithmic trading on market
quality during bull and bear markets.

Contrarian traders are traders that increase their buying when prices fall and increase
their selling when prices are rising. Kaniel et al. (2008) argue that contrarian traders
act as liquidity providers. Institutional investors requiring immediacy offer price
concessions to encourage other investors to take the other side of the trade.
Momentum traders conversely act as liquidity demanders. The results of Kirilenko et
al. (2011) show that during the Flash Crash HFTs acted as momentum traders,
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aggressively selling to keep inventories near a target inventory level. Herding and
positive-feedback trading by ATs may result in a reduction in market quality (Culter et
al., 1990). The following hypothesis predicts that ATs engage in momentum trading
during intraday periods of negative returns.

Hypothesis4.4: Algorithmic traders act as liquidity demanders during price falls.

4.3

Australian Securities Exchange

The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) was formed in July 2006 through the merger
of the Australian Stock Exchange and the Sydney Futures Exchange. The ASX operates
as a fully automated continuous order-driven market. Orders are submitted
electronically by buyers and sellers through the ASX Trade, an electronic order book
for securities listed on the ASX. ASX Trade replaced the Integrated Trading System (ITS)
in November 2010, which earlier replaced the Stock Exchange Automated Trading
System (SEATS) in October 2006. The system facilitates the trading of equities, debt
securities and warrants on ASX’s markets. Orders are automatically matched based on
price and time priority. Submitted orders are filled by crossing with either the best bid
(if it is a sell order) or the best ask (in the case of a buy order). Unfilled orders become
standing limit orders which fill the bid-ask schedule. The information available to all
market participants on the bid-ask schedule include any standing limit orders, its order
type, volume and price. A short series of the most recent executions are also visible.
The ASX facilitates trades during exchange-open hours between 10:00 am to
4:00 pm. Brokers can submit orders in the pre-open from 7:00-10:00 am in
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preparation for the market opening. A single price call auction takes place for each
stock between 10:00-10:09:15 am using a specific algorithm. To prevent brokers from
distorting prices, the actual opening time is generated randomly and occurs within 15
seconds of the prescribed opening time. Normal trading takes place between 10:00
am and 4:00 pm under a continuous double-sided auction where price and time
priority rules apply. Trading ceases at 4:00 pm and the market is placed in pre-close
until 4:10 pm. Brokers enter, amend and cancel orders in preparation for the closing
single price auction which takes place between 4:10 pm and 4:12 pm.

4.2

Data and Descriptive Statistics

An internal database is directly sourced from the ASX. The dataset consists of trade by
trade data for the top 100 capitalised stocks listed on the ASX from July 2, 2007 to
October 26, 2009. The unique feature of this dataset is that it consists of a field that
identifies the source of each trade. Using this identifier, this study determines which
trades are associated with human traders or computer based systems. This field, which
is a five character user code, consists of two types of user code. The first group of user
code is five letter user code that consists of a username of a market participant
associated with each submitted order indicate the actions of a human trader.3 The
second group of user code is five alphanumeric characters which indicate that the
order is submitted through a computer based system gateway.

3

User code consists of four characters of the participant’s surname, followed by a single character of
his/her first name. For example, the participant whose name is Anthony Flint is identified as “FLINA”.
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Note that the first (second) group is a proxy for human (computer) based
trading; it is possible that human traders submit their orders through the computer
based system gateway, and that a computer based trading strategy is executed
through a terminal classified as human based.45 This study further classifies the group
of computer based system as either ATs or other computer based trading platform,
referred to as Broker Engines (BEs), based on the average trade size and trading
frequency from the relevant gateway, with BE’s trading in both larger size and lower
frequency than algorithmic trading gateways.6
This study combines the ASX internal dataset with ten levels of order book data
sourced from Thompson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) provided by the Securities
Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA). The combined dataset provides a
reconstruction of the full order book for each trade. For each trade, the following
information is provided in the dataset: (i) the direction of the trade (i.e., buy/sell), (ii)
the share volume, (iii) stock code, (iv) date, (v) time stamp to the nearest hundredth
of a second, (vi) initiator indication (indicating which participant initiated the trade),
(vii) market participant identifier (ASX internal field described above), and (viii) bid and
ask quotes and share volume at each of the ten depth levels. Information from the
liquidity suppliers includes trade price, volume, and user code.

Further information about each user code is contained in the “ASX source file”. This file indicates that
each participant can be associated with multiple user codes through which they can process orders.
5
This classification scheme originally identifies retail brokers (such as Commonwealth Securities
Limited (“CommSec”) and ETRADE Australia Securities Ltd (“E*TRADE Australia”)) as computer
based traders; however, these brokers are predominantly retail-based, and are subsequently classified as
human traders.
6
To further test the robustness of the computerised user code classifications, the sample is cross tested
by applying a filter based on the frequency of trades and average dollar volume across each six month
sub-sample.
4
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Table 6-1 reports summary statistics for the 100 sample stocks by trader type.
The average dollar traded volume per 15-minute interval is $2,787,462, suggesting a
high level of trading activity in our sample stocks. A significant proportion of trading
volume is conducted by ATs, averaging $996,473 in dollar traded volume over each
15-minute interval. Algorithmic trading dollar volumes are split evenly between buys
and sells, with average dollar buy volumes accounting for about 51% of algorithmic
trading dollar volumes.
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Table 4-1
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for average trading activity per 15-minute interval over the
period from 2 July, 2007 to 26 October, 2009 for 100 sample stocks. Algorithmic Trades are trades
classified as originating from a computer algorithm. All Trades include all trades for the entire sample
period. Total Ratio, Buy Ratio, and Sell Ratio are the trading activity ratios. Each ratio is calculated by
dividing the trading value contributed by the AT by order type by total dollar volume transacted in the
interval.
Algorithmic Trades
All Trades
Total
Buy
Sell
Total
Panel A: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by dollar volume transacted
Mean
996,473
507,264
489,209
2,787,462
Median
387,253
189,545
183,542
880,095
Max
114,105,434
109,810,983
42,726,422
2,390,425,843
Min
0
0
0
1
Standard Deviation
1,013,692
970,294
927,707
6,616,942
Panel B: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by share volume transacted
Mean
84,291
42,751
41,238
263,255
Median
40,432
19,433
18,635
92,526
Max
25,523,166
24,564,580
8,904,090
148,207,452
Min
0
0
0
1
Standard Deviation
186,482
104,276
97,569
842,649
Panel C: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by number of trades
Mean
61
32
29
107
Median
40
20
18
70
Max
1,573
1,125
1,077
2,709
Min
0
0
0
1
Standard Deviation
67
37
35
118
Panel D: Average trading activity in a 15-minute interval as measured by trading ratios
Total Ratio
Buy Ratio
Sell Ratio
Mean
0.4954
0.2519
0.2435
Median
0.4956
0.2239
0.2148
Max
1
1
1
Min
0
0
0
Standard Deviation
0.2133
0.1640
0.1614

4.3

Research Design

To analyze the relation between algorithmic trading and subsequent market quality,
the trading day is partitioned into multiple time intervals. However, the length of the
time interval depends on two contradicting factors. First, as ATs can react fast to
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changing market conditions, the time interval should not be too long to ensure the
effects of algorithmic trading on market quality are captured. However, the time
interval should not be too short to limit the number of transactions within each
interval. Hendershott et al. (2014) examine liquidity measures in 5 and 30 minute
intervals. In this study, each trading day is divided into 15-minute intervals. Trading
hours on the ASX are between 10:00 and 16:00. A single price call auction takes place
between 10:00-10:10 through the use of a specific algorithm. This time period is
removed from the sample, as the nature of the orders submitted during this period is
fundamentally different from the continuous double sided auction that takes place on
the ASX limit order book.
Hendershott (2011) state that algorithmic trading should be normalised by
trading volume, otherwise it would proxy for overall changes in trading volume.
Following Lakanishok et al. (1992), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), and Li and
Wang (2010), algorithmic trading volume is measured as:

𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 =

𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡

(4.1)

where 𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 (𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) is the total dollar value of
market and limit order purchases (sales) made by ATs for stock 𝑖 in interval 𝑡. This
consists of trades undertaken by an AT, and does not include broker engine trades.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total dollar value of all market and limit order buys
and sells for stock 𝑖 in interval 𝑡. This includes algorithmic, broker engine and human
trades. Trading volume ratios for buys and sells are also calculated separately, where
algorithmic trading buy volume is measured as:
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𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡

𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖𝑡 =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡

(4.2)

and algorithmic trading sell volume is measured as:

𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 =

𝐴𝑇_𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡

(4.3)

where algorithmic trading buying, selling, and total trading volume is calculated as
before.
Following Harris (1994), liquidity indicators analysed include the bid-ask
spread, market depth, and short-term volatility. The bid-ask spread is defined as:

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 =

𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑡 −𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡
(

𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑡 +𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑡
)
2

(4.4)

where 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 is the percentage bid-ask spread for stock 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, the inside
ask is the lowest ask price at time period t, and the inside bid is the highest bid price
at period 𝑡. The mid-point is used to avoid problems associated with bid-ask bounce.
It is computed for every trade for each stock, and is averaged over all trades in each
interval. As a robustness test, the percentage effective spread is also employed, and
is defined as twice the difference between the actual execution price and the market
quote at the time of each trade. Market depth is calculated using two measures. Best
depth is defined as the logarithm of the total number of shares available at the best
bid and the best ask (Harris, 1994). It is computed for every trade for each stock and
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is averaged across all trades for each 15-minute interval. The second measure is
defined as the sum of the volume of shares at each bid and ask price throughout the
limit-order book. Volatility is measured using the intraday high-low price range
estimator proposed by Parkinson (1980). The volatility measure is given as follows:

𝜎=√

(lnℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ−ln𝑙𝑜𝑤)2
4𝑙𝑛2

, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇.

(4.5)

where volatility is calculated for the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ stock in the 𝑡𝑡ℎ time interval; ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ and 𝑙𝑜𝑤
refers to the highest traded price and lowest traded price in each 15-minute interval.
To avoid the effect of bid-ask bounce, the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask spread is
used as the traded price.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Multiple Regressions of Market Quality on Lagged Algorithmic Volume

To determine the impact of algorithmic trading volume on market quality,
Hendershott et al. (2014) use an instrumental variable regression to determine causal
impacts. They argue that the decision to engage in algorithmic trading may depend on
liquidity. To account for this potential endogeneity issue, the lagged ratio of
algorithmic trading volume to total volume is used as an instrument. The intuition
behind this is that lagged algorithmic trading precedes changes in market quality
indicators. This may not overcome all endogeneity issues however if the liquidity
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variables are serially correlated. Consequently, when submitting an order using an
algorithm, traders may form expectations about future bid-ask spreads and depth. In
estimating the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality, Hendershott et al.
(2011) include trading volument and volatility as control variables in their regression.
Hendershott et al. (2011) note that the quoted bid-ask spread is problematic as
traders may be willing to trade inside the bid-ask quote. Consequently, both the
quoted bid-ask spread and effective spread are included. To examine the relation
between algorithmic trading volume and subsequent market quality, the following
regressions are estimated for each individual stock:

𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

(4.6)
1)

𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

(4.7)

𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1

(4.8)

(4.9)

+ 𝛽4 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage bid-ask spread and effective spread for time
interval 𝑡, respectively; 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of the best and total
depth at time interval 𝑡; 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ) and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1) ratios; and 𝑁𝑇𝑡
is the number of trades executed during time interval 𝑡. 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 , 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 , and 𝜎𝑡−1 are
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to control for serial-autocorrelation in the dependent variables. 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day, and
zero otherwise; and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to
16:00 hours, and zero otherwise. The inclusion of intraday time dummy variables
controls for intraday variation. The volatility regression is estimated four times, with
each liquidity variable (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 ,𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 ,𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 , and 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1) used as an
explanatory variable in the regression. Each equation is estimated separately for each
stock using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); the resulting t-statistics are
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987).
The regression results for percentage spreads are reported in Table 4-2, which
are estimated using the total number of algorithmic trades in the interval, as well as
algorithmic buy and sell trades. Table 4-2 reports the cross-sectional means of the
coefficients and associated t-statistics. Results show that for total algorithmic trades,
both bid-ask spread measures are positively associated with lagged algorithmic
trading volume; the average t-statistic for the bid-ask spread (effective spread) is 2.36
(2.36). In contrast, examining buy and sell trades individually, the coefficients on the
ratios are not distinguishable from zero. This is different to Hendershott et al. (2014)
who show that algorithmic trading resulted in a reduction in bid-ask spreads.
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Table 4-2
Percentage Spreads and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The
regression model is specified as follows:
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 ) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 ) during
time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 ) ratio,
respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday high-low
price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from
10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term. Regression
coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses.
The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for presentation, the
coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 , 𝑁𝑇𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 105, and those for Constant, 𝜎𝑡−1 , 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 ,
and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 102.
Total
Constant
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(12.08)
2.00
(2.36)
-0.07
(-1.91)
1.03
(6.07)
85.33
(162.43)

𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡
R2

-0.20
(-2.57)
0.10
(0.80)
0.79

Buy
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(12.00)
4.00
(2.36)
-0.10
(-1.90)
1.55
(6.06)

85.29
(161.58)
-0.30
(-2.56)
0.10
(0.79)
0.79

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(12.90)
2.00
(1.06)
-0.07
(-1.89)
1.02
(6.02)
85.42
(163.69)

-0.20
(-2.61)
0.10
(0.70)
0.79

Sell
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(12.82)
2.00
(1.06)
-0.10
(-1.89)
0.015
(6.01)

85.38
(162.83)
-0.30
(-2.61)
0.10
(0.69)
0.79

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(12.74)
2.00
(1.84)
-0.07
(-1.90)
0.010
(6.03)
85.41
(163.98)

-0.20
(-2.61)
0.10
(0.74)
0.79

𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(12.66)
3.00
(1.84)
-0.10
(-1.90)
0.015
(6.02)

85.37
(163.13)
-0.30
(-2.60)
0.10
(0.73)
0.79

An important determinant of market quality is the available size to trade at both the
bid and ask side of the market. For larger market participants, a reduction in depth at
or near the best quotes may result in worse execution prices as traders consume
liquidity to fill the order. Harris (1990) argues that liquidity has both a price dimension
(i.e., bid-ask spread) and a quantity dimension (i.e., depth). For instance, if an AT
efficiently picks off stale limit orders, limit order traders may reduce their order size
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in response. Hendershott et al. (2011) show that higher algorithmic trading volume is
negatively associated with market depth.

Table 4-3
Quoted Depths and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The
regression model is specified as follows:
𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) and total quoted depth
(𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell
(𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 ) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the
intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random
error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average tstatistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units
for presentation, the coefficient for 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is multiplied by 104, and the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑡 ,
and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 102.
Total
Constant
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1

𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.08
(28.26)
-1.23
(-1.16)
2.30
(2.60)
-6.64
(-7.73)
0.89
(282.44)

𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡
R2

1.01
(1.57)
2.05
(4.64)
0.81

𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.53
(19.81)
-0.76
(-1.70)
-0.30
(-0.58)
-2.29
(-4.98)

0.95
(561.90)
1.08
(3.52)
0.76
(3.07)
0.92

Buy
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.06
(28.73)
-0.13
(-0.20)
2.30
(2.53)
-6.58
(-7.68)
0.89
(285.08)

1.04
(1.62)
2.07
(4.68)
0.81

Sell
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.52
(19.93)
-0.38
(-0.76)
-0.30
(-0.64)
-2.26
(-4.94)

0.95
(566.76)
1.09
(3.56)
0.78
(3.13)
0.92

𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.07
(28.92)
-1.69
(-1.23)
2.30
(2.54)
-6.59
(-7.70)
0.89
(284.79)

1.02
(1.59)
2.05
(4.66)
0.81

𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.52
(20.02)
-0.86
(-1.40)
-0.30
(-0.64)
-2.27
(-4.95)

0.95
(565.89)
1.09
(3.55)
0.77
(3.12)
0.92

Table 4-3 shows the regression results for both best and total depth. In contrast to
Hendershott et al. (2011), the relationship between algorithmic trading volume and
subsequent market depth is insignificant for both depth measures.
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Table 4-4
Volatility and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The
regression models are specified as follows:
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic
total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 ) ratio, respectively; 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage
bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 ) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 ) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the
natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) and total quoted depth (𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) during time
interval 𝑡; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a
random error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average
t-statistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the
units for presentation, the coefficient for Constant, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 , 𝑁𝑇𝑡 , 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 , 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are
multiplied by 104.

Constant
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡
R2

Total
Buy
Sell
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
-1.60 -1.60 17.60 32.00 -1.40 -1.40 17.90 32.20 -1.40 -1.40 17.80 32.10
(-1.06) (-1.05) (5.14) (5.72) (-0.69) (-0.68) (5.43) (5.92) (-0.79) (-0.78) (5.41) (5.87)
0.50 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.04 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.20
(0.84) (0.84) (0.73) (0.56) (0.32) (0.32) (0.17) (0.06) (0.64) (0.64) (0.53) (0.40)
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(8.77) (8.77) (8.35) (8.45) (8.78) (8.78) (8.36) (8.45) (8.78) (8.78) (8.37) (8.46)
0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73
(43.74) (43.74) (47.32) (46.20) (43.74) (43.75) (47.38) (46.28) (43.78) (43.78) (47.44) (46.33)
0.56
0.58
0.58
(6.22)
(6.29)
(6.28)
-1.40
-1.40
-1.40
(-4.45)
(-4.54)
(-4.52)
0.38
0.38
0.38
(6.22)
(6.28)
(6.27)
-2.40
-2.40
-2.40
(-5.34)
(-5.40)
(-5.37)
-0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.10
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.30)
1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70
(2.30) (2.30) (2.47) (2.42) (2.29) (2.29) (2.46) (2.41) (2.29) (2.29) (2.47) (2.42)
0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59

The last market quality variable examined is volatility. The literature examining
algorithmic and high frequency trading find that the presence of algorithmic trading
does not contribute to higher volatility, and may actually lower it (Hendershott and
Riordan, 2011). Hendershott and Riordan (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading is
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more likely to dampen volatility than to increase it, as ATs can monitor the market and
demand liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity when it is expensive, thereby
moderating changes in liquidity. Table 4-4 shows the relation between algorithmic
trading volume on subsequent volatility. In line with Hendershott and Riordan (2011),
algorithmic trading does not contribute to higher volatility. Across all regression
specifications, the coefficients on algorithmic trading variables are not distinguishable
from zero, consistent with the first hypothesis (H4,1).

4.4.2 Algorithmic Trading Volume during Periods of Market Stress

The results in the previous section show that market quality is not associated with
lagged algorithmic trading volume (except for the total ratio). This is similar to other
studies finding that algorithmic trading does not result in a deterioration in market
quality. However, Kirilenko et al. (2011) document that algorithmic trading had a
negative impact on the market during one period of extreme market stress. Examining
the flash crash of May 6, 2010, the authors find that HFT was not responsible for the
crash, though their responses exacerbated market volatility during the period.
Kirilenko et al. (2011) find that HFTs exhibit trading patterns inconsistent with
traditional market makers, through trading aggressively in the direction of price
changes and not accumulating significant inventory positions. Thus, HFTs do not
supply liquidity when prices move against their trading position. Further, they can
exacerbate price movements by competing for liquidity as they try to rebalance their
inventory positions. The results of Kirilenko et al. (2011), however, apply to one
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extreme event. It is unknown whether such behaviour is representative of algorithmic
trading during less extreme market episodes.

To test this, each time interval is classified into up and down intervals for each stock,
based on whether the return is positive or non-positive. This is defined as:

𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑝 ≡ {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡 < 0

and 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 ≡ 1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑝

(4.10)
(4.11)

The following regression models are then estimated for each stock:

+
−
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1

+ 𝛽5 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(4.12)

+
−
𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1

+ 𝛽5 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(4.13)

+
−
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1

(4.14)
+ 𝛽5 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
+
−
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1

(4.15)
+ 𝛽5 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

𝑈𝑝
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛
−
where 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼0+
𝑡−1 ≡ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 ≡ 𝐷𝑡−1 . The findings of

Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2011) suggest that algorithmic trading can have a
negative impact on trading during market downturns if algorithmic trading increase
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their demand for liquidity, or reduce their supply of liquidity, as total liquidity
contracts, or both.
Table 4-5 shows the results for bid-ask spreads and effective spreads. Panel A
of Table 4-5 shows that lagged algorithmic trading volume is positively related to bidask spreads and effective spreads only for down intervals. This positive relation is
significant during down intervals with an average t-statistic of 2.97 for both bid-ask
spreads and effective spreads, and insignificant for up intervals with an average tstatistic of 1.64 and 1.63, respectively. These results are consistent across buy and sell
trades, with the coefficients in the regressions for both spread measures positive and
significant for down intervals, and insignificant for up intervals. These results show
that the relation between market quality and lagged algorithmic trading volume is not
independent of market conditions, suggesting that the findings of Kirilenko et al.
(2011) can be extended to less extreme market falls.
The results for market depth are shown in Table 4-6. After controlling for
lagged depth and volatility, intraday variation and trading activity, total depth is
significantly and negatively related to lagged algorithmic trading volume. Examining
all trades, the average coefficient on the lagged algorithmic trading volume during
down intervals is significantly negative with an average t-statistic of -2.97. The
relationship between lagged algorithmic trading volume and market depth is,
however, insignificant when 𝑄𝐷𝑡 is computed using the best quotes (average tstatistic of -1.96), suggesting that the main impact of lagged algorithmic trading
volume is on depth throughout the limit order book. Similar to the spread results, 𝛽1
is insignificant for both best and total depth. The results are similar for buys and sells,

118

with 𝛽1 being insignificant across both best and total depth, while 𝛽2 is significantly
negative for total depth, not best depth.
Table 4-5
Percentage Spreads and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down
Markets
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The
regression model is specified as follows:
+
−
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡
where 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 ) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 ) during
time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up and down
intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 )
ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday
high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term.
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in
parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for
+
−
presentation, the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
, 𝑁𝑇𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 105, and those
for Constant, 𝜎𝑡−1 , 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 , and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 102.
Total
Constant
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(11.82)
2.00
(1.64)
3.00
(2.97)
-0.08
(-2.16)
1.07
(6.27)
84.71
(134.93)

𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡
R2

-2.00
(-2.45)
1.00
(0.77)
0.79

Buy
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(11.74)
3.00
(1.63)
5.00
(2.97)
-0.10
(-2.16)
1.62
(6.26)

84.68
(134.16)
-3.00
(-2.44)
1.00
(0.77)
0.78

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(12.64)
1.00
(0.46)
3.00
(2.04)
-0.08
(-2.15)
1.07
(6.23)
84.80
(136.15)

-2.00
(-2.49)
1.00
(0.68)
0.79
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Sell
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(12.56)
2.00
(0.46)
4.00
(2.04)
-0.10
(-2.15)
1.61
(6.22)

84.77
(135.37)
-3.00
(-2.48)
1.00
(0.67)
0.78

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡
0.02
(12.47)
1.00
(0.94)
3.00
(2.71)
-0.08
(-2.15)
1.07
(6.23)
84.79
(136.04)

-2.00
(-2.48)
1.00
(0.73)
0.79

𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡
0.03
(12.39)
1.00
(0.93)
4.00
(2.71)
-0.10
(-2.15)
1.61
(6.23)

84.76
(135.26)
-3.00
(-2.47)
1.00
(0.73)
0.78

Table 4-6
Quoted Depths and Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down
Markets
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009. The
regression model is specified as follows:
+
−
𝑄𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝑄𝐷𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) and total quoted depth
(𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up
and down intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell
(𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 ) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the
intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random
error term. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average tstatistics are in parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units
+
for presentation, the coefficient for 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is multiplied by 104, and the coefficients for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
,
−
2
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are multiplied by 10 .
Total
Constant
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1

𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.18
(27.77)
-1.46
(-1.01)
-2.10
(-1.96)
3.30
(3.49)
-7.02
(-7.75)
0.88
(244.37)

𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡
R2

1.24
(1.67)
2.12
(4.61)
0.79

Buy
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.56
(19.41)
-0.48
(-0.87)
-1.48
(-2.97)
-0.20
(-0.15)
-2.47
(-5.11)

0.95
(485.73)
1.16
(3.48)
2.12
(3.09)
0.91

𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.16
(28.20)
-0.05
(-0.02)
-1.58
(-1.36)
3.30
(3.42)
-6.97
(-7.71)
0.88
(246.75)

1.27
(1.71)
2.15
(4.65)
0.79

Sell
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.55
(19.54)
0.12
(0.04)
-1.65
(-2.54)
-0.20
(-0.19)
-2.44
(-5.05)

0.95
(489.58)
1.17
(3.51)
2.12
(3.16)
0.91

𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡
1.17
(28.41)
-1.81
(-0.82)
-2.50
(-1.88)
3.20
(3.42)
-6.96
(-7.72)
0.88
(246.39)

1.26
(1.69)
2.13
(4.62)
0.79

𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
0.55
(19.61)
-0.32
(-0.35)
-1.89
(-2.94)
-0.20
(-0.20)
-2.44
(-5.06)

0.95
(489.45)
1.17
(3.50)
2.12
(3.12)
0.91

The results for volatility presented in Table 4-7 are similar, with a rise in lagged
algorithmic trading volume generally being related to an increase in volatility during
periods of decreasing prices, though not during periods of increasing prices. Focusing
on 𝛽1 for all trades using 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 as a regressor, the average coefficient is negative
with an average t-statistic of -0.44. The average coefficient estimate for 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡− ,
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however, is positive with an average t-statistic of 2.30. Similar results are found using
effective spreads and both depth measures as control variables. These results hold for
both buys and sells.
In line with previous literature, the results in Section 4.4.1 indicate that higher
algorithmic trading volume in the market is not associated with a deterioration in
market quality. In contrast, this section suggests that such results could be biased as
they fail to take into account the direction of prices. Dividing the sample into periods
of increasing and decreasing prices, results reveal that lagged algorithmic trading
volume is related to a reduction in liquidity and an increase in volatility during periods
when the market is falling, and has no association with market quality during periods
when the market is increasing. This is consistent with the second hypothesis (H4,2).
This aligns with the findings such as Kirilenko et al. (2011) that document that
algorithmic trading had a negative impact on the market during periods of market
stress.
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Table 4-7
Volatility on Lagged Algorithmic Trading Volume during Up and Down Markets
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 stocks ASX
stocks based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to October 26, 2009.
The regression models are specified as follows:
+
−
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
+
−
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝜎𝑡 is the intraday high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡; 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 represents the
percentage bid-ask spread (𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) and effective spread (𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 ) during time interval 𝑡; 𝑄𝐷𝑡
represents the natural logarithm of the best quoted depth (𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 ) and total quoted depth (𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 )
during time interval 𝑡; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+ and 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡− denote the algorithmic trading variables on up and down
intervals, respectively; 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 )
ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡 is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝜎𝑡−1 is the intraday
high-low price range estimator at time interval 𝑡 − 1; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term.
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in
parentheses. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square. To adjust the units for
presentation, the coefficients for Constant, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡+ , 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡− , 𝑁𝑇𝑡 , BQDt−1 , 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are
multiplied by 104, and those for 𝜎𝑡−1 , 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1, and 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 are multiplied by 102.
Total
Buy
Sell
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡 𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡
Constant -2.10 -2.10 25.10 41.60 -2.00 -1.90 24.90 41.20 -2.00 -1.90 41.50 41.50
(-1.24) (-1.23) (6.02) (6.41) (-0.94) (-0.93) (6.22) (6.56) (-1.00) (-0.99) (6.56) (6.56)
+
-0.80 -0.80 -1.30 -1.40 -1.30 -1.30 -1.90 -2.00 -2.20 -2.20 -2.70 -2.70
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-1.04) (-1.10) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.70) (-1.70)
2.20 2.30 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.70 2.70 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−
(2.30) (2.31) (2.06) (2.04) (2.13) (2.13) (2.03) (2.04) (2.74) (2.74) (2.70) (2.70)
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
𝑁𝑇𝑡
(8.77) (8.77) (8.44) (8.51) (8.77) (8.77) (8.43) (8.49) (8.78) (8.78) (8.51) (8.51)
70.25 71.80 70.26 71.38 70.19 71.76 70.19 71.33 70.24 71.39 70.24 71.39
𝜎𝑡−1
(42.80) (46.54) (42.81) (45.45) (42.76) (46.55) (42.77) (45.47) (42.82) (45.54) (42.82) (45.54)
59.94
59.96
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−1 59.75
(5.93)
(6.00)
(5.99)
39.66
39.78
39.79
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
(5.93)
(5.99)
(5.98)
-2.10
-2.10
-3.20
𝐵𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
(-5.50)
(-5.51)
(-6.15)
-3.20
-3.20
-3.20
𝑇𝑄𝐷𝑡−1
(-6.18)
(-6.13)
(-6.15)
0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.40
𝑀𝑡
(-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.09) (-0.09)
1.80 1.80 2.00 1.90 1.80 1.80 2.00 1.90 1.80 1.80 1.90 1.90
𝐴𝑡
(2.30) (2.30) (2.57) (2.47) (2.29) (2.29) (2.56) (2.46) (2.31) (2.31) (2.50) (2.50)
R2
0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
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4.4.4 Feedback Trading and Market Quality

The findings of Kirilenko et al.(2011) imply that algorithmic trading could harm market
quality during price declines if they increase their demand for liquidity during these
periods. Kaniel et al. (2008) argue that contrarian traders act as liquidity providers.
Institutional investors requiring immediacy offer price concessions to encourage other
investors to take the other side of the trade. Momentum traders conversely act as
liquidity demanders. Herding and positive-feedback trading may result in a reduction
in market quality (Culter et al., 1990).

To test whether ATs systematically engage in herding and positive-feedback trading,
the following regression is estimated:

𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1

(6.16)

+ 𝛽4 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

where the algorithmic trading buy and sell ratios are examined separately to
determine whether ATs systematically reduce their buying, and increase their selling,
during price declines. Table 6-14 shows that 𝛽1 is significantly negative for buys and
significantly positive for sells; t-statistics are very large, being -12.98 for buys and
12.59 for sells. These results indicate a certain degree of herding by ATs. ATs reduce
their buying in stocks with falling prices, while increasing their selling. This lends
support to the conjecture that ATs increase their demand for liquidity during price
falls, and that this reduces market quality, which is consistent with previous studies
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examining the trading strategies of ATs (Anand and Venkataraman, 2013; ASIC 2012;
Korajczyk and Murphy 2014; Hu, 2013; Golub et al., 2012).

Table 6-14
Momentum Trading During Down Markets
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 100 ASX stocks
based on 15-minute intervals. The sample period extends from July 2, 2007 to March 6, 2009. The
regression model is specified as follows:
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 is the algorithmic total (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑡−1 ), buy (𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑡−1 ), and sell (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 ) ratio, respectively; 𝑁𝑇𝑡
is the number of trades executed during time interval𝑡; 𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one from 10:15 to 11:00 hours of the trading day and zero otherwise, and 𝐴𝑡 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one from 15:00 to 16:00 hours and zero otherwise; and εit is a random error term.
Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages from the 100 stocks. Average t-statistics are in
parentheses. To adjust the units for presentation, the coefficients for 𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 , 𝑁𝑇𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡 , and 𝐴𝑡 are
multiplied by 102.
Constant
𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑡

4.5

Buy Ratio
0.10
(42.44)
-2.61
(-12.98)
-0.01
(-1.16)
0.65
(114.69)
-0.39
(-2.09)
-0.40
(-2.13)

Sell Ratio
0.09
(37.53)
2.41
(12.59)
-0.01
(-1.06)
0.65
(112.91)
-0.25
(-1.45)
-0.56
(-2.85)

Summary

As a consequence of advances in technology, order execution in financial markets has
changed dramatically. Instead of trades being entered manually by brokers, orders are
increasingly being conducted by computer algorithms that either seek to minimise
market impact or to profit from proprietary trading opportunities. The growth in this
new form of trading, with its high speed and sophistication, has generated concern on
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the part of regulators, exchanges, investors and journalists on the impact of ATs on
market integrity and quality. As data on ATs has become available, a number of studies
have begun to examine the effect of algorithmic trading on market quality. Despite
this, few studies examine the impact of algorithmic trading during adverse market
environments.
In this chapter, the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality is assessed
over different market conditions. Over the whole sample period, results provide no
evidence that AT volume has an impact on market quality. However, when the sample
is split into increasing and decreasing stock returns, results show that AT is negatively
associated with future market quality when prices are falling and has no relation when
prices are rising. The negative impact of AT on market quality is explained by
algorithmic traders engaging in positive-feedback trading, in which they reduce their
buying and increase their selling of securities during periods of falling prices.
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Chapter 5: Execution Costs of Option Strategy Trades

5.1

Introduction

The literature reviewed in Section 2.2 provide a number of insights into how option
market makers set the bid-ask spread. Specifically, market makers adjust prices in
response to information asymmetry and hedging costs (including the costs of hedging
delta, vega and gamma risks). The implication is that transaction costs in option
markets will be greater when hedging and adverse selection costs increase. The
literature on this issue examines outright option trades; the execution costs of option
strategies and its determinants are yet to be investigated. This is a result of data being
unavailable to conduct this line of research. Option strategies (such as straddles and
butterfly spreads) allow market participants to combine options to either speculate
on future volatility, or to speculate on directional movements with greater flexibility.
Despite the prominence of option strategies documented in recent empirical studies
(e.g., Lakonishok et al., 2007), literature on the transaction costs of option strategies
is sparse.
The objective of this essay is to bridge the gap in the literature by examining
the execution costs of option strategies. More specifically, it documents the size of
execution costs of option strategies relative to outright options on the Australian
Options Market (AOM) and examines whether any differences can be attributed to
differences in market making and adverse selection costs. The remainder of this
chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides institutional details of the AOM.
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Section 5.2 outlines the hypotheses on option strategies. Section 5.3 presents the data
and descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 outlines the research design and presents the
results. Section 5.5 summarises the chapter.

5.2

Hypotheses on Option Strategies

The two principal approaches to modeling market maker behaviour are inventory
control models and adverse selection models. The level of inventory holding costs and
adverse selection costs differ across financial markets. Options market makers face
unique risks in managing inventory and adverse selection costs. Relative to equity
market makers, they have less control over their inventory positions (Lakonishock et
al., 2007). As a result of this, hedging is an integral part of the mechanics of market
making in options markets (Battalio and Schulz, 2011). The literature suggests that
options market makers face the following three types of hedging costs; delta cost is
the cost of setting up a hedging portfolio; vega (gamma) cost is the cost incurred in
maintaining a hedged portfolio as the underlying stock volatility (delta) changes over
time. The presence of these dimensions of risk increases the difficulty of the market
maker’s hedging in options markets.
Empirical findings show that option market makers adjust prices to account for
these hedging costs (Jameson and Wilhelm, 1992, Cho and Engle, 1999, Kaul et al.,
2004, Patrella, 2006, Landsiedl, 2005, and Engle and Neri, 2010). For example, Wei
and Zheng (2010) show that bid-ask spreads adjust to changes in a number of liquidity
determinants affecting a market maker’s inventory-holding costs. The authors show
that over half the time series variation in the bid-ask spread is explained by changes
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in an option’s time-to-maturity, moneyness, stock return volatility, option return
volatility, option trading volume and option price.
The particular features of option markets may also attract informed investors.
Options offer greater leverage relative to equity markets (Black, 1975). This greater
leverage may induce investors with short-lived information to favour the use of
options (Charkravarty et al. 2004). The literature shows option market makers adjust
prices to account for changes in information asymmetry (Bartram et al., 2008; Ahn et
al., 2008).
Option trades do not necessarily have to involve a trade in a single option
series but can simultaneously involve a number of different options with different
strike prices, exercise dates etc. For instance, a trader who seeks to profit from
changes to the security’s volatility can engage in option strategies such as straddles or
strangles, which involve the simultaneous buying of a put and call option in the same
option series. These present risks to the market maker that are different to trading
outright options. Relative to outright option trades, the greater complexity of strategy
trades means that options market makers will incur higher hedging costs for option
strategy trades. This is because the market maker takes into account the cost of
hedging a newly created position by trading component options separately. For
example, consider a market maker who has received a quote request for a straddle.
Setting the quotes, the market maker takes into account the cost of hedging a newly
created position by trading component options separately. It follows that the market
maker requires higher liquidity premiums for strategy-linked options than outright
options. Further, a likely consequence is that strategy-linked options trade at less
advantageous prices than outright options, unless option strategy traders are
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consistently (and considerably) superior at timing the market to traders who trade
outright options.
Furthermore, the diversity of option strategies allows traders to combine
options to either speculate on future volatility while eliminating exposure to
directional risks, or to speculate on directional movements while eliminating the
volatility of the underlying, thereby reducing risk. Informed traders may take
advantage of this by engaging in option strategies over outright options. Fahlenbrach
and Sandås (2010) demonstrate that volatility-based option strategies predict future
realised volatility. It is therefore hypothesised that the market maker requires higher
liquidity premiums for strategy trades.

Hypothesis5.1: Execution costs for option strategy trades are higher relative to outright
option trades.

Option strategies have different levels of complexity. For example, a straddle consists
of simultaneously purchasing or selling a put and call option at the same strike price,
whereas a butterfly trade consists of selling four put or call options at three different
strike prices. As the market maker takes into account the cost of hedging a newly
created position by trading component options separately, hedging costs for strategy
trades will be higher for option strategies with greater complexity due to the greater
number of option components.

The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis5.2: The execution costs of option strategies increase as a function of their
complexity.

As discussed, market makers’ quote setting strategies are affected by information
asymmetry and inventory-holding costs (e.g., Ho and Stoll, 1981, Easley and O’Hara,
1987). Furthermore, option strategies generate higher hedging costs for market
makers and may contain information about future returns and volatility. This suggest
that the differences in transaction costs between option strategies and outright
options can be explained by differences in the level of information asymmetry and
hedging costs of option strategies relative to outright options. This leads to the
following hypotheses.

Hypothesis5.3: Market makers face higher levels of information asymmetry trading
option strategies relative to outright options.

Hypothesis5.4: Market makers face higher hedging costs trading option strategies
relative to outright options.

5.3

Australian Options Market

The Australian Options Market (AOM) is a quasi-limit order book market where
liquidity is supplied by public limit orders and designated market makers. Limit orders
and market maker quotes are ranked on a price/time priority basis. The amount of
liquidity supplied by limit orders is minimal relative to market makers, meaning that
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the AOM can be considered to be a dealer market. The AOM offers market makers fee
incentives for meeting certain benchmark quoting requirements. Each market maker,
assigned two or more underlying assets, can choose to make a market on a continuous
basis, in response to quote requests, or both. Market makers who choose to make a
market on a continuous basis are obliged to provide orders continuously for certain
percentages of time, in 18 series per underlying security, encompassing three calls and
three puts in any three of the next six expiry months. Market makers who choose to
make a market in response to quote requests are monitored on their provision of
orders on request for certain percentages of the time for all series up to nine months
maturity. Liquidity is assisted when there are multiple market makers in a class;
however, as market makers are not required to provide quotes in all series, or at all
times, there is no guarantee that all series will have prices displayed.
Option strategies on the AOM are referred to as combination trades. Trading
of option strategies on the AOM takes place through the central limit order book using
a special trade facility. Use of this facility has important advantages over the central
order book for strategy trades. First, execution risk is reduced by trading all legs of the
strategy simultaneously, particularly if the option legs include highly illiquid options.
Second, the risk of adverse price movements, while executing each leg of the strategy,
is removed.
There are two main types of combination orders (“strategy orders”, hereafter)
executed on the AOM; standard and tailor-made strategies. Standard strategies are
limited to common strategies prescribed by the AOM. Tailor-made strategies provide
the flexibility to define particular single series components of the strategy, having
greater complexity than standard strategies. For each type of strategy, a trader
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executes a trade by entering a quote in the special trade facility for each leg of the
strategy. When a particular strategy is created, it is assigned a unique strategy series
identifier. The order is then assigned with all other orders with the same unique
identifier, based on price/time priority against the other strategies. For a trade to
occur, another trader may trade against the strategy order, matching all legs included
in the strategy or the AOM matches the strategy with orders that are currently in the
market for each option.

5.4

Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data are obtained from an internal database from the AOM. The sample consists
of trade by trade data for all equity options listed on the AOM. For each transaction,
data include the underlying stock, date, time (to the nearest millisecond), price, and
volume. The sample period extends from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2007. The
sample is restricted to normal trading hours for the options market (9:30a.m. 4:20p.m. during the sample period), and includes all options traded on a sample of 20
stocks displaying the highest option volume (including both puts and calls) over the
sample period. The trade record includes a flag for trades that are part of strategies,
and this is further segregated into either standard or tailor-made combinations.
The internal AOM data are combined with order book data sourced from
Reuters Data Scope Tick History provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The data provide the prices of the best bid and ask quotes, time
stamped to the nearest millisecond. To determine the direction of each strategy trade,
Sackickas and Wilson’s (2003) quote rule is used: trades are determined as buyer- or
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seller-initiated according to whether the trade price is above or below the bid-ask
midpoint. As the quotes for strategy trades are unavailable, this study implies quotes
based on the quotes given on the limit order book for the individual components.
Trades that have no corresponding quotes (which may occur for strategy trades), or
trade at the bid-ask mid-point, are removed.
Table 5-1 reports the average price, the average daily number of contracts
traded, average moneyness, and time to maturity (TTM) for strategy-linked trades and
outright trades, separately. The sample consists of a total of 775,390 transactions, of
which 287,042 are strategy-linked trades: 259,134 tailor-made strategy-linked trades
and 27,908 standard strategy-linked trades. This suggests that option strategies
constitute a considerable proportion of option trading volume on the AOM. The
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the
strike (spot) price for call (put) options. TTM is calculated as the difference between
the current date of the option and the expiry date. Underlying volatility is calculated
as the natural logarithm of the difference between the daily high and low prices of the
underlying stock.
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Table 5-1
Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM), standard strategy-linked
(SS), and outright options. Panel A describes the full sample. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics
across three moneyness categories. The moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike)
price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as at-the-money
(ATM) if it is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the money (OTM)
if less than 0.9. Panel C splits the sample into three time-to-maturity (TTM) categories. In Panel D, the
sample is divided into volume categories: each trading day, each option series is partitioned into one
of three categories based on the number of trades. Number of Trades is the daily average number of
trades. Trade Premium is the average of the options premiums ($). Moneyness is the average
moneyness. Time to Maturity is the average time to maturity (days). Trade Size is the average trade size
(contracts).
Number of Trade Premium
Time to Maturity Trade Size
Moneyness
Trades
($)
(days)
(contracts)
Panel A – Overall
TM Options
SS Options

259,134

1.38

1.00

61.81

22.06

27,908

0.69

0.99

30.76

41.15

488,348

0.97

0.98

51.74

19.12

ATM

225,539

1.13

1.00

52.94

24.38

ITM

15,753

5.87

1.21

89.82

6.30

OTM

17,842

0.52

0.85

149.30

6.68

26,105

0.66

0.99

28.87

43.13

Outright Options
Panel B – Moneyness
TM Options

SS Options
ATM
ITM

510

3.49

1.17

46.08

11.08

1,293

0.23

0.87

62.85

12.91

ATM

437,198

0.88

0.99

44.07

20.69

ITM

12,395

5.77

1.21

117.16

6.53

OTM

38,755

0.47

0.86

117.31

6.70

39,890

2.57

0.99

239.18

5.31

OTM
Outright options

Panel C – Time to Maturity
TM Options
> 90 days
30 - 90 days
< 30 days

99,677

1.24

0.99

48.17

16.88

119,567

1.09

1.01

14.00

31.97

1,023

1.78

0.98

199.39

6.67

SS Options
> 90 days
30 - 90 days

9,322

0.77

0.98

44.14

26.23

17,563

0.59

0.99

13.84

51.08

58,527

2.02

0.97

205.00

5.22

30 - 90 days

196,370

0.96

0.97

49.36

14.07

< 30 days

233,451

0.72

0.99

15.35

27.07

< 30 days
Outright options
> 90 days
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Table 1, continued
Panel D – Volume
TM Options
Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

22,298

2.67

1.03

135.00

1.00

Volume Group 2

38,144

2.07

1.00

102.00

2.61

198,692

1.10

1.00

45.85

28.16

Volume Group 3 (Highest)
SS Options
Volume Group 1 (Lowest)
Volume Group 2
Volume Group 3 (Highest)

483

1.73

1.00

96.45

1.00

1,599

1.16

0.98

66.02

2.76

25,826

0.64

0.99

27.35

44.28

Outright options
Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

35,842

1.76

0.98

125.00

1.00

Volume Group 2

67,347

1.38

0.97

89.60

2.59

385,159

0.83

0.98

38.30

23.82

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

Panel B of Table 5-1 reports the descriptive statistics along three moneyness
categories: in-the-money options (ITM) where moneyness is greater than 1.1; at-themoney options (ATM) where moneyness is between 0.9 and 1.1; and out-of-themoney options (OTM) where moneyness is less than 0.9. The majority of trades are
concentrated in ATM options (89% of all trades). Average moneyness ranges from
0.853 for OTM options to 1.212 for ITM options. Panel C of Table 5-1 reports summary
statistics divided into three TTM categories; greater than 90 days, between 30 and 90
days, and less than 30 days to maturity. Trades that are less than 30 days to maturity
make up the greatest proportion of the sample. There is a significant range in
maturities between option series, with TTM for long-term options averaging over 200
days, while short-term options average less than 15 days. Panel D of Table 5-1 reports
summary statistics according to volume categories based on the number of trades
during a trading day.
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Panel B of Table 5-1 reports the descriptive statistics along three moneyness
categories: in-the-money options (ITM) where moneyness is greater than 1.1; at-themoney options (ATM) where moneyness is between 0.9 and 1.1; and out-of-themoney options (OTM) where moneyness is less than 0.9. The majority of trades are
concentrated in ATM options (89% of all trades). Average moneyness ranges from
0.853 for OTM options to 1.212 for ITM options. Panel C of Table 5-1 reports summary
statistics divided into three TTM categories; greater than 90 days, between 30 and 90
days, and less than 30 days to maturity. Trades that are less than 30 days to maturity
make up the greatest proportion of the sample. There is a significant range in
maturities between option series, with TTM for long-term options averaging over 200
days, while short-term options average less than 15 days. Panel D of Table 5-1 reports
summary statistics according to volume categories based on the number of trades
during a trading day.

5.5

Research Design and Empirical Results

5.5.1 Transaction Costs

This section investigates whether outright options and options that constitute
strategies (“strategy-linked options”, hereafter) differ in execution costs using the
percentage effective spread. A standard measure of liquidity used in the literature is
the bid-ask spread. The quoted bid-ask spread, which is simply the difference between
the bid and ask prices, captures the ex-ante costs transaction costs of undertaking a
transaction (O’Hara, 1995). Christie and Huang (1994) suggest that using the relative
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quoted spread is more appropriate as it takes into account the value of the security.
Finally, Peterson and Fialkowski (1994) suggest that the quoted spread is not a true
reflection of execution costs as a trader could place an order inside the quoted bidask spread, resulting in a lower execution cost. In line with Bessembinder (2003), the
percentage effective spread is calculated as:

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 200% × 𝐷𝑖 ×

(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 −𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖 )
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖

(5.1)

where 𝐷𝑖 is a trade direction indicator variable (𝐷𝑖 = 1 for a buy order, 𝐷𝑖 = − 1 for
a sell order), 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the price of the trade, and 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑖 is the mid-quote prior to the
trade. Table 4-2 reports percentage effective spreads for outright options, tailor-made
strategy-linked (“TM”, hereafter), and standard strategy-linked (“SS”, hereafter)
options by option type. The average percentage effective spread for outright options
over the entire sample is 8.31%. Percentage Effective spreads for both TM (13.69%)
options and SS options (10.72%) are significantly greater than those for outright
options at the 1% level. Results also reveal that percentage effective spreads for TM
options are significantly greater than those for SS options at the 1% level.
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Table 5-2
Percentage Effective Spreads
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM), standard strategylinked (SS), and outright options across call and put option trades. TM – Outright is the difference in
effective spreads between TM and outright options. SS – Outright is the difference in effective spreads
between SS and outright options. TM – SS is the difference in effective spreads between TM and SS
options. The t-test is used to test the deviation of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical
significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Call

Put

All

TM Options

11.30

15.40

13.69

SS Options

8.81

12.23

10.72

Outright Options

7.61

9.17

8.31

Panel A - Option Types

Panel B - Difference in Percentage Effective Spreads
TM – Outright

3.69**

6.23**

5.38**

SS – Outright

1.21**

3.06**

2.40**

TM – SS

2.49**

3.18**

2.98**

To examine whether option characteristics drive percentage effective spreads to be
higher for strategy-linked options relative to outright options, the sample is
partitioned into moneyness categories. Within each moneyness category, it is further
separated into TTM categories. Finally, within each TTM category, the sample is
categorized into three groups by trading volume. Volume categories are based on the
number of trades during the day. Volume group 1 (3) includes option series with the
lowest (greatest) number of trades each day.
Table 5-3 reveals that percentage effective spreads for TM options are
significantly higher than those for outright options at the 1% level across all
moneyness, TTM, and volume categories. Table 5-4 shows that for the majority of
trades (97 per cent), SS options have higher execution costs than outright options at
the 1% level. Percentage effective spreads for SS options are significantly higher for
all ATM options at the 1% level, except for options in the lowest volume group with a
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TTM between 30-90 days and greater than 90 days. SS options cost significantly higher
for one of the ITM option categories and significantly higher for the majority of OTM
options at the 1% level. Table 5-5 reveals that TM options are significantly more costly
to trade than SS options at the 1% level only for a few subsets of the sample. In the
ATM sample, for the majority of trades, TM options are significantly more expense to
trade than SS options at the 1% level. However, differences in percentage effective
spreads between the two groups are not significantly different for six of the nine ITM
categories. Also, the OTM sample shows that percentage effective spreads for TM
options are significantly wider than SS options at the 1% level only for a few trades.
Supporting hypotheses H5,1 the results overall reveal that execution costs for
(both TM and SS) strategy-linked options are greater than those for outright options.
On the contrary to hypothesis H5,2, between the two strategy-linked options option
categories, this study does not provide strong evidence that TM options are more
costly to trade than SS options. This implies that market makers require higher
liquidity premiums for (both TM and SS) strategy-linked options relative to outright
options regardless of option characteristics, but they do not strongly discriminate
between TM and SS options in setting quotes.
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Table 5-3
Percentage Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for TM and Outright Options
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM) and outright options for volume categories within each of the moneyness and time-tomaturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a trading day. The
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-the-money) ATM if it
is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to expiry. Number of
Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used to test the deviation
of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.

Moneyness

Time to Maturity
(days)

TM Options
Percentage
Number of
Effective Spreads
Trades
(%)

Outright Options
Percentage
Number of
Effective Spreads
Trades
(%)

Difference
(TM - Outright)

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

> 90

8.25

7090

4.30

10,458

3.95**

Volume Group 2

ATM

> 90

8.25

8410

4.22

13,032

4.03**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

> 90

7.89

12,175

3.75

16,452

4.14**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

30 – 90

11.77

5,588

6.60

10,865

5.17**

Volume Group 2

ATM

30 – 90

11.46

12,906

6.21

26,540

5.25**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

30 – 90

10.03

69,405

5.30

138,451

4.73**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

< 30

21.55

2,364

18.49

4,018

3.06**

Volume Group 2

ATM

< 30

19.95

7,257

15.28

13,106

4.67**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

< 30

15.33

98,811

9.29

204,276

6.04**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

> 90

4.77

1,512

2.15

1,493

2.62**

Volume Group 2

ITM

> 90

5.32

1,330

2.64

1,362

2.68**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

> 90

4.74

1,304

1.96

1,255

2.78**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

30 – 90

4.59

1,167

2.65

890

1.94**

Volume Group 2

ITM

30 – 90

4.95

1,395

2.53

1,077

2.42**
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Volume Group 3 (Highest)
Table 3, continued

ITM

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

Volume Group 2

ITM

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

30 – 90

5.82

1,985

3.09

1,646

2.73**

< 30

3.60

1,042

< 30

4.58

1,760

2.47

676

1.13**

2.73

1,108

1.85**

ITM

< 30

6.79

4,160

2.97

2,888

3.82**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

> 90

24.91

1,989

11.66

3,879

13.25**

Volume Group 2

OTM

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

> 90

25.44

2,292

11.62

4,756

13.82**

> 90

26.08

3,495

9.49

5,840

16.59**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

30 – 90

46.23

1,106

23.93

1,106

22.30**

Volume Group 2

OTM

30 – 90

40.79

1,810

20.82

4,821

19.97**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

30 – 90

33.62

3,761

16.18

9,377

17.44**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

< 30

69.85

201

46.73

860

23.12**

Volume Group 2

OTM

< 30

63.84

486

42.63

1,545

21.21**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

< 30

48.35

1,873

30.24

4,974

18.11**
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Table 5-4
Percentage Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for SS and Outright Options
This table reports percentage effective spreads for standard strategy-linked (SS) and outright options for volume categories within each of the moneyness and time-tomaturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a trading day. The
moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-the-money) ATM if it
is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to expiry. Number of
Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used to test the deviation
of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
SS Options
Moneyness

Time to Maturity
(days)

Percentage
Effective Spreads
(%)

Number of
Trades

Outright Options
Percentage
Effective Spreads
(%)

Number of
Trades

Difference
(SS – Outright)

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

> 90

4.92

120

4.30

10,458

0.60

Volume Group 2

ATM

> 90

4.91

221

4.22

13,032

0.69*

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

> 90

5.12

417

3.75

16,452

1.37**

Volume Group1 (Lowest)

ATM

30 – 90

7.05

142

6.60

10,865

0.45

Volume Group 2

ATM

30 – 90

8.26

573

6.21

26,540

2.05**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

30 – 90

5.92

7,924

5.30

138,451

0.62**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

< 30

27.97

96

18.49

4,018

9.48**

Volume Group 2

ATM

< 30

21.63

468

15.28

13,106

6.35**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

< 30

11.91

16,060

9.29

204,276

2.62**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

> 90

2.97

17

2.15

1,493

0.82

Volume Group 2

ITM

> 90

4.26

20

2.64

1,362

1.62

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

> 90

2.87

19

1.96

1,255

0.91
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Table 4, continued
Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

30 – 90

2.45

19

2.65

890

Volume Group 2

ITM

30 – 90

5.10

33

2.53

1,077

2.57**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

30 – 90

4.45

81

3.09

1,646

1.36

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

< 30

2.01

20

2.47

676

-0.46

Volume Group 2

ITM

< 30

3.01

44

2.73

1,108

0.28

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

< 30

3.54

257

2.97

2,888

0.57

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

> 90

15.28

25

11.66

3,879

3.62

Volume Group 2

OTM

> 90

11.17

55

11.61

4,756

-0.44

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

> 90

15.72
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9.49

5,840

6.23**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

30 – 90

35.44

24

23.93

24

11.51**

Volume Group 2

OTM

30 – 90

35.21

102

20.82

4,821

14.39**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

30 – 90

20.37

413

16.18

9,377

4.19**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

< 30

52.55

14

46.73

860

5.82

Volume Group 2

OTM

< 30

48.79

70

42.63

1,545

6.16

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

< 30

34.55

455

30.24

4,974

4.31**

143

-0.20

Table 5-5
Effective Spreads by Volume, Moneyness, and Time to Maturity for TM and SS Options
This table reports percentage effective spreads for tailor-made strategy-linked (TM) and standard strategy-linked (SS) options for volume categories within each of the
moneyness and time-to-maturity categories. Volume categories are partitioned into three categories from the lowest to the highest based on the number of trades during a
trading day. The moneyness of an option series is calculated as the spot (strike) price divided by the strike (spot) price for call (put) options. Moneyness is defined as (at-themoney) ATM if it is between 0.9 and 1.1, in-the-money (ITM) if greater than 1.1, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if less than 0.9. Time to Maturity is the number of days to
expiry. Number of Trades is the average number of trades. Difference is the difference in percentage effective spreads between TM and outright options. The t-test is used
to test the deviation of the mean values from zero. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.

Moneyness

Time to Maturity
(days)

TM Options
Percentage
Number of
Effective Spreads
Trades
(%)

SS Options
Percentage
Number of
Effective Spreads
Trades
(%)

Difference
(TM- SS)

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

> 90

8.25

7,090

4.92

10,458

3.33**

Volume Group 2

ATM

> 90

8.25

8,410

4.91

13,032

3.34**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

> 90

7.89

12,175

5.12

417

2.77**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

30 – 90

11.77

5,588

7.05

142

4.72**

Volume Group 2

ATM

30 – 90

11.46

12,906

8.26

573

3.20**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

30 – 90

10.03

69,405

5.92

7,924

4.11**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ATM

< 30

21.55

2,364

27.97

96

-6.42

Volume Group 2

ATM

< 30

19.95

7,257

21.63

468

-1.63

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ATM

< 30

15.33

98,811

11.91

16,060

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

> 90

4.77

1,512

2.97

17

1.80

Volume Group 2

ITM

> 90

5.32

1,330

4.26

20

1.06

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

> 90

4.74

1,304

2.87

19

1.87

144

3.42**

Table 5, continued
Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

30 – 90

4.60

1,167

2.45

19

2.15

Volume Group 2

ITM

30 – 90

4.95

1,395

5.10

33

-0.15

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

30 – 90

5.82

1,985

4.45

81

1.37

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

ITM

< 30

3.60

1,042

2.01

20

1.59

Volume Group 2

ITM

< 30

4.58

1,760

3.01

44

1.57

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

ITM

< 30

6.79

4,160

3.54

257

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

> 90

24.91

1,989

15.28

25

9.63

Volume Group 2

OTM

> 90

25.44

2,292

11.17

55

14.27**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

> 90

26.08

3,495

15.72

126

10.36**

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

30 – 90

46.23

1,106

35.44

1,106

10.79

Volume Group 2

OTM

30 – 90

40.79

1,810

35.21

102

5.58

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

30 – 90

33.62

3,761

20.37

413

13.25

Volume Group 1 (Lowest)

OTM

< 30

69.85

201

52.55

14

17.30

Volume Group 2

OTM

< 30

63.84

486

48.79

70

15.05**

Volume Group 3 (Highest)

OTM

< 30

48.35

1,873

34.55

455

13.80**

145

3.25**

5.5.2 Multivariate Analysis

The literature on option bid-ask spreads suggests a number of liquidity determinants,
including time to maturity, moneyness, trading volume, option volatility, and
underlying stock volatility (e.g., Neal, 1987, George and Longstaff, 1993, Chong et al.,
2003, Cao and Wei, 2010, and Wei and Zheng, 2010). In line with this research, the
univariate analysis shows that TM and SS options have higher effective spreads
relative to outright options across the following option characteristics: time to
maturity, moneyness, and trading volume.
To determine if proportional effective spreads for strategy trades are higher
after controlling for other option characteristics including option volatility and
underlying stock volatility, the following regression is estimated for each underlying
stock:

𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑡

(5.2)

+𝛽5 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝜎𝑜 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

where 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average proportional effective spread of all trades for option
𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the SS (TM) traded volume as a proportion of total traded
volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the difference between the
current date of the option and the expiry date; moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the ratio of closing
spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price of call (put) options for option 𝑖 on day
𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; following
Wei and Zheng (2010), option volatility (𝜎𝑜𝑖𝑡 ) is calculated as the absolute value of the
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option price elasticity times the underlying stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡. The
stock volatility measure is given as follows:

𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑡 = √

(lnℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 −ln𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 )2
4𝑙𝑛2

, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇

(5.3)

where volatility is calculated for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡; ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 refers to the highest
traded price and lowest traded price of underlying stock for each day. Each equation
is estimated separately for each stock using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM); the resulting t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey and West, 1987).
Table 4-6 reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients and
associated t-statistics of the estimated regressions. Consistent with prior literature,
proportional effective spreads are affected by a number of option liquidity
determinants. Results show that an increase in the standard strategy volume relative
to total trading volume does not have an impact on proportional effective spreads,
implying that market makers do not require higher compensation for providing
liquidity for standard strategy-linked trades. These results hold across both put and
call options. On the contrary, an increase in tailor-made strategy volume as a
proportion of total trading volume is significantly associated with an increase in
effective spreads at the 1% level. These results suggest that execution costs for tailormade strategy-linked options are higher relative to outright options in line with the
results of the univariate analysis. In contrast to H5,1, execution costs are not higher for
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standard strategy-linked trades after option volatility and underlying stock volatility
are taken into account.
Option market makers also face adverse selection costs, as the greater
leverage of options and the higher investment returns they offer attract informed
traders to the options market (Black, 1975, Charkravarty et al., 2004) The evidence
shows that option market makers adjust prices to account for hedging and adverse
selection costs. Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) report that discrete hedge rebalancing
(gamma risks) and stochastic stock return volatility (vega risks) are not fully
diversifiable and account for 8% and 4.5% of the option bid-ask spread, respectively.
Kaul et al. (2004) report that a significant proportion of the bid-ask spread is
attributable to inventory management costs; 50% attributable to setting up a delta
neutral position and 6.93% associated with discrete rebalancing. Ahn et al. (2008)
report that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the KOPSI 200
Index options traded on the Korean Exchange account for 34.99% of the bid-ask
spread for call options and 39.14% of the bid-ask spread for put options.
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Table 5-6
Multiple Regressions of Percentage Effective Spreads on Option Characteristics
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 20 underlying
stocks. The regression model is specified as follows:
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝜎𝑜 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
where 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average proportional effective spread of all trades for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡;
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the SS (TM) traded volume as a proportion of total traded volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡;
time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the difference between the current date of the option and the expiry date;
moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the ratio of closing spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price of call (put) options
for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; option
volatility (σo𝑖𝑡 ) is calculated as the absolute value of the option price elasticity times the underlying
stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation (3). The regression is
estimated for each underlying stock, separately for calls and puts. Regression coefficients are crosssectional averages from the 20 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses. The first (second)
component in each bracket is the percentage of significantly positive (negative) coefficients at the 10%
level. The R2 is the cross-sectional average adjusted R-square.

Intercept

𝑆𝑆

𝑇𝑀

𝑇𝑇𝑀

𝑀

𝑉

𝜎𝑜

𝜎𝑠

R2 (%)

Call
18.210
(7.806)
[100,0]
1.337
(0.279)
[11,6]
5.189
(8.641)
[100,0]
0.008
(1.884)
[44,0]
-5.020
(-6.934)
[0,100]
-0.515
(-3.347)
[0,89]
0.443
(14.209)
[100,0]
-5.241
(-7.483)
[0,100]

Put
31.500
(11.801)
[100,0]
1.337
(1.137)
[39,0]
6.437
(9.902)
[100,0]
-0.059
(-7.746)
[0,100]
-7.326
(-10.041)
[0,100]
-0.119
(-0.790)
[6,22]
0.032
(7.540)
[100,0]
-1.081
(-2.697)
[6,72]

41.63

44.40

149

5.5.2 Hedging and Adverse Selection

The previous section shows that tailor-made strategy-linked options are at a
disadvantage relative to outright options in terms of transaction costs. This section
examines whether option hedging and adverse selection costs faced by market makers
can explain this disadvantage using multivariate regression. The literature suggests
that options market makers face two types of hedging costs: the initial cost of creating
a delta hedged position and the cost of rebalancing the portfolio at discrete times to
maintain a delta neutral portfolio (Kaul et al., 2004). Engle and Neri (2010) specify
hedging costs in the option market as the percentage delta multiplied by the
underlying bid-ask spread. Consequently, initial hedging costs are modeled as follows:

𝜕𝑐

𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 = |𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡 ×
𝑖𝑡

𝜕𝑐

where |𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡 ×
𝑖𝑡

𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡

𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡

| × 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟

(5.4)

| is the average percentage delta for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and

𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is the average underlying percentage bid-ask spread for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡.
Following Patrella (2006) and Engle and Neri (2010), rebalancing costs are calculated
as:

𝑅𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛤𝑖𝑡 × 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡

(5.5)

where 𝛤𝑖𝑡 refers to the average gamma for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡 is measured each
day using the intraday high-low price range estimator proposed by Parkinson (1980).
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The degree of adverse selection is measured by the probability of informed trading
(PIN) developed in Easley et al. (2006). The PIN is a measure which uses inferred order
flow to quantify the extent information asymmetry. There are two exogenous
variables in this model. One is the occurrence of an information event. The other is
the value of the asset. Prior to every trading session, the occurrence of an information
event is determined with probability α. If no information event occurs, the value of
the asset is 𝑉 ∗ . Otherwise, the asset value is determined to be 𝑉 𝐻 > 𝑉 ∗ with
probability δ or 𝑉 𝐻 < 𝑉 ∗ with probability 1-δ. The value of the asset becomes public
at the end of the trading session.
There are three types of traders: (1) informed traders, (2) uninformed traders,
and (3) market makers. Informed traders observe the true value of the asset, and they
know whether an information event has occurred prior to each trading session. In
contrast, uninformed traders are purely liquidity motivated. Uninformed traders
arrive at the trading platform according to the Poisson process at the rate ε (per
minute per trading session). If an event occurs, informed traders also arrive at the
rate μ. These arrival processes are independent of each other. Informed traders buy
(sell) assets when the asset value is 𝑉 𝐻 (𝑉 𝐿 ). Market makers set quotes such that their
expected profit is zero each time. Using the model of Easley et al. (2006), the
unconditional probability of informed trading is defined as follows:

𝛼𝜇

𝑃𝐼𝑁 = 𝛼𝜇+2𝜀
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(5.6)

This provides a PIN for each stock but constant over time. Following Engle and Neri
(2010), buy and sell orders are aggregated over each minute of the trading day to
provide a daily PIN measure. In order to ensure a sufficient number of trades in each
minute interval, PIN is estimated for each stock for each day using transaction data in
the equities market, employed as a proxy for the level of informed trading in the
options market. Though the PIN is a proxy Engle and Neri (2010) point out that there
is evidence that informed traders prefer trading in the options market (Arnold et al.,
2000).
The methodology of Engle and Neri (2010) is used here to examine whether
option hedging and adverse selection costs faced by market makers can explain the
results in the previous section, the following regression is estimated for each
underlying stock:

𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐻𝐶it + 𝛽5 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡
+𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝜎𝑜 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(5.7)

where 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average difference in percentage effective spreads of
TM (SS) trades and outright trades; initial hedging cost (𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation
(3); rebalancing cost (𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation (4); 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 is defined in Equation
(4), stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation (2); 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one for call options and zero for put options. The other explanatory
variables are as described for Equation (1). Each equation is estimated separately for
each stock using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); the resulting t-statistics
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987).
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Table 4-7 reports the results of the regression estimates. The results indicate
that (both initial and rebalancing) hedging and adverse selection costs do not lead to
wider proportional effective spreads for SS trades relative to outright option trades as
indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the variables 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 . All
control variables included in the regressions are statistically insignificant at the 5%
level. In contrast, results indicate that initial hedging costs significantly affect the
difference in proportional effective spreads for TM trades relative to outright options
trades, with the coefficient on 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 statistically significant at the 1% level. On the
contrary, rebalancing hedging costs do no significantly affect the difference in
proportional effective spreads. This is in contrast to Engle and Neri (2010) who show
that both hedging and rebalancing costs are an important component of the bid-ask
spread. Rebalancing costs may still be an important component of the bid-ask spread
in the options market. However, the results suggest that market makers do not require
compensation for rebalancing costs of strategy trades relative to outright options after
the hedge has already been set up.
In contrast to H5,3, results show that market makers are not sensitive to adverse
selection costs in setting quotes for tailor-made options relative to outright options.
This is in line with other studies that show that the adverse selection component of
the bid-ask spread is small (Vijh, 1990; Neal, 1992). However, given that option
strategy trades in particular are likely to contain information about future realized
volatility, this finding is somewhat surprising. It may be that informed traders only
engage in specific types of option strategies (Fahlenbrach and Sandas, 2010).
Supporting hypothesis H5,4, overall results indicate that the difference in proportional
effective spreads for tailor-made options is affected by market making costs, which is
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in line with a number of studies examining the components of the bid-ask spread in
the options market . The implication is that market makers require higher premiums
for tailor-made options relative to outright options when initial hedging is more costly,
suggesting that that informed trading is not a key component of the bid-ask spread.
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Table 5-7
Percentage Effective Spreads, Hedging Costs and Probability of Informed Trading
This table reports the GMM estimates from the regressions estimated for each of the 20 underlying
stocks. The regression model is specified as follows:
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐶it + 𝛽5 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝜎𝑜 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝜎𝑠 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖
where 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the daily average difference in percentage effective spreads of TM (SS) trades and
outright trades; initial hedging cost (𝐼𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation (1); rebalancing cost (𝐻𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 ) is defined
in Equation (2); time-to-maturity (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the difference between the current date of the option and
the expiry date; moneyness (𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) is the ratio of closing spot (strike) price to strike (closing spot) price
of call (put) options for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the total daily option volume for option
𝑖 on day 𝑡; option volatility (σo𝑖𝑡 ) is calculated as the absolute value of the option price elasticity times
the underlying stock volatility for option 𝑖 on day 𝑡; stock volatility (σs𝑖𝑡 ) is defined in Equation (3);
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for call options and zero for put options. The
regression is estimated for each underlying stock. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages
from the 20 stocks. Average t-statistics are in parentheses. The first (second) component in each
bracket is the percentage of significantly positive (negative) coefficients at the 10% level. The R2 is the
cross-sectional average adjusted R-square.

Intercept

𝐼𝐻𝐶

𝑅𝐻𝐶

PIN

𝑇𝑇𝑀

𝑀

𝑉

𝜎𝑜

𝜎𝑠

Type

S-O

TM - O

5.071
(0.551)
[28, 0]
0.226
(0.925)
[28, 0]
0.996
(0.273)
[17, 17]
-0.349
(0.042)
[22, 6]
-0.013
(-0.401)
[11,22]
-0.938
(-0.372)
[17, 22]
-0.067
(-0.237)
[11, 17]
-2.933
(-0.360)
[0, 11]
-0.451
(-0.424)
[0, 17]
0.601
(0.276)

18.452
(3.032)
[78, 0]
0.270
(3.351)
[78, 0]
3.179
(0.961)
[28, 0]
0.508
(0.142)
[11, 6]
-0.010
(-0.943)
[0, 22]
-4.956
(-2.491)
[6, 55]
-0.168
(-0.539)
[11, 25]
0.246
(-0.004)
[6, 11]
0.349
(0.421)
[17, 0]
0.761
(0.677)
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R2 (%)

5.5

[0, 0]

[33, 6]

6.026

7.547

Summary

This study measures the magnitude of execution costs of outright options and options
which constitute strategies (“strategy-linked options”) and examines if any differences
in trade prices between these two groups is attributable to differences in market
making costs. The literature suggests that options market makers face the following
three types of hedging costs; delta cost is the cost of setting up a hedging portfolio;
vega (gamma) cost is the cost incurred in maintaining a hedged portfolio as the
underlying stock volatility (delta) changes over time. Market makers may also face
adverse selection costs. This study investigates whether differences in transaction
costs between strategy-linked options and outright options are due to hedging cost or
adverse selection costs using a proprietary data set provided by the Australian Options
Market (AOM).
Results of the univariate analysis indicate that strategy-linked options exhibit
wider spreads than outright options across both put and call options, and across
options with different characteristics (moneyness, time to maturity, and trading
activity), which are shown to be related to the liquidity of options (Wei and Zheng,
2010). Multivariate analysis shows that after directly controlling for a number of
liquidity determinants, tailor-made strategy-linked trades incur higher execution costs
than outright options trades. Results also indicate that the difference in execution
costs between tailor-made strategy-linked options and outright options is driven by
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the initial costs in delta hedging the option position and not a result of higher adverse
selection costs.
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Chapter 6: Intraday Patterns in Quoted Depth

6.1

Introduction

A large body of empirical research has been undertaken documenting systematic
patterns in bid-ask spreads different types of market exchanges, including orderdriven, specialists and competitive dealer markets. However, these patterns have not
yielded similar results across these market types. As a result of this, several competing
theories have arisen to explain the intraday behaviour in liquidity across these
markets, such as inventory, market power and information models. Furthermore, the
literature reviewed in Section 2.2 reveals a number of studies examining intraday
patterns in quoted depth on specialist and order-driven markets. However, no study
has examined intraday patterns in quoted depth on competitive dealer markets. This
essay fills the gap in the literature by investigating the intraday patterns in quoted
depth on the Nasdaq.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes
the data and research design employed. Section 6.3 provides the empirical results on
the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, volume and volatility.
Section 6.4 presents additional tests. Section 6.5 summarises the chapter.
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6.2

Hypotheses on Intraday Patterns in Liquidity

Prior studies examining the inventory component of bid-ask spreads on a competitive
dealer market suggest that inventory effects could dominate near the close of trading.
In the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1982), the dealer has a preferred or target
inventory position, and adjusts his/her prices to return to his/her target inventory
level. If the dealer is too long, he/she lowers both the bid and ask prices to induce
other traders to buy to reduce inventory towards the target level. If the market maker
is below the target inventory level, he/she raises both the bid and ask prices. Chordia
et al. (2002) and Bessembinder (2003b) suggest that if market makers perceive that
competitive quotations will attract orders, then reductions (increases) in inventory
should lead to posting of more aggressive quotations at the bid (ask) to attract sell
(buy) orders and restore inventory. Inventory effects are likely to be acute at the close
of trading as dealers attempt to reduce their market exposure, resulting in bid-ask
spreads narrowing significantly at the market close.
The literature examining competitive dealer markets document this pattern in
bid-ask spreads over the course of the trading day (see Chan et al. 1995a, Chan, Chung
and Johnson, 1995, Kliedon and Werner, 1996, and Cai, Hudson and Keasey, 2004).
The narrowing of spreads at the close is attributed to inventory management, with
individual dealers who want to ‘go home flat’ post quotes that improve the inside
spread in order to attract order flow away from other dealers. In addition, the dealer
may remove order imbalances by increasing the depth of the quote to attract orders
away from other dealers. This leads to the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis6.1: Quoted depth (bid-ask spreads) will be relatively large (narrow) near
the close of trading.

The Nasdaq operates as a competitive dealer market, where each individual dealer
competes for investor orders by displaying quotations that represent their buy and
sell interest in Nasdaq securities. In displaying their quotes, market makers post both
the price (i.e., the bid and ask price) and the quantity (i.e., the bid and ask depth) of
shares that they are willing to trade. In 1997, major changes were made to the way
Nasdaq dealers handled customer orders following the Chrisitie and Shultz (1994)
debate about price fixing by market makers on the Nasdaq. The SEC instituted new
Order Handling Rules (OHR) that were designed to make the Nasdaq market more
competitive and reduce dealer participation in Nasdaq trades by ensuring the dealers
took public limit orders into account. The Limit Order Display Rule (LODR) requires
dealers to publicly display limit orders they receive from customers, unless an
exception applies. If the limit order is priced better than his or her quote or that adds
size to his or her quote, the market maker must publicly display it. For example,
assume a dealer is currently quoting 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10. If the dealer
receives a limit order to buy 11,000 shares at a bid price of $10.50, the dealer is
required to revise the quote to reflect the higher bid price and larger bid size. This rule
applies to all individual dealer quotes, regardless of their quote position relative to the
market inside.
The introduction of the LODR has important implications for the
interrelationship between bid-ask spreads and market depth at the best quotes.
Assume the dealer is currently quoting 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10 and receives
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a limit order to buy 10,000 shares at a bid price of $10. In this situation, the dealer
does not have to change the quote as the bid price and bid size have not been
improved. If the best bid happens to be at $10.50, the dealer may not wish to update
the quote from 1,000 shares to 2,000 shares (which is optional), due either to the
quote being too far from the inside market or decides it is in his or her interest to let
the limit order replace their market making in this particular security. However, if the
best bid is currently at $10, the dealer is currently quoting at the best bid, possibly
wanting to buy as a result of managing his or her inventory position. In this situation,
the dealer is likely to change the quote to 2,000 shares otherwise he or she may miss
the opportunity to execute their order. Dealers therefore are likely to post larger
depths when their quotes are at the best bid and ask prices. It follows that quoted
spreads and depth are inversely related because of dealers changing their quote sizes
as the move from the non-inside market to the inside market. This leads to the
following hypothesis.

Hypothesis6.2: Quoted depth and bid-ask spreads are inversely related.

6.3

Nasdaq

Created by the NASD in 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (Nasdaq) was set up to enhance the efficiency of the over-thecounter (OTC) markets for stock securities, through the use of a telecommunication
network linking thousands of geographically diverse participants. The Nasdaq was
designed as a competitive dealer market. Within this particular market structure,
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prices are set by dealer quotes, where each individual dealer competes for investor
orders by displaying quotations that represent their buy and sell interest in Nasdaq
securities. Market makers registered to trade in listed Nasdaq securities are required
to do three things. They must display their buying and selling interest by posting a twosided quote in all stocks they choose to make a market in. They must display all quotes
and orders to the Nasdaq and finally they are obligated to honour their quotes.
Companies that choose to list on the Nasdaq must have at least 3 market makers
(excluding ECNs).
In 1997, major changes were made to the way Nasdaq dealers handled
customer orders, following the Chrisitie and Shultz (1994) debate about price fixing by
market makers on the Nasdaq. The SEC instituted new Order Handling Rules (OHR)
that were designed to make the Nasdaq market more competitive and reduce dealer
participation in Nasdaq trades by ensuring the dealers took public limit orders into
account. The new rules required dealers to handle a marketable limit order in one of
three ways: (1) execute the limit order against the dealers inventory; (2) the limit order
must be reflected in the dealers quote; (3) send the limit order to another dealer; (4)
send the order to an Exchange Communication Network (ECN). Another important
change by the SEC was to enable public access to superior prices posted by market
makers in ECNs. An ECN is an electronic trading system separate to the exchange that
allows investors to execute trades through an open limit order book (Fink, Fink and
Weston, 2006). This enabled traders to bypass the placement of orders with dealers
and instead submit orders and trade with each other directly. Prior to 1997, dealers
could provide alternative pricing systems by quoting one set of prices in the public
market and another better price placed on the ECN. The rule change forced dealers to
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publicly display their most competitive quotes, regardless of where it is placed. The
effect of these reforms has been: (1) growth in limit order trades as even the small
retail customers could become temporary market makers and; (2) spurred the
development of ECN’s, whose liquidity is based primarily on limit-order flow
(McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2000).

6.4

Data and Research Design

The data is obtained from a Reuters intraday database managed by SIRCA.7 The sample
contains stocks listed on the Nasdaq-100 index and covers the period November 30,
2008 to April 23, 2009. The data is derived from one-minute intervals and consists of
the best bid and ask prices and volumes at the end of each interval, the interval high
and low prices, and the volume traded during the interval. Consistent with previous
research (including Chung and Zhoa, 2003; Cai et al., 2004; Vo, 2007) the trading day
is partitioned into 30-minute intervals, these one-minute intervals are averaged into
14 separate 30-minute trading intervals, from 09:30 hours to 16:00 hours (i.e. from
the open to the close of trading).
The variables examined include the bid-ask spread, quoted depth, volume and
volatility. Following Chan et al. (1995b), the bid-ask spread is defined as:

PBASt 

7

inside askt  inside bidt
 inside askt  inside bidt 


2
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(1)

where PBASt is the percentage bid-ask spread at time period t, the inside ask is the
lowest ask price at time period t, and the inside bid is the highest bid price at period t.
The midpoint is used to avoid problems associated with bid-ask bounce. Following
Huang and Stoll (1996) and Chung and Zhao (2003), the following filters are applied in
the calculation of the bid-ask spread: (1) bid-ask spread quotes are excluded if the
spread is greater than $5 or less than zero; (2) exclude ask quote at if [(at – at-1)/at-1] is
greater than 10%; (3) exclude bid-quote if [(bt-bt-1)/bt-1] is greater than 10%.
Quoted depth is defined as the average volume of shares available at the best
bid and the best ask at the end of each interval for each stock (Harris, 1994). Volume
is measured as the number of shares traded across each 30-minute interval. Volatility
is measured as the natural logarithm of the difference between the interval high and
interval low for each one-minute interval. To prevent cross-sectional differences
across securities biasing results, all variables are standardized by subtracting the daily
mean and dividing by the daily standard deviation for each stock.
In Section 6.3, it is hypothesised that bid-ask spreads and market depth are
inversely related and that bid-ask spreads (quoted depth) are wide (small) at the open
and tight (large) at the close of trading. To formally test for intraday patterns in bidask spreads, quoted depth, volume and volatility, we regress the variables upon a set
of intraday dummy variables using Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) procedure. The GMM technique is applied in prior research examining
intraday patterns in liquidity, such as Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Abhyankar et al.
(1997), Cai et al. (2004). GMM estimates the coefficients through the use of
orthogonality conditions and provides results that are robust to the presence of
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autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Many of the microstructure studies using the
GMM technique employ the procedure of Newey and West (1987) to adjust for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are
controlled for using the Parzen Kernel (Gallant, 1987). Andrews (1991) shows that the
Bartlett Kernel used by Newey and West (1987) exhibits greater bias and is 100
percent less efficient asymptotically than the Parzen Kernel. The lag truncation period
is calculated using the formula n^(1/5) (Andrews, 1991). For each variable, the
following model is estimated:

n

st (Vi ,t )   0    k Dk   t

(2)

k 1

where st (Vi ,t ) is the standardized variable in interval t for firm i, n is the number of
intervals in the day, Dk a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls
in interval k, otherwise zero. The 30-minute interval 12:30 to 13:00 is excluded from
the regression.

6.3

Empirical Results

Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Harris (1994) document that volume and volatility
are significant determinants of both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth. As illustrated
in Figure 6-1, volume on the Nasdaq follows a U-shaped pattern, being highest at the
open and close of trading, and lowest during the middle of the trading day. Price
volatility is highest at the start of trading, falls consistently to the middle of the trading
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day, and then increases for the remainder of the trading day. Regression results in
Table 6-1 confirm that both volume and volatility in the first and last thirty-minute
intervals of the trading day are higher than during the middle of the day. The intraday
variation in trading volume and volatility is consistent with the results documented by
Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) for the Nasdaq, and is similar to the patterns in
trading volume and volatility for other markets (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992; Chan,
Chung and Johnson, 1995; Ahn and Cheung, 1999).

Standardized Average Volume and Volatility
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Figure 6-1
Standardized Trading Volume and Volatility
This figure depicts the intraday pattern in standardized trading volume and volatility in 5-minute
intervals. The sample extends from November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. Traded volume is measured
as the number of shares traded across each 5-minute interval. Volatility is measured as the natural
logarithm of the difference between the interval high and interval low during each 1-minute interval.
The two variables are then averaged across 78 equal 5-minute intervals.
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Table 6-1
Mean Value of the Standardized Quoted Depth, Bid-Ask Spread, Trading Volume and
Volatility
The GMM technique is used to estimate the following model:
n

st (Vi ,t )   0    k Dk   t
k 1

where

st (Vi ,t ) is the standardized variable occurring in interval t for firm i, n is the number of intervals

in the day,

Dk a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls in interval k, otherwise zero.

The 30 minute interval of 12:30 to 13:00 is excluded.
Time
SPREAD
DEPTH
9:30 - 10:00
1.0261**
-0.4451**
10:00 - 10:30
0.2542**
-0.2494**
10:30 - 11:00
0.1428**
-0.1793**
11:00 - 11:30
0.0865**
-0.1446**
11:30 - 12:00
0.0503**
-0.0946**
12:00 - 12:30
0.0163**
-0.0346**
13:00 - 13:30
0.0221**
-0.0010
13:30 - 14:00
-0.0052
0.0020
14:00 - 14:30
-0.0326**
0.0544**
14:30 - 15:00
-0.0556**
0.1230**
15:00 - 15:30
-0.1370**
0.3138**
15:30 - 16:00
-0.2664**
0.8638**
Intercept
-0.0904**
-0.0141**
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level

VOLUME
1.6567**
0.7967**
0.5042**
0.2286**
0.0582**
0.0341**
-0.0770**
-0.0557**
0.2554**
0.3949**
0.8248**
2.3065**
-0.5329**

VOLATILITY
1.3851**
0.6537**
0.3836**
0.1964**
0.0806**
0.0307**
-0.0326**
-0.0317**
0.1166**
0.1573**
0.2637**
0.4297**
-0.2791**

Figure 6-2 plots the intraday variation of bid-ask spreads during successive 5-minute
intervals. Consistent with the prediction of hypothesis H6,1, bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq
stocks are highest at the open, decline quickly over the first hour of trading, remain
relatively stable until 15:00 hours, and narrow sharply towards the close. The results
of the GMM estimation presented in Table 6-1 confirm this result. The coefficient of
the dummy variable for the 9:30-10:00 time interval is positive and significant at the
1% level, indicating spreads in the first 30-minute interval are higher than during the
middle of the day. The coefficient for the last 30-minute interval is significantly
negative, indicating that spreads are narrower at the close relative to spreads in the
167

middle of the day. The narrowing of spreads on the Nasdaq is consistent with
inventory management where dealers (in the absence of market power) post
competitive prices to attract orders away from competing dealers to offset inventory
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imbalances, thereby lowering the inside spread.

Time of Day

Figure 6-2
Standardized Bid-Ask Spreads and Quoted Depth
This figure depicts the intraday pattern in standardized bid-ask spreads and quoted depth in 5-minute
intervals. The sample extends from November 30, 2008 to April 23, 2009. The bid-ask spread is
measured as the ask quote minus the bid quote divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Quoted depth is
measured as the average of the volume at the best bid and ask quotes. Both variables are calculated at
the end of each 1-minute interval and then averaged across 78 equal 5-minute time-intervals.
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In a study of dealer quotation behavior on the Nasdaq, Chung and Zhao (2004b)
discuss how the institutional features of the Nasdaq lead to a negative correlation
between the dealer’s posted spread and depth. Figure 6-2 reveals the intraday
variation in quoted depth is opposite to the pattern in bid-ask spreads, consistent with
the second hypothesis H6,2. Quoted depth is lowest at the open, increases over the
early hours of trading and remains relatively stable until approximately 15:00 hours,
when quoted depth begins to increase significantly. The results of the GMM regression
in Table 6-1 document a similar pattern. The coefficient for the first 30-minute interval
is significantly negative, while the coefficient for the 15:30-16:00 interval shows
quoted depth reaches its highest level. This pattern in quoted depth at the close of
trading differs sharply to the results of Lee et al. (1993) on the NYSE, who document
significantly lower depth. However, these findings are consistent with Chung and Zhao
(2004b), supporting the view that both the price and quantity of dealer’s quotes are
inter-dependent, and that spreads and depth are negatively correlated. The narrowing
of the bid-ask spread and increase in quoted depth at the close of trading suggests
that inventory management on the part of market makers results in improved liquidity
at the close of trading.

6.4

Additional Tests

As a robustness test of the results presented in Table 6-2, Equation 2 is estimated using
the procedure of Meulbroek (1992). Equation 2 is estimated for each stock in the
sample using the GMM procedure as stated, with the dummy variable for each time
interval being the average coefficient from the individual regressions. To test whether
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each coefficient differs statistically from zero, we calculate a Z-statistic for each
coefficient. The Z-statistic is calculated as:

Z

1
N

N

t
i 1

i

N (0,1),

(3)

where N is the number of stocks in the sample and t i is the t-statistic for stock i. Table
6-2 shows that these results are robust to the estimation technique used, with the
regression coefficients qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table 6-1.
Trading volume and price volatility are highest at the start and end of the trading day.
Bid-ask spreads (quoted depth) are highest at the opening and are lowest (highest) at
the close of the trading day.
To further ensure that the intraday patterns in spreads and depth on the
Nasdaq are not caused by variation in volume and volatility, we directly control for
trading volume and price volatility using the method of Heflin et al. (2007). Under this
approach, firm i’s bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, trading volume and volatility are
expressed as percent deviations from firm i’s mean level for that variable computed
using the 12:30 to 13:00 interval. The GMM regression is estimated separately for
each time interval, with the percent deviations of volume and volatility used as
‘instruments’.
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Table 6-2
Regression Estimates in Variation in Standardized Bid-Ask Spread, Quoted
Depth, Trading Volume and Volatility
The GMM technique is used to estimate the following model:
n

st (Vi ,t )   0    k Dk   t
k 1

where

st (Vi ,t ) is the standardized variable occurring in interval t for firm i, n is the number of

intervals in the day,

Dk a time-of-day dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t falls in interval k,

otherwise zero. The 30 minute interval of 12.30 to 1.00 is excluded. The coefficients are the average
of the coefficients from the regression of each individual stock. Positive Coefficient (%) is the
percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive coefficient. The Z-statistic to test whether the
mean coefficient for each dummy variable differs from zero is given by the formula

Z

1
N

N

t
i 1

i

N (0,1), where N is the number of stocks in the sample and t i is the t-statistic

for stock i.
Time
9:30 - 10:00
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
10:00 - 10:30
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
10:30 - 11:00
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
11:00 - 11:30
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
11:30 - 12:00
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
12:00 - 12:30
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
13:00 - 13:30
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
13:30 -14:00
Positive Coefficient (%)
Z-statistics
p-value
14:00 - 14:30

SPREAD
1.0267
93.75
181.855
0.0000
0.2514
83.33
55.03
0.0000
0.1410
80.21
32.60
0.0000
0.0859
80.21
21.20
0.0000
0.0498
83.33
13.00
0.0000
0.0164
67.71
4.51
0.000
0.0221
80.21
6.25
0.0000
-0.0045
48.96
0.66
0.5090
-0.0318
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DEPTH
-0.4533
5.21
-88.925
0.0000
-0.2554
6.25
-49.13
0.0000
-0.1822
7.29
-35.95
0.0000
-0.1505
6.25
-28.90
0.0000
-0.1000
8.33
-18.99
0.0000
-0.0392
22.92
-8.18
0.000
-0.0064
47.92
-0.25
0.8034
-0.0010
51.04
-0.36
0.7117
0.0510

VOLUME
1.7291
100
157.193
0.0000
0.8704
100
96.72
0.0000
0.5773
100
67.94
0.0000
0.3047
100
38.31
0.0000
0.1361
90.72
17.42
0.0000
0.1091
94.85
14.90
0.000
0.0245
61.86
3.31
0.0008
0.0783
89.69
10.30
0.0000
0.3314

VOLATILITY
1.4195
100
282.444
0.0000
0.6844
100
154.43
0.0000
0.4142
100
105.59
0.0000
0.2296
100
63.19
0.0000
0.1131
100
32.21
0.0000
0.0628
98.97
19.85
0.000
0.0018
52.58
0.50
0.6202
0.0320
86.60
9.96
0.0000
0.1482

Positive Coefficient (%)
22.92
Z-statistics
7.60
p-value
0.0000
14:30 - 15:00
-0.0554
Positive Coefficient (%)
18.75
Z-statistics
13.96
p-value
0.0000
15:00 - 15:30
-0.1348
Positive Coefficient (%)
8.33
Z-statistics
35.40
p-value
0.0000
15:30 - 16:00
-0.2628
Positive Coefficient (%)
5.21
Z-statistics
67.36
p-value
0.0000
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level

71.88
8.94
0.0000
0.1175
87.5
22.25
0.0000
0.3109
92.71
54.91
0.0000
0.8595
100
125.46
0.0000

100.00
39.71
0.0000
0.4734
100
57.00
0.0000
0.9080
100
102.72
0.0000
2.3863
100
228.42
0.0000

98.97
36.82
0.0000
0.1892
100
48.84
0.0000
0.2973
100
78.62
0.0000
0.4637
100
112.16
0.0000

For each half hour interval, the following equation is estimated:
dst (Vi ,t )  0  1DVOLATILITYi ,t  2 DVOLUMEi,t  ei,t

(4)

where dst (Vi ,t ) , DVOLATILITYi ,t and DVOLUMEi ,t are per cent deviations of

st (Vi ,t ) (spread and depth), VOLATILITYi ,t , VOLUMEi ,t for interval t from firm i’s
mean of each of these variables computed from the 12:30-13:00 interval.
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Table 6-3
Regression Estimates of Variations in the Standardized Bid-Ask Spread
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model:

dst (Vi ,t )  0  1DVOLATILITYi ,t  2 DVOLUMEi,t  ei,t

where

dst (Vi ,t ) , DVOLATILITYi ,t and DVOLUMEi ,t are per cent deviations of st (Vi ,t ) ,

VOLATILITYi ,t , VOLUMEi ,t for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each 30-minute trading interval.
Time
a0
t-statistic
9:30 - 10:00
0.4898
27.23**
10:00 - 10:30
0.1577
15.84**
10:30 - 11:00
0.1108
19.78**
11:00 - 11:30
0.0709
15.97**
11:30 - 12:00
0.0555
11.92**
12:00 - 12:30
0.0244
10.63**
13:00 - 13:30
0.0129
5.26**
13:30 -14:00
0.0014
0.56
14:00 - 14:30
-0.0174
-5.72**
14:30 - 15:00
-0.0258
-8.05**
15:00 - 15:30
-0.0649
9.90**
15:30 - 16:00
-0.0881
-19.84**
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level

a1
-0.0353
-0.0758
-0.0775
-0.0896
-0.0655
-0.0775
-0.0753
-0.0815
-0.0351
-0.0438
-0.0427
-0.0170

t-statistic
-7.91**
-5.7**
-15.68**
-15.27**
-4.64**
-8.82**
-6.37**
-13.8**
-3.82**
-5.22**
-12.76**
-12.03**

a2
0.0817
0.0822
0.0829
0.1001
0.0608
0.0819
0.1152
0.0973
0.0408
0.0581
0.0627
0.0257

t-statistic
10.85**
10.75**
11.47**
10.12**
2.47**
5.19**
7.89**
8.88**
2.43*
3.98**
-18.84**
5.64**

The GMM regression results are presented in Tables 6-3 and 6-4, with the coefficients
on the control variables consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Harris
(1994). An increase in the deviation of trading volume and price volatility from their
midday mean levels are negatively related to bid-ask spreads and positively related to
quoted depth. Controlling for these variables, the trend in bid-ask spreads and quoted
depth are qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-4
Regression Estimates of Variations in Standardized Quoted Depth
The GMM is used to estimate the following model:

dst (Vi ,t )  0  1DVOLATILITYi ,t  2 DVOLUMEi,t  ei,t

where

dst (Vi ,t ) , DVOLATILITYi ,t and DVOLUMEi ,t are per cent deviations of st (Vi ,t ) (depth),

VOLATILITYi ,t , VOLUMEi ,t for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each 30-minute trading interval.
Time
a0
t-statistic
9:30 - 10:00
-0.2106
-22.23**
10:00 - 10:30
-0.0899
-10.07**
10:30 - 11:00
-0.0497
-6.56**
11:00 - 11:30
-0.0331
-5.19**
11:30 - 12:00
-0.0050
-0.58
12:00 - 12:30
0.0224
4.84**
13:00 - 13:30
0.0498
13.35**
13:30 -14:00
0.0687
14.07**
14:00 - 14:30
0.1272
20.24**
14:30 - 15:00
0.1917
23.85**
15:00 - 15:30
0.3548
31.86**
15:30 - 16:00
0.7655
34.02**
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level

a1
0.0148
0.0716
0.1096
0.1537
0.1029
0.1278
0.1246
0.1680
0.0537
0.0689
0.1194
0.0988

t-statistic
5.8**
7.43**
14.28**
13.2**
3.91**
7.48**
9.11**
11.11**
3.16**
2.92**
11.19**
9.06**

a2
-0.0286
-0.0830
-0.1252
-0.1608
-0.0965
-0.1456
-0.1798
-0.2265
-0.0713
-0.1020
-0.2342
-0.1739

t-statistic
-9.96**
-10.15**
-12.3**
-11.62**
-2.07*
-5.04**
-9.90**
-9.00**
-2.51*
-2.58**
-9.00**
-3.88**

Re-estimating equation (4) using the procedure of Meulbroek (1992), as shown in
Tables 6-5 and 6-6 reveal no qualitative difference in the results. Traded volume and
volatility cannot explain differences in the variation in spreads and depth between the
competitive dealer market and other market structures.
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Table 6-5
Regression Estimates of Variations in the Standardized Bid-Ask Spread
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model:

dst (Vi ,t )  0  1DVOLATILITYi ,t  2 DVOLUMEi,t  ei,t
where

dst (Vi ,t ) , DVOLATILITYi ,t and DVOLUMEi ,t are per cent deviations of st (Vi ,t ) (spread),

VOLATILITYi ,t , VOLUMEi ,t for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The model is estimated separately for each stock for each 30-minute trading interval.
The coefficients are an average of the coefficients from the regression of each individual stock. Positive
Coefficient (%) is the percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive coefficient. The Z-statistic to test
whether the mean coefficient for each time interval differs from zero is given by the formula

Z

1
N

N

t
i 1

i

N (0,1), where N is the number of stocks in the sample and t i is the t-statistic for stock

i.
Time
9:30 - 10:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
10:00 - 10:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
10:30 - 11:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
11:00 - 11:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
11:30 - 12:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
12:00 - 12:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
13:00 - 13:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
13:30 -14:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
14:00 - 14:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics

a0

a1
0.0689
95.79
55.71
0.0000
0.1562
91.58
27.52
0.0000
0.1044
85.26
21.50
0.0000
0.0678
83.16
17.92
0.0000
0.0486
96.84
15.76
0.0000
0.0231
81.05
10.30
0.0000
0.0142
72.63
6.32
0.0000
0.0009
49.47
0.1142
0.9091
-0.0244
25.26
-11.04
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-0.0402
4.21
-19.41
0.0000
-0.0885
4.21
-25.82
0.0000
-0.0815
14.74
-20.45
0.0000
-0.0939
16.84
-19.83
0.0000
-0.0981
10.53
-20.58
0.0000
-0.0914
11.58
-22.97
0.0000
-0.0969
11.58
-19.36
0.0000
-0.0949
11.58
-24.8195
0.0000
-0.0713
17.90
-21.89

a2
0.5292
86.32
17.81
0.0000
0.0902
84.21
23.52
0.0000
0.0962
88.42
19.58
0.0000
0.1115
88.42
18.36
0.0000
0.1144
81.05
19.73
0.0000
0.1078
83.16
20.54
0.0000
0.1266
84.21
19.18
0.0000
0.1187
87.37
21.1243
0.0000
0.1067
84.21
31.21

p-value
14:30 - 15:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
15:00 - 15:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
15:30 - 16:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value

0.0000
-0.0314
22.11
-13.49
0.0000
-0.0727
5.26
-29.16
0.0000
-0.1005
23.16
-27.98
0.0000
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0.0000
-0.0684
17.90
-24.59
0.0000
-0.0507
16.84
-24.01
0.0000
-0.0236
11.58
-21.88
0.0000

0.0000
0.1044
84.21
30.12
0.0000
0.0861
83.16
26.62
0.0000
0.0580
86.32
22.95
0.0000

Table 6-6
Regression Estimates of Variations in Standardized Quoted Depth
The GMM method is used to estimate the following model:

dst (Vi ,t )  0  1DVOLATILITYi,t  2 DVOLUMEi,t  ei,t

where

dst (Vi ,t ) , DVOLATILITYi ,t and DVOLUMEi ,t are per cent deviations of st (Vi ,t ) (depth),

VOLATILITYi ,t , VOLUMEi ,t for interval t from firm i’s mean of each of these variables computed from
the 12:30-1:00 interval. The coefficients are an average of the coefficients from the regression of each
individual stock. Positive Coefficient (%) is the percentage of stocks in the regression with a positive
coefficient. The Z-statistic to test whether the mean coefficient for each time interval differs from zero is
given by the formula

Z

1
N

N

t
i 1

i

N (0,1), where N is the number of stocks in the sample and t i is

the t-statistic for stock i.
Time
9:30 - 10:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
10:00 - 10:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
10:30 - 11:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
11:00 - 11:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
11:30 - 12:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
12:00 - 12:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
13:00 - 13:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
13:30 -14:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
14:00 - 14:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
14:30 - 15:00

a0

a1
-0.1680
15.79
-40.05
0.0000
-0.0575
29.47
-13.08
0.0000
-0.0192
42.11
-6.14
0.0000
-0.0086
40.00
-5.16
0.0000
0.0204
56.84
1.24
0.2166
0.0285
73.68
6.06
0.0000
0.0500
72.63
14.17
0.0000
0.072
91.58
16.27
0.0000
0.1313
90.53
26.09
0.0000
-0.2721
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a2
0.0184
88.42
18.00
0.0000
0.1008
96.84
23.44
0.0000
0.1238
98.95
23.94
0.0000
0.1688
97.90
23.20
0.0000
0.1909
96.84
22.75
0.0000
0.1707
90.53
19.18
0.0000
0.1680
11.58
19.12
0.0000
0.198
94.74
24.36
0.0000
0.1514
95.79
20.53
0.0000
0.1572

-0.0556
4.21
-25.68
0.0000
-0.1421
4.21
-31.55
0.0000
-0.1912
2.11
-33.50
0.0000
-0.2414
1.05
-31.15
0.0000
-0.2859
3.16
-30.75
0.0000
-0.2648
2.11
-25.75
0.0000
-0.2712
84.21
-25.01
0.0000
-0.332
2.11
-30.20
0.0000
-0.2492
2.11
-30.85
0.0000
0.1924

Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
15:00 - 15:30
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value
15:30 - 16:00
Positive Coefficient %
Z-statistics
p-value

6.5

98.95
32.08
0.0000
0.3553
1.05
44.81
0.000
0.8339
100
58.14
0.0000

95.79
23.72
0.0000
0.1536
97.90
27.67
0.000
0.1294
96.84
26.42
0.0000

2.11
-34.90
0.0000
-0.3533
100
-36.21
0.000
-0.4500
2.11
-35.61
0.0000

Summary

This chapter analyses the behavior of quoted depth in addition to the bid-ask spread
on the Nasdaq, a competitive dealer market. Results show that the intraday pattern
in quoted depth is negatively associated with the bid-ask spread. Nasdaq stocks
experience wide spreads at the open and narrow spreads at the close, while depth is
low at the open and high at the close. The general pattern in quoted depth on the
Nasdaq differs to that observed on the NYSE, where depth declines at the close of
trading.
The negative correlation between spreads and depth for Nasdaq stocks
supports the contention of Chung and Zhao (2004b) that both the price and quantity
of dealer quotes are inter-dependent, with both used by dealers to manage their
inventory. As patterns in the determinants of spreads and depth, namely trading
volume and volatility, are similar across dealer, specialist and order-driven markets, it
is concluded that the higher depth at the end of the trading day results from inventory
management by Nasdaq dealers and that this results in improved liquidity.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions

This dissertation examines order submission strategies across different trading
platforms. Liquidity and transaction costs depend upon both the characteristics of
individual securities and the structure of the market and subsequent order submission
strategies of market participants. The market structure of an exchange is
multidimensional, consisting of various factors affecting the trading behaviour of
market participants. As market design affects trading strategies and hence liquidity,
exchanges are continually adjusting their trading platforms in order to maximise
liquidity and cater to market participants. It is therefore important for exchanges,
regulators, market participants and academics to understand how market design
affects investors order submission strategies in order to further understanding of what
constitutes optimal market structure.
This dissertation focusing on two areas, namely order submission strategies in
(1) limit order markets where market makers are not present and (2) markets that
employ designated market makers. Limit order markets depend on endogenous
liquidity creation based on investors agreeing to trade with each other. It examines a
number of issues yet to be investigated in the literature in relation to order submission
strategies across limit order markets and markets with designated market makers.
This includes the impact of a tick increase on market quality in a futures market
setting, the relation between algorithmic trading volume and future market quality
the execution costs of option strategies and their determinants and, intraday patterns
in quoted depth on the Nasdaq, a competitive dealer market.
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7.1

Summary of Findings

Chapter 3 examines the impact of a tick size increase on market quality in a
futures market setting. Exchanges worldwide have lowered the minimum price
increment with the aim of improving liquidity and lowering transaction costs. A
number of studies analyse the impact of tick size reductions on market quality, with
results showing that the tick size reduction is associated with lower bid-ask spreads
and quoted depth. This literature provides conflicting evidence on whether the change
is indicative of an overall improvement or reduction in liquidity. In 2009, the Sydney
Futures Exchange (SFE) and the Eurex increased the minimum tick size for the 3-Year
Treasury Bond Futures (“3Y T-bond”) and the 5-Year Euro Bobl Futures (“5Y Bob1”) to
facilitate increased liquidity during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This natural
experiment provides an opportunity to re-examine this issue.
Consistent with prior studies, results show that an increase in the tick size is
associated with an improvement in depth at the best quotes and depth throughout
the limit order-book for both contracts. The evidence also suggests that the increase
in the tick size resulted in an increase in the bid-ask spread. The price impact analysis,
used as a comprehensive measure of the change in liquidity after the increase in
minimum tick, suggests that the tick size resulted in an increase in execution costs for
the event contracts. These results indicate that the increase in the bid-ask spread
more than offset the increase in quoted depth.
Chapter 4 examines the relation between algorithmic trading volume and
future market quality. Although prior literature examines the effect of algorithmic
trading on market quality, few papers assess the impact of algorithmic trading over
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different market conditions. Using a proprietary data set provided by the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX), the results over the whole sample provide no evidence that
market quality is associated with algorithmic trading volume. This conclusion changes
however, when the sample is split into intraday intervals of increasing and decreasing
stock returns. Results show that algorithmic trading volume is significantly associated
with future spreads, depth and volatility when prices are falling, and has no relation
when prices are rising. This may imply that during price declines, ATs increase their
demand for liquidity. Finally, results reveal that algorithmic trading’s negative
association with market quality can be explained by ATs engaging in positive feedback
trading, where they systematically decrease their purchases of stocks during periods
of falling prices, while increasing their level of selling.
Chapter 5 examines the execution costs of option strategies and outright
options on the Australian Options Market. This essay builds on prior studies examining
transaction costs in the options market, which do not distinguish between outright
options and options that constitute strategies. This is a significant omission, as option
strategies may have higher transaction costs given their greater complexity. This
chapter adds to the literature by being the first study to measure the execution costs
of option strategies relative to outright options and investigates if any differences in
the execution costs of strategy-linked options and outright options are attributable to
differences in market making costs.
The analysis reveals three key findings. First, execution costs for strategylinked options are greater relative to outright options. Second, the execution costs of
option strategies are dependent upon the complexity of option strategies, with tailormade strategy-linked options being more costly to trade than standard strategy-linked
181

options. These findings are supported by a range of empirical measures. Strategylinked options display wider effective spreads across put and call options and across a
number of different option characteristics. Multivariate analysis shows that after
directly controlling for a number of liquidity determinants, tailor-made strategy-linked
trades incur higher execution costs than outright options trades. The third key finding
is that the greater execution costs of option strategies are caused by the higher
inventory-holding costs of the market maker and not higher adverse selection costs.
Results indicate that the difference in execution costs between tailor-made strategylinked options and outright options is driven by the initial costs in delta hedging the
option position.
Chapter 6 examines the intraday pattern in quoted depth on the Nasdaq, a
competitive dealer market. The empirical evidence from prior literature suggests that
market design plays an important role in the observed pattern in bid-ask spreads and
quoted depth over the course of the trading day. The literature examining markets
with designated market makers shows that bid-ask spreads tighten near the close of
trading, as market makers improve their prices to attract order flow from other
liquidity suppliers in order to manage their inventory levels. Using similar arguments,
it is hypothesised that quoted depth increases near the close of trading.
Consistent with prior studies on competitive dealer markets, results show bidask spreads are widest at the open of trading and tightest near the close of trading.
Furthermore, quoted depth is shown to be inversely related to bid-ask spreads,
increasing over the trading day and increasing most significantly near the close of
trading. Results show that the pattern in quoted depth is a result of the market
structure of the Nasdaq and not a result of patterns in the determinants of spreads
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and depth. Controlling for two important determinants of bid-ask spreads and quoted
depth, trading volume and price volatility, results show that the patterns in quote
depth and bid-ask spreads are unaffected. The results support the hypothesis that the
price and quantity quotes of dealers are interdependent and that dealers use both
spreads and depth to manage their inventory near the close of trading.

7.2

Contributions to the Literature, Limitations and Areas for Future Research

The findings from this dissertation provide a number of insights into the factors
affecting liquidity in limit order markets and markets with designated market makers
and their impact on market quality.
The results in Chapter 3 suggest that increasing the tick size encourages more
limit orders to be posted throughout the limit order book. Despite this, it still leads to
a higher execution costs, as futures markets already have sufficient depth to meet
traded volume (Alampieski and Lepone, 2009). This confirms the results of other
studies that show a reduction in tick size primarily benefits small trades and liquid
securities (Bollen and Whaley, 1998). One avenue to explore is whether there are
other benefits to a tick size increase is to examine its impact on the resiliency of the
order book, which is a key aspect of liquidity (Kyle, 1985). Resiliency is a temporal
dimension of liquidity and reflects the speed at which the limit order book is
replenished after being subject to a liquidity shock, such as a market order. The
increase in the tick size may have led to an improvement in the resiliency of the limit
order book, resulting in an improvement in overall market liquidity.
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The results in Chapter 4 indicate algorithmic trading destablises markets during
all price declines, rather than during extreme market movements (Kirilenko et al,
2011). Analysis suggests that it results from algorithmic traders withdrawing liquidity
from the market, in line with studies examining the behaviour of algorithmic traders
(ASIC, 2012). An issue of concern however is the accuracy of classifying trades as
algorithmic trades. The algorithmic trading measure will encompass both liquidity
supply likely comes both from high frequency traders that are making markets
algorithmically and from buy-side institutions that are submitting limit orders as part
of “slice and dice” algorithms. As the concern with algorithmic trading rests with the
potential behavior of high frequency traders, being able to specifically identify high
frequency traders in the data would provide a more robust analysis of the impact of
HFTs on market quality during price declines. A further issue is the use of lagged
algorithmic trading as an instrumental variable when assessing the impact of
algorithmic trading on market quality. This may not overcome all endogeneity issues
however if the liquidity variables are serially correlated. A more robust approach is to
identify a structural change that resulted in higher algorithmic trading for a sample of
stocks on an exchange. This natural experiment can be used to provide more robust
causal estimates of the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality during price
declines.
Chapter 5 provide the first empirical evidence measuring the transaction costs
of option strategies and its determinants. It indicates that market makers do not adjust
bid-ask spreads in response to adverse selection costs. Further evidence is needed to
validate and extend these findings. Two approaches could be used. Partitioning option
strategy trades according to institutional and retails investors could be used to test
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whether certain option strategy trades are informative and whether these trades are
driving the higher observed transaction costs, under the assumption that institutional
investors are proxies for informed traders. An alternative is to examine whether there
are certain types of strategy trades that are predictive of future returns and assess
whether market makers are likely to adjust the bid-ask spread in response to these
strategy trades.
Chapter 6 shows that market makers narrow bid-ask spreads and increase
quoted depth in response to inventory imbalances, in order to end the day ‘flat’. This
indicates that market makers improve liquidity at the end of the trading day. As a
further test of whether market makers adjust for inventory imbalances, the behaviour
of market makers can be compared for liquid and illiquid stocks. Under the inventorybased model, the decrease (increase) in spreads (depth) should be greater for illiquid
stocks, as it is more difficult to unwind inventory positions in illiquid securities.
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